The skies over the Gulf have come to resemble a battlefield. Iranian missiles and drones pierce the airspace over one country after another, while air-defense systems scramble to intercept them.
On the ground, air-raid sirens sound urgently, and the fall of some of these missiles or drones causes human and material damage.
While these developments have formed part of the scene across most Gulf countries and cities—Kuwait, Doha, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Manama—since the launch of the U.S.–Israeli strike against Iran, a major development was recorded in recent hours: on Monday, a Saudi Aramco facility in Ras Tanura was hit by a drone strike.
In the wake of these developments, the Gulf Ministerial Council convened an extraordinary meeting via videoconference. In its concluding statement, the council affirmed that the Iranian attacks constitute an unjustified aggression and a blatant violation of the sovereignty of the GCC states. It stressed that the council would take all necessary measures to protect its security and stability and to safeguard its territory, citizens, and residents, including the option of responding.
The statement also emphasized that the security of GCC states is indivisible, and that any attack on one member state is considered an attack on all others, pursuant to the Joint Defense Agreement and the GCC Charter. It further reaffirmed the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
On the diplomatic front, Gulf states moved swiftly to summon Iranian ambassadors and hand them official notes of protest.
Saudi Arabia condemned the attacks on its territory and hinted at the possibility of retaliation, affirming that it is taking all necessary measures to protect its security. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar likewise adopted measures to safeguard their security, while underscoring their strong protests against what they described as violations of their sovereignty.
Gulf States’ Options
All these developments place the countries of the region before a delicate equation in which military calculations intersect with considerations of political and economic deterrence—up to and including the option of a potential response.
Academic and political researcher Abdullah Baaboud argues that “the strongest card held by the Gulf states does not lie in an individual response, but in building a graduated and conditional package of pressures managed collectively, one that constrains Tehran’s room for political and military maneuver.”
He adds: “Recent GCC statements referring to the guaranteed right to respond under Article 51 of the UN Charter constitute a legal and political foundation that can be built upon to entrench collective deterrence and broaden the circle of alliances.”
On the economic level, observers say Gulf states possess a significant set of pressure tools, including tightening oversight of Iranian financial transfers and networks, combating sanctions-evasion channels, and coordinating with international partners to raise the cost of continued attacks.
Writer Ahmed Khalifa maintains that “the Gulf wields influential weight in global energy markets, leverage within the OPEC+ alliance, and the capacity to move markets if necessary.” He argues that any broad escalation threatening shipping or oil would prompt major powers to intervene directly—an indirect pressure lever on Iran.
Asked about the Gulf states’ ability to impose a new deterrence equation that changes Iran’s behavior rather than merely containing escalation, Khalifa said deterrence is achievable by clearly raising the cost of any Iranian attack, strengthening regional defensive alliances, intensifying international sanctions, and developing counter-drone and missile defenses. He stressed that deterrence does not mean war; it means making attacks futile.
Baaboud, for his part, believes that a complete rupture remains on the table as a political escalation option, but is often used as a negotiating ceiling rather than a permanent choice for all parties.
Potential Direct Confrontation
The drone attack on a Saudi Aramco facility—preceded by missile strikes—along with Gulf reactions, raises a fundamental question: Is the region approaching a direct confrontation between the Gulf states and Iran, or will escalation remain within calculated limits?
In this context, Baaboud sees the possibility of confrontation as real but not the most likely scenario, given the high cost of war amid geographic proximity and the sensitivity of Gulf economies to major shocks.
He favors a “strengthened defensive deterrence” scenario over full-scale confrontation, with limited or undeclared responses and calibrated political and legal escalation. At the same time, he stresses that if hostile acts continue, Gulf states will move to redraw the rules of engagement through alliances, international security arrangements, and diplomatic and financial pressure.
Naturally, economic and financial costs are a core consideration in any military confrontation, and the Gulf states are no exception. Yet crossing the red line they have identified—protecting their security and the safety of their citizens—could push them toward measures exceeding anything taken so far.
Khalifa concludes that “the continuation of Iranian hostile actions could lead either to a redrawing of the rules of engagement through expanded alliances and the construction of a joint regional defense system, or to calibrated political and economic escalation without open war.” He clarifies that “direct confrontation remains the least likely outcome, but it is possible if major red lines are crossed.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
