Power Vacuum Drives Internal Struggle in Iran After Khamenei’s Death

Rasha Ibrahim's avatar Rasha Ibrahim03-05-2026

Iran enters an unprecedented era in its modern history following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026, in a U.S.-Israeli military operation. The absence of the ruler who held power for over three decades not only creates a leadership void but also places the regime at risk of internal contests for authority.

For a system built largely around the figure of the Supreme Leader, this vacuum could shift the balance of power among its political and military institutions.

Khamenei was the central figure in Iran’s political and religious system, not merely a statesman. When he assumed office in 1989, he was not, as Andres Ilves, director of Strategic Initiatives at MBN and author of Iran Briefing, noted, “a renowned theologian,” which led him to consolidate power through a close alliance with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which gradually became the backbone of the regime.

With the Supreme Leader killed amid escalating military confrontation, Ilves believes the internal balance of power in Iran may now tilt more heavily in favor of the IRGC.

“The IRGC has been under the Supreme Leader’s supervision for more than three and a half decades and has served as the backbone of power in Iran. The killing of the Supreme Leader under these circumstances gives them an opportunity to seize full control,” Ilves said.

He added, “The Supreme Leader did not die peacefully in his bed; he was killed, and this may push the IRGC to seek revenge and fill the political vacuum.”

Such a shift could sideline civilian state institutions in favor of a “military-industrial complex” that sees constant tension as a means of maintaining its influence. In this scenario, opportunities for diplomatic engagement with the West may be further limited if IRGC leaders determine that continuing confrontation serves their political and economic interests.

The repercussions of Khamenei’s absence are not limited to politics. The leader was also seen as the de facto head of the global Shiite community, which could open the door to sectarian tensions in the region.

Ilves warns that Khamenei’s killing could be interpreted in some circles as a sectarian targeting, potentially triggering protests or unrest whose intensity would depend on the stance of local Shiite leaders outside Iran and their ability to either calm or inflame public sentiment.

Within Iran, popular reactions have revealed a clear divide. Crowds in some cities celebrated what they described as “freedom from the grip of the Supreme Leader” and the end of decades of repression, while other sectors expressed shock and anger over the loss of “the reference” and “the leader.”

The impact of this shift is not confined to Iran’s borders. Military developments across the region accelerated following what Washington and Tel Aviv described as “decapitating the regime.”

Iran-allied armed factions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen mobilized, launching missile strikes targeting critical facilities in the Gulf. Rockets also fell in Israel, while hundreds of targets inside Iran were struck.

Amid this escalation, Gulf states face increasing security and economic challenges.

Ilves said the ability of these countries to endure depends largely on the duration of the conflict.

“It really depends on how long this war continues. If it lasts, as President Trump says, for about four weeks, it may be sustainable. But if it extends beyond that, Gulf countries will have to deal with long-term consequences, especially economically,” he said.

He warned that ongoing tensions could affect one of the region’s key sources of economic strength. “If you look, for example, at the United Arab Emirates as a safe haven for tourists and investments, continued war will significantly impact that role and affect regional and international travel,” he added.

Another question remains: does the United States have a clear plan for what comes next?

Ilves said the U.S. premise assumes a change at the top of the system through “decapitation,” then leaving the course of events to the Iranian people to decide their future—a scenario reminiscent, to some extent, of the dynamics of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

But the reality may be more complicated. With escalating regional tensions and the growing influence of the IRGC within the state, Iran now faces an extremely sensitive phase that could determine the shape of its political system for many years.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.


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