Given its strategic position overlooking vital maritime routes and its direct connection to Red Sea security, the Horn of Africa represents one of the most influential geopolitical arenas affecting Egypt’s national security.
The region’s importance has grown amid rapid political shifts within its states, rising regional pressures, and intensifying international competition to establish military bases that bolster strategic influence.
Against this backdrop, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi received his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on February 8. The two leaders affirmed the continuation of Egypt’s participation in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and stressed the need to intensify joint coordination to confront regional challenges. They also emphasized that responsibility for securing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden rests exclusively with the states bordering them.
Reinforcing this approach, Egypt’s former defense minister, Abdel Mageed Saqr, one day before his successor was appointed, attended a formation of Egyptian forces participating in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, in the presence of the Somali president. He announced the forces’ readiness to carry out their duties with efficiency and professionalism under all conditions.
Rapid Developments
Cairo is increasingly concerned by the political fragility, internal conflicts, and intense regional and international competition unfolding across the Horn of Africa, given their direct repercussions for the security of the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal.
Ambassador Mohamed Hegazy, a former assistant foreign minister, told Alhurra that the rapid developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea directly affect the security and stability architecture of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean – particularly Egypt’s national security. He warned that “any imbalance in this sensitive geography opens the door to the expansion of armed groups, a rise in piracy, and growing militarization of maritime corridors, threatening freedom of navigation and undermining global economic stability.”
According to African affairs expert Rami Zahdi, Cairo’s concern over the Red Sea reflects its broader strategic vision. He told Alhurra that “any disruption to this maritime artery directly impacts the Suez Canal, the Egyptian economy, and regional balances,” explaining Egypt’s rejection of any military presence by non-littoral states along the Red Sea.
The Red Sea file also featured prominently in the recent meeting in Cairo between President el-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both leaders stressed the importance of securing the Red Sea and condemned attempts to impose a military presence along its shores in violation of international law and recognized maritime norms.
During his visit to Ethiopia yesterday, Erdogan also called for preventing the Horn of Africa from becoming an arena for conflict among foreign powers, urging regional states to develop solutions to their own problems.
Squabbles in Addis Ababa
On the sidelines of the 39th African Union summit in Addis Ababa, a notable disagreement emerged between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the future of the Red Sea.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed linked stability in the Horn of Africa to guaranteeing his country access to a “maritime outlet,” arguing that “a country of more than 130 million people cannot achieve sustainable growth without diversifying its sea outlets.” He stressed that securing Ethiopia’s access to the sea should take place through “peaceful cooperation.”
In response, Cairo moved quickly to reaffirm its traditional position, asserting that governance of the Red Sea lies exclusively with its littoral states. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty explained, during meetings with African officials on the sidelines of the summit, that Egypt categorically rejects any attempts by non-coastal actors to impose themselves as partners in managing this vital maritime corridor.
Ambassador Hegazy noted that Cairo believes security of this critical waterway must first and foremost be the responsibility of the states bordering it, through regional cooperation mechanisms based on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. “This position is not about exclusion,” he said, “but about preventing the internationalization of conflicts and ensuring the region does not become an arena for settling scores among major powers.”
A Trilateral Axis
In October 2025, President el-Sisi received Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to discuss developments in the Horn of Africa, underscoring the importance of intensifying coordination between Egypt and Eritrea, alongside enhancing cooperation with Arab and African states bordering the Red Sea.
That meeting built on understandings reached in late 2024 in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, when the leaders of Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea met and launched joint coordination aimed at establishing a trilateral axis to protect the three countries’ strategic security, including securing the Red Sea as a cornerstone of regional stability.
In the same context, a phone call between the foreign ministers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia addressed developments related to Red Sea security. Both ministers emphasized the importance of coordination among littoral states to preserve the security and stability of this vital maritime corridor and ensure freedom of navigation and international trade.
Zahdi, however, argues that there is so far no indication of a formal trilateral military alliance among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Horn of Africa. He says the situation is more complex than a simple “alliance or no alliance” framework. “For Saudi Arabia,” he explained, “there is a clear convergence with Egypt in visions regarding Red Sea security and the necessity of keeping its management in the hands of its coastal states. Coordination here is closer to a functional partnership based on shared present and future interests.”
Hegazy added that Egyptian coordination with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey reflects a shared understanding that protecting the security of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa requires collective approaches and sustained political and security coordination. He pointed to ongoing efforts to revive and launch the Red Sea Cooperation and Stability Forum for littoral states, headquartered in Riyadh.
Between calls by some countries to secure a maritime foothold and Cairo’s insistence on restricting Red Sea governance to its coastal states, the issue remains open to multiple scenarios amid a highly fluid regional environment marked by intense competition for influence.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
