When rockets are launched from southern Lebanon toward northern Israel, everything else fades into the background: official statements and security plans alike. The reality on the ground alone, according to observers, is enough to undermine the narrative put forward two months ago that Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River had been dismantled.
In January, Lebanese authorities announced the completion of the first phase of withdrawing Hezbollah’s weapons from that area and the transition to a second phase. Yet the war now underway has revealed a different reality. Hezbollah has joined the confrontation “in support of” Iran, announcing that it is countering attempts by Israeli forces to advance in border areas of southern Lebanon and targeting several sites in northern Israel.
For its part, the Israeli army announced that it had “destroyed dozens of Hezbollah rocket-launching platforms planted south of the Litani River that Hezbollah had been using to fire rockets and shells toward Israeli territory.”
This discrepancy between what the state declares and what is happening on the ground coincided with a ruling issued Monday by Lebanon’s military court ordering the release of three Hezbollah members who had been arrested while transporting unlicensed weapons on their way to the south, in exchange for a symbolic financial fine.
All of this has intensified the debate over whether the authorities’ slow handling of the issue of weapons outside the state’s control has contributed to dragging Lebanon into a new war—one whose price is now being paid by ordinary citizens.
The State’s Responsibility
In implementation of the ceasefire agreement concluded between Israel and Lebanon with U.S. mediation in November 2024, the Lebanese army announced on January 8 that it had established operational control over southern Lebanon. It explained that this phase focused on securing territory and vital areas and strengthening its deployment south of the Litani River, except for locations that remain under Israeli army control.
Following the army’s statement, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the efforts of the Lebanese government and army in this direction represented “an encouraging beginning,” but were “far from sufficient in light of Hezbollah’s attempts to rearm and rebuild its terrorist infrastructure with Iranian support,” stressing that Hezbollah’s disarmament is “necessary for Israel’s security and Lebanon’s future.”
Observers say that the continued existence of weapons outside the authority of the state has left the country vulnerable to military decisions taken by a partisan group at a time when the state suffers from political and security weakness that limits its ability to enforce a monopoly on arms.
In this context, retired Brigadier General Yarab Sakr stresses that “the Lebanese state bears direct responsibility—on the same level as Hezbollah—for the country’s slide into war,” due to what he describes as its “leniency and hesitation in dealing with Hezbollah’s weapons.”
Sakr told Alhurra that the recent developments in villages along the border strip reflect “the failure of the new administration in which hopes had been placed to escape the grip of militias.” He added that the army’s announcement of “operational control south of the Litani does not in practice mean the area is free of weapons,” as recent events have shown with the continued presence of Hezbollah fighters and weapons south of the river.
He also noted that the November 2024 ceasefire agreement stipulated that the Lebanese army would deploy south of the Litani River and that militias’ weapons would be removed from all Lebanese territory within a period not exceeding sixty days. Yet, according to him, “the state wasted nearly eight months without taking decisive steps.”
Similarly, Mohammad Sablouh, director of the legal program at the Cedar Center, told Alhurra that the Lebanese people’s experience with officials’ promises shows that they often remain “ink on paper.”
A Different Interpretation
In contrast, Charles Jabbour, head of media and communications for the Lebanese Forces party, rejects holding the Lebanese state responsible for dragging the country into war. He argues that decisions taken by the government and statements by the president and prime minister describing Hezbollah’s actions as a “grave mistake” confirm that the state is not a partner in this decision.
Speaking to Alhurra, Jabbour pointed out that on March 2 the government adopted a “historic decision” banning Hezbollah’s military and security activities, obliging it to surrender its weapons and prohibiting the use of Lebanese territory as a launch point for any military actions. He added that the president emphasized that “Hezbollah bears responsibility for the destruction and devastation that has occurred.”
For his part, a source within the Kataeb Party believes that what has been achieved over the past year, although “insufficient,” represents noticeable progress regarding the Lebanese government’s sovereign decision-making. After decades in which Hezbollah’s weapons and its security and military system were effectively legitimized, the state—through successive decisions—has begun treating these weapons as being outside the law.
