Amid escalating military tensions, the Muslim Brotherhood has once again chosen to align itself with Iran.
The organization’s largest branch issued an official statement signed by Salah Abdel Haq, the acting Supreme Guide, calling for “strengthening cooperation and coordination” in confronting what it described as “the Israeli-American aggression against Iran.”
Sudanese Brotherhood figure Al-Naji Mustafa also called for “supporting Iran,” in a stance that observers say reflects the nature of the relationship linking certain currents of political Islam with the Iranian regime.
This relationship between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood is not new. Rather, it traces back to historical and ideological roots that predate the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.
According to researcher Maher Farghali, who specializes in Islamist movements, the Muslim Brotherhood was among the first Islamic forces to express support for the Iranian revolution. The group even sent representatives to meet Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the revolution succeeded.
Farghali also notes that some leaders of the Iranian revolution were influenced by the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to the revolution, Ali Khamenei translated some of the works of Sayyid Qutb into Persian, and those writings circulated within revolutionary circles. This reflects a degree of ideological convergence among several leading figures of political Islam, including Hassan al-Banna, Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi, and Khomeini, who shared the idea of a “vanguard of believers” and the pursuit of establishing an Islamic system of governance.
Sunni and Shiite
Researcher on fundamentalist movements and regional security issues Amr Farouk says the Muslim Brotherhood’s support for Iran comes within the framework of deep ideological and organizational ties.
He explained that the Brotherhood and Iran’s “state of the jurist” (Wilayat al-Faqih) represent, in his view, two faces of Sunni and Shiite political Islam, often described as the duality of “caliphate and imamate.”
Farouk added that the Brotherhood’s stance toward Tehran also reflects opposition to the policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, especially after some branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were placed on terrorism lists.
In January 2026, the administration of President Donald Trump designated Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as terrorist organizations, imposing sanctions on those branches and several of their members.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the measures were part of initial steps aimed at thwarting violence carried out by Muslim Brotherhood branches.
Farouk believes that the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Iranian regime cannot be reduced to temporary political positions; rather, it extends through multiple historical contexts. He noted that Tehran has hosted the Brotherhood and provided it with financial and ideological support at different times.
According to him, this was evident during the Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt between 2011 and 2013, as well as in what he described as support for the organization during confrontations between the Brotherhood’s “specialized committees” and Egyptian state institutions.
He also pointed out that official reports issued by the Egyptian military spokesperson and the Interior Ministry between 2014 and 2019 spoke of the seizure of “Iranian-made weapons” in the possession of members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood during that period.
Meanwhile, Amir Hossein Abdollahian, the former Iranian foreign minister and special adviser to the Iranian parliament speaker for international affairs — who later died along with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash — previously stated in press remarks that he visited Egypt in 2012 following the election of Mohamed Morsi as president.
Abdollahian explained that the Brotherhood signed several agreements with Iran and that an Iranian delegation visited Cairo in the same year, meeting Morsi and Brotherhood leaders. He also noted that a Brotherhood delegation visited Tehran and expressed a desire to meet Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, even if only for a few minutes.
The “Supreme Leader State”
For his part, Dr. Fawaz Kasib Al-Anzi, a researcher in strategic and security affairs, believes there are no official documents proving a direct organizational agreement between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood against Gulf states.
However, he argues that political realities in the Middle East over past decades have revealed clear intersections in certain regional files.
He said these overlaps appeared during several crises in the region, including some armed factions in Syria, certain political forces or armed groups in Iraq, as well as some political parties or groups in Yemen.
He believes these dynamics emerged in the context of regional competition and attempts to reshape the balance of power within some Arab states following the Arab Spring.
Al-Anzi also emphasized that the Palestinian issue has played a role in this convergence, as various actors have used it within their political discourse. While Iran has framed its support for Palestinian factions as part of its regional strategy, some Islamist movements have viewed that support as a way to strengthen their own political influence.
Regarding the future of what some describe as the “Supreme Leader state project,” researcher Amr Farouk said it is still too early to conclude that the project — whether Sunni or Shiite in form — has come to an end, given current realities on the ground.
He explained that the blows suffered by Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih system do not necessarily mean the project itself has ended, just as the challenges facing the Muslim Brotherhood do not mean it will disappear entirely from the political scene.
Farouk believes that both projects represent tools or political projects that can be activated or repositioned depending on the political circumstances of each phase. Their disappearance from the scene could therefore be temporary, followed by repositioning or changes in roles, particularly as the Middle East enters a phase of redrawing regional power balances.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
