Iran’s Missile Propaganda…Myth Fact-Checked

Even before the most recent Israeli strike on Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s exercises—known as “Combined Maneuvers 1404”—received extensive media coverage early last week. The reporting highlighted a “qualitative shift” in Tehran’s missile capabilities, with headlines such as “Iranian Missiles: The Enemy Ships’ Nightmare” and “Advancing Range and Precision” dominating official platforms.

According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, the latest drills, titled “The Great Prophet 19,” featured the unveiling of the “Fath-450.” This ballistic missile is over seven meters long, carries a 225-kilogram warhead, and reaches speeds of approximately Mach 5. The “Fath-360” was also touted as a highly precise tactical missile capable of penetrating fortifications, utilizing advanced navigation systems for pinpoint targeting. However, this media narrative raises fundamental questions regarding the gap between official rhetoric and actual operational capabilities.

Available data, including information from internal opposition sources, indicates that this force operates out of the Dastvareh Barracks in northwest Tehran, managing an extensive network of bases and clandestine sites.

According to exclusive sources speaking to Alhurra, the force comprises approximately 15 divisions and command centers distributed across nine primary airbases. A key component of this structure is the “Seventh Iron Brigade,” based at the Al-Mahdi Barracks in Bidganeh. Responsible for the Shahab missile series, this brigade represents the historical core of Iran’s missile program; its founding members were trained in Syria and Libya during the 1980s on Soviet-made Scud missiles. These Scuds continue to serve as the technical foundation for many systems now rebranded under new names.

Iran’s missile strategy is rooted in the concept of “passive defense,” an initiative launched in 1989 that involves relocating sensitive facilities deep into mountain ranges and subterranean tunnel networks. Four major centers have been identified.

• Semnan Missile Complex: As the largest missile complex in the country, this site houses launch platforms and explosive testing facilities. It plays a pivotal role in integrating the missile program with the technical development and deployment of warheads.
• Lar Missile Center (Fars Province): This facility contains a vast tunnel network officially termed an “underground missile city.” Its primary functions are protection, concealment, and deception—objectives that are particularly critical given Iran’s continued reliance on fixed launch platforms.
• Khorramabad Center (Imam Ali Barracks): Dedicated to long-range Shahab-3 missiles, this site was the location of major accidental explosions in 2010. Those blasts resulted in dozens of fatalities and were widely attributed to substandard safety protocols.
• Bidganeh and Karaj Area: This region serves as a field laboratory for missile propellant development. In 2011, Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam—widely regarded as the “father of Iran’s missile program”—was killed there during an explosion involving unstable fuel.

Missile Manufacturing and Oversight: Production is overseen by the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). While the AIO formally operates under the Ministry of Defense, it remains functionally integrated with the Revolutionary Guard. Industrial production is divided into two primary groups:

• Hemat Group: Specializes in liquid-fuel missiles. These systems require hours of preparation and fueling prior to launch, rendering them highly vulnerable to early detection and preemptive strikes.
• Bakri Group: Focuses on solid-fuel missiles, such as the “Fath-450” and “Fath-360.” Although these systems allow for rapid launch readiness, Iran reportedly faces technical challenges in achieving uniform fuel casting; inconsistencies in the fuel grain can lead to flight deviation or mid-air explosions.

Defense documents and intelligence reports point to deep-seated cooperation between the IRGC Aerospace Force and the SPND (Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research), which oversees “Project 111,” a program dedicated to warhead design. These documents indicate that the designs of the Shahab-3 and Qadr missiles were modified to accommodate larger, spherical payloads—specifications often associated with non-conventional warheads. This overlap explains the high sensitivity of the missile file in international negotiations, a point recently underscored by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Intelligence also confirms ongoing technical collaboration between Tehran and Pyongyang, particularly in missile engine development. Reports suggest that North Korean experts are stationed in clandestine compounds east of Tehran, where technology transfers are exchanged for oil. The striking similarities between North Korea’s Musudan (Hwasong-10) and Iran’s Khorramshahr missile highlight this partnership, directly challenging Tehran’s claims of total technological self-reliance.

Having reviewed the program’s structure and strategic messaging, it is essential to now examine the hard realities that expose the program’s underlying vulnerabilities:

• The Illusion of “Pinpoint” Accuracy: Tehran asserts that missiles like the Fath-450 can strike with a precision of less than 35 meters. However, operational history—including the strike on Iraq’s Ain al-Asad base and attacks against opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan—has revealed error margins frequently exceeding several hundred meters. In numerous instances, missiles have either failed at launch or impacted open terrain far from their intended targets.
• The Precision Component Crisis: Iran remains under a stringent sanctions regime that restricts its access to advanced microchips and high-performance gyroscopic guidance systems. Consequently, the Revolutionary Guard reportedly relies on smuggling and repurposing civilian-grade electronics. This leaves their guidance systems relatively rudimentary and highly susceptible to electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures employed by technologically superior powers.
• Media Overexposure and “Military Cosmetics”: A significant portion of the hardware showcased in military exercises—such as the recent maneuvers along the southern coast—is reportedly comprised of wooden mock-ups or legacy missiles that have been repainted and rebranded. Analysts describe this as “military cosmetics,” a strategy designed to project an image of technological diversity and strategic depth while masking a more limited inventory of truly effective platforms.
• Failures in Interception and Defensive Gaps: While Iran’s military doctrine prioritizes offensive capabilities, its self-defense infrastructure remains a notable weakness. Domestic air defense systems like the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15—marketed as formidable equivalents to Western or Russian platforms—failed to detect or intercept the low-altitude drones that successfully struck sensitive military installations in Tehran and Isfahan. This underscores a significant disparity between Iran’s declared missile ranges and its actual combat readiness in a contested environment.

The deployment of Iranian missiles consistently exposes a rift between state rhetoric and operational results. Historical data from previous strikes shows error margins that far exceed Tehran’s “pinpoint” precision claims. Furthermore, the persistent pressure of international sanctions has choked the supply of high-end electronic components, stunting guidance accuracy and leaving these systems vulnerable to modern electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.

Ultimately, Iran’s missile program appears to be a hybrid of legacy technology, incremental indigenous upgrades, and sophisticated media projection. While it remains a potent threat to civilian centers and unprotected infrastructure, its effectiveness against a modern, integrated defense network remains highly questionable.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.