The source also told Alhurra that the Lebanese army has taken significant steps south of the Litani River, including dismantling more than one hundred tunnels and confiscating tons of weapons.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun had previously affirmed that the government’s decision to place all weapons exclusively in the hands of the state would be implemented according to the plan developed by the army command when security conditions allow. He stressed that attacking the army or questioning its capabilities “serves attempts to undermine the authority of the state.”
Meanwhile, Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc “Loyalty to the Resistance,” said that the government had failed to confront “Israeli violations” or pressure Israel to stop its strikes. He argued that “this failure is being justified by hiding behind the demand to disarm Hezbollah.”
The Military Court
The political debate coincided with a ruling by the military court ordering the release of three Hezbollah members who had been arrested for transporting unlicensed weapons while heading south, in exchange for a symbolic fine.
The decision came days after the cabinet announced a ban on any military or security activity by Hezbollah and required the group to hand over its weapons to the state. The ruling sparked widespread criticism on social media, where commentators said it reflected continued leniency regarding weapons outside the framework of state legitimacy.
In this context, activists recalled the case of singer Fadl Shaker, linked to the 2013 Abra clashes, noting that he is still being tried despite being acquitted of the charge of fighting against the army.
Sablouh believes that “Hezbollah’s influence within some security and judicial institutions is evident in the handling of certain cases,” pointing to what he describes as “double standards” for which, he says, “the military prosecutor’s office bears responsibility by distributing charges unjustly and according to political alignments.”
He added that the case of the Hezbollah members “moved within days from detention to trial,” while other cases take years to reach court. He called for the abolition of the military court or limiting its jurisdiction to military personnel, and for holding accountable those responsible for prosecutions in such cases.
Sakr also criticized the release of the Hezbollah members in exchange for a symbolic fine “despite the clear crime and available evidence,” saying that this indicates that Lebanon’s judiciary has not yet freed itself from the influence of militias.
Jabbour, however, said that the case has been reopened and that “Justice Minister Adel Nassar has taken measures against the judge who issued the ruling.”
Field Warnings
Criticism directed at the Lebanese state is not limited to its failure to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons before Lebanon slid into a new war. It also includes accusations that it failed to provide sufficient protection to some predominantly Christian southern towns during the ongoing clashes.
In this context, Kataeb Party leader Sami Gemayel said in a post on the platform X that he had contacted the army commander several times warning of the dangers of the army’s absence on the ground in the Qlayaa–Marjayoun area and other villages.
Regarding what happened in Qlayaa, Gemayel said: “Unfortunately, what we warned about has happened. Hezbollah gunmen entered one of the homes, which led to it being targeted by Israeli shelling and to the severe injury of the parish priest, Father Pierre Al-Rahi,” who later died. He added that “leaving people to their fate without protection or clear guidance is shameful and unacceptable.”
Jabbour said that what happened in Qlayaa was “unacceptable,” stressing that “the role of the state and the army remains essential in preventing any armed groups from infiltrating certain areas and avoiding a repetition of what happened.”
A Call to Correct the Course
Criticism also targeted a statement by Army Commander General Rodolphe Haikal in which he said that the solution to the current crisis “cannot be purely military but must also be political.”
In this context, Michel Helou, secretary-general of the National Bloc party, criticized Haikal’s position. Commenting on the statement, he said: “What happened during the Raouche events in September is now being repeated openly and on a broader scale: the army commander comments on the decisions of the executive authority rather than implementing them. This statement is political and raises questions. The government and the president must correct the course.”
The so-called “Raouche events” refer to an incident in which Hezbollah members illuminated the Raouche Rock with images of the party’s former secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, contrary to a government decision banning such a move, without the army intervening to enforce the decision.
Jabbour emphasized the need to accelerate the state’s steps to implement its decisions and extend its authority over the entire Lebanese territory. He said that the president had proposed a clear initiative to exit the crisis into which Hezbollah had placed the country.
The same source in the Kataeb Party expressed hope that the army would continue its efforts, first by securing steadfast southern villages and preventing armed groups from entering them, and second by deploying across all Lebanese territory and assuming responsibility for security in cooperation with other security agencies.
The source also called for raids on weapons depots known to the army, controlling their transfer, and dismantling parallel security structures “so that the state can reassert its authority and demonstrate its capability should it enter direct or indirect negotiations” with Israel.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
