For nearly half a century, Iran’s ruling system has formed an ideological axis that transcended geography, expanding into a doctrinal sphere that stretched across much of the Islamic world.
Now, with the fall of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the confrontation, a central question comes to the fore: are we witnessing a complete collapse of Iran’s political order—and of its influence on armed politics and violence-laden ideology?
At the dawn of the Iranian Revolution, which toppled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the declared ambition was to establish a political system that reflected the will of the people.
But that dream was quickly shattered.
The Islamic Republic was proclaimed, along with the appointment of a supreme leader vested with near-absolute powers: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
The system of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) took root, making Shiite religious authority the foundation of political power.
Iranian ideology soon extended beyond the country’s borders in what later became known as the “export of the revolution.”
Mohammad Sadeq Ismail, director of the Arab Center for Strategic Studies, believes the Iranian Revolution marked a pivotal turning point in thought and politics across the region.
He adds that what became known as the “export of the revolution” was not merely a political slogan, but an intellectual framework adopted by groups and non-state actors, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as armed forces and organizations in Iraq and Yemen.
Ismail also points to the role of the city of Qom as a hub for religious authorities and a source of doctrinal guidance, which turned Iran into a central reference point for Shiite thought and offered the region a model that fused religion and politics.
But today, the revolutionary system itself is hanging in the balance. Does this mean the project of exporting the revolution has come to an end?
Who Fills the Void in the Arab World?
Writer Tharwat Al-Kharbawy told Alhurra that the fall—or even the weakening—of Iran’s ruling system would have a dual impact on Arab thought and culture.
Al-Kharbawy, a member of Egypt’s Senate, said that the retreat of a transnational ideology could push Islamist elites toward “statism,” meaning a renewed focus on the nation-state rather than supranational projects. At the same time, the fracturing of the Iranian model could give momentum to secular and liberal currents in the Arab world, reinforcing the argument that mixing religion and politics leads to destructive conflicts.
However, Al-Kharbawy warns of the potential dangers created by a power vacuum.
He says hardline Sunni movements may attempt to fill the void in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—an outcome he considers the region’s greatest challenge, especially as Arab states such as Egypt and the Gulf countries pursue massive modernization projects. These states, he argues, will seek to promote moderation as the only viable path to stability and to attract investment.
Researcher on Islamist movements Maher Farghaly points to a similar scenario.
He says that any major transformation in Iran—including the possible collapse of the regime—could reshape regional balances. He draws a connection between the repercussions of Khomeini’s 1979 revolution and the Juhayman movement that emerged the same year, when a Sunni jihadist group seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca.
Farghaly adds that the regional climate at the time contributed to the rise of Salafi-jihadist currents in Egypt, which sought to replicate radical models of change within the local context—leaving social and intellectual effects that are still felt today.
Nevertheless, Farghaly stresses that Sunni extremism is a historically recurring phenomenon, and that radical ideological structures often lie dormant, ready to be reactivated when suitable social and political conditions arise.
Whether Shiite or Sunni, extremism, says Mohammad Sadeq Ismail, director of the Arab Center for Strategic Studies, cannot be uprooted quickly. Changing deeply entrenched ideas requires a long time that goes beyond the impact of wars. He cites the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which returned to power after two decades—demonstrating that intellectual transformations are deeper and more enduring than the shifts of politics.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
