In the Gulf, an unprecedented U.S. military buildup is being met by Iranian threats to strike any military base from which attacks against Iran might be launched.
Caught between the two are the Gulf states, striving to safeguard their security. One of the first “preventive steps” they have taken was to announce that they will not allow their territories to be used to launch any military operations against Iran.
At the same time, the Gulf states maintain defense agreements and close military cooperation with the United States—an arrangement that could prove decisive if a war were to directly threaten their security.
As is well known, the security relationship between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is not based on a binding collective defense treaty. Instead, it rests on an overlapping network of bilateral agreements that vary in their legal formulations and the scope of their political commitments, without a collective defense framework encompassing the GCC as a single bloc.
This reality opens the door to difficult questions: Does Washington have a clear mandate to intercept missiles that might target Gulf cities if Americans are not under direct threat? And how does it reconcile host countries’ refusal to allow their bases to be used for offensive operations with U.S. commitments to protect vital infrastructure in the Gulf—especially if such protection conflicts with safeguarding American assets and forces in the region?
The U.S. Military Presence
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 marked a decisive turning point in the nature of the U.S. military presence in the region. In September 1991, the United States and Kuwait signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement that included arrangements for the stationing of forces and the prepositioning of military equipment.
Bahrain, for its part, hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which was reactivated in 1995 and is responsible for overseeing naval operations in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea.
As for Qatar, the United States pledged to guarantee its security—including taking retaliatory military action—under an executive order issued by President Donald Trump in October 2025. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia also signed a strategic defense agreement with the United States during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington last November, reinforcing a partnership between the two countries that spans some 80 years.
The United Arab Emirates, in turn, is linked to Washington by a defense cooperation agreement that entered into force in 2019.
At the level of legal designations, the United States has granted some Gulf states the status of Major Non-NATO Ally, a classification that provides benefits in defense cooperation and technology transfer without creating an automatic defense obligation. Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have received this designation.
Limits of U.S. Action
Kuwaiti strategic analyst Dr. Dhafer Al-Ajmi told Alhurra that Washington is likely to act defensively if the Gulf states are subjected to a direct attack, particularly to protect its forces and strategic interests. However, he noted that the final decision remains political and subject to the discretion of the U.S. administration. “The bilateral agreements in the Gulf do not rise to the level of an automatic commitment similar to Article Five of NATO,” he explained. “They emphasize cooperation, consultation, and defensive support, but do not mandate direct military intervention.”
Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said that “given the close relationships between the Trump administration and both Riyadh and Doha, one can expect that any Iranian attack on these countries would be met with a strong response, regardless of the nature of the target.”
Military affairs specialist Mohammed Al-Qubayban pointed to the 2015 Camp David Summit statement, in which the United States expressed its readiness to work jointly with GCC states to deter and confront any external threat that violates the United Nations Charter or undermines the territorial integrity of any GCC member state.
U.S. Bases
GCC countries host the bulk of the U.S. military deployment in the region, within a network that includes roughly eight permanent bases. The number of U.S. troops stationed in the Gulf is estimated at tens of thousands.
These bases provide advanced operational capabilities, including support for air, naval, and logistical operations, as well as air defense systems and rapid-deployment readiness.
This U.S. military presence is governed by bilateral agreements with each host country, in the absence of a binding collective defense treaty.
Al-Ajmi believes that if the Gulf states were struck by Iran as a result of the U.S. military presence, Washington would face significant political and strategic responsibility, particularly with regard to protecting its forces and installations.
Regarding the Gulf states’ refusal to allow military bases to be used in any future war against Iran, Al-Ajmi explained that, both legally and politically, the use of bases depends on the consent of the host country. “Overriding this refusal could lead to a serious sovereignty crisis and undermine the alliance,” he said.
Al-Qubayban added that “the United States would not use its military bases in the Gulf unless one of the GCC states itself came under attack.”
Amid all this, the Gulf states’ own defensive capabilities remain a key factor in protecting their security.
In this context, Amin Tarzi, professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Marine Corps War College, told Alhurra that “if Iran were to target military or civilian assets in the Gulf, the countries of the region possess considerable defensive systems and their own response options, in addition to economic tools that could be employed as part of a response.”
In sum, U.S. agreements with the Gulf states do not amount to an automatic defense commitment, but they do leave the door open for U.S. action to defend them if the need arises.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
