How Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Became a Power Network

Three months after assuming power in Iran in 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini decided to establish a force parallel to the Iranian army whose mission would be to protect the new regime and “export the revolution abroad.” This force became known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), referred to in Persian as Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami.

After carrying out internal operations aimed at consolidating the rule of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) system in Iran, the Revolutionary Guard conducted its first major military operations during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, mobilizing tens of thousands of ideologically recruited fighters, many of whom came from marginalized sectors of Iranian society.

Over the past 47 years, the Revolutionary Guard has grown from a small force into a complex intelligence network combining ideology, weaponry, politics, and economics. Its activities are not limited to Iran; its operations and affiliated networks extend across the Middle East, Africa, South America, and Europe.

Since the Revolutionary Guard developed missile capabilities and became involved in Iran’s nuclear program, it has continued its efforts to expand these programs. Many of the Iranian scientists overseeing the missile and nuclear programs are officers loyal to the Guard’s leadership and to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Israel has assassinated several of these scientists in recent years.

The Revolutionary Guard is estimated to have around 125,000 personnel, including ground, naval, and air units. It also commands the Basij militia, a volunteer paramilitary force loyal to the religious regime and frequently used to suppress protests against the government.

Kamal Abdul Karim, deputy secretary-general of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz, describes the Revolutionary Guard as a complex network combining intelligence and security structures, with its own intelligence apparatus that operates separately from Iran’s official intelligence services.

According to Abdul Karim, the difference between the Revolutionary Guard and Iranian military intelligence lies in their methods. The Guard relies heavily on penetrating local societies by recruiting local individuals, especially in marginalized communities—by exploiting poverty and hardship, then providing financial support in exchange for gathering information and building networks of social and economic influence. By contrast, Iranian military intelligence focuses mainly on monitoring the external framework of hostile military forces.

In addition to its well-known headquarters across Iran, the Revolutionary Guard maintains secret bases inside and outside the country, some of which are located in underground tunnel complexes.

“The Revolutionary Guard constitutes more than half of the soldiers and ranks of Iran’s military. Its members command the bases, camps, and all units of the Iranian army, as well as the air and naval forces. A Revolutionary Guard soldier has decisive authority inside the army and can control other personnel who are not part of the Guard, even if they are senior officers,” Abdul Karim told Alhurra.

Abdul Karim, who has been monitoring the Revolutionary Guard and its movements inside and outside Iran for more than four decades, added that many officers in the Iranian army feel marginalized and reduced to tools in the hands of the Guard, which makes the army easier to infiltrate.

The Revolutionary Guard and the Supreme Leader

Since its founding, the Guard’s top leadership has been directly tied to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Khomeini established the Revolutionary Guard, and after his death leadership passed to Ali Khamenei, who was reportedly killed in a joint U.S.–Israeli attack on his location in Tehran in early March.

Although the Iranian regime has appointed Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, as the new Supreme Leader, it appears difficult for him to assume effective control of the Revolutionary Guard as his predecessors did, given the military and political turmoil currently facing Iran.

This instability follows intensive air and missile strikes carried out by the United States and Israel against regime and Revolutionary Guard bases and facilities since February 28.

Iranian affairs expert Massoud Fek notes that the Revolutionary Guard has dramatically expanded its military, economic, and political influence over the past decades, to the point where it has become one of the most powerful centers of authority within the Iranian state.

“The transfer of leadership after Ali Khamenei’s death may force the new Supreme Leader to build new balances within the regime,” Fek told Alhurra. “For that reason, Mojtaba Khamenei may rely even more heavily on the Revolutionary Guard to ensure the stability of power, particularly under both domestic and external pressure.”

Regarding whether the new leadership might affect the Guard’s strategy, Abdul Karim said the Revolutionary Guard continues to follow essentially the same strategy used during the Iran–Iraq War. The only major change, he explained, is the shift from reliance on human manpower to modern technological capabilities such as drones and ballistic missiles.

Divisions and Headquarters of the Revolutionary Guard

According to figures in the Iranian opposition, the Revolutionary Guard’s structure is distributed across several main public headquarters inside Iran, including:

The IRGC headquarters in Tehran, which serves as the crisis management center and the link between the military and political and economic authorities.

The “Thamen al-Aemeh” headquarters, responsible for commanding Iranian ground forces in northeastern Iran and protecting the borders.

The “Khatam al-Anbiya” headquarters serves as the Guard’s main economic arm, overseeing projects in oil, infrastructure, industry, trade, and construction, not only inside Iran but also in countries where the Guard maintains networks and operational centers.

The Guard’s intelligence structures responsible for internal security include “Sarallah headquarters” in Tehran, which is tasked with confronting security threats, protests, and unrest in the capital and protecting sensitive state institutions.

“Hamzeh Sayyed al-Shuhada headquarters” operates in northwestern Iran, particularly in Kurdish cities and towns, where it monitors Kurdish opposition groups and suppresses protests.

“Quds headquarters” in southeastern Iran oversees intelligence and security operations focused on armed groups in Sistan and Baluchistan and monitors the border with Pakistan.

The Quds Force

The Quds Force is the Revolutionary Guard’s primary external operations arm, responsible for providing cover for intelligence operations including assassinations, the formation and support of armed militias, and destabilizing regional and global security through support for militant groups.

Under the U.S. “Rewards for Justice” program, the U.S. State Department designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Quds Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.

Earlier, in 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Revolutionary Guard as a global terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224, as amended.

The Basij Organization

The Basij Organization, whose name means “mobilization” in Persian, was established in Iran in November 1979 by order of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini.

Khomeini called for the creation of “an army of 20 million men” to protect the revolution and its political and religious system.

The organization was formally established in April 1980, and in 1981 it was integrated into the organizational structure of the Revolutionary Guard.

Over the years, the Basij’s role expanded far beyond its original military mission during the Iran–Iraq War to encompass broad areas of public life inside Iran. Today, the Basij is one of the regime’s most prominent tools for maintaining internal security and enforcing laws.

It has played a major role in suppressing anti-government protests, enforcing social norms, and sometimes acting as a kind of “morality police.” It also maintains a widespread presence in cities and towns, helping enforce Islamic dress and behavior codes and confronting what the regime considers Western cultural influence in universities and public spaces.

Thanks to its extensive membership network, the Basij also collects local information on individuals and groups considered threats to the regime.

In addition to its security and social roles, it also participates in pro-government activities such as disaster relief, reconstruction projects, and providing social services to its members.

Abdul Karim, who lives outside Iran in Europe, stresses that the Revolutionary Guard has effectively become the regime’s sole power structure, arguing that there is no alternative to it unless it is dismantled and the regime itself collapses.

He added that inside Iran today—especially amid the ongoing war—the Revolutionary Guard and its formations are often referred to as “the force of death,” because its members, affiliated groups, and commanders kill anyone who confronts them in Iran’s streets.

He further noted that the Iranian army effectively no longer functions as an independent institution, with the country now largely under the control of the Revolutionary Guard and its commanders.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic. 


Discover more from Alhurra

Sign up to be the first to know our newest updates.

https://i0.wp.com/alhurra.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/footer_logo-1.png?fit=203%2C53&ssl=1

Social Links

© MBN 2026

Discover more from Alhurra

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading