Alhurra’s Iraq correspondent reported, citing Iranian opposition sources, that former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohsen Rezaei is leading a three-member wartime council while Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, remains absent from public view.
The supreme leader sits at the apex of power in Iran and serves as the country’s ultimate authority, overseeing political, military and economic affairs. The position carries sweeping powers, including appointing top officials in the IRGC and judiciary, and combines religious authority with state leadership under the doctrine of “Velayat-e Faqih,” established by Ruhollah Khomeini after he took power in 1979 and became Iran’s first supreme leader.
Developments in Iran during the current war suggest that the position of supreme leader is no longer the central locus of power following the killing of former leader Ali Khamenei and the appointment of his son Mojtaba as successor.
On Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump said it remains unclear whether Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is still alive, amid reports he was wounded in an airstrike.
Reuters quoted Trump speaking at a White House event: “We don’t know … whether he’s dead or not. I will say nobody has seen him, which is unusual.” He added, “Many say he was badly disfigured, they say he lost a leg … and that he was severely wounded. Others say he died.”
Amid the ongoing war and the absence of the new supreme leader, the question remains: Who is running Iran?
According to Alhurra’s correspondent, seven Iranian opposition figures — including Kurdish military leaders — say a three-member council is currently governing Iran and directing the war against the United States and Israel.
The sources said the council is headed by Mohsen Rezaei, former IRGC commander and current adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei, alongside IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — indicating the dominance of the hardline faction within the IRGC over Iran’s governing institutions.
According to the sources, the council is focused on maintaining internal stability and preventing unrest or popular uprisings through strict security measures, relying on the Basij forces — the IRGC’s paramilitary arm. In recent days, the Basij has carried out widespread arrests, particularly targeting Iranian youth accused of cooperating with Israel and the United States. Martial rulings have also been issued granting Basij members and IRGC special forces authority to open fire on any gathering, protest or individuals deemed suspicious in public spaces.
The council’s measures also include activating the Quds Force — the IRGC’s external operations wing — along with Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, to coordinate with the IRGC’s aerospace force in launching rapid, intensive missile and drone attacks against U.S. interests, Israel and Gulf states. The strategy also involves adopting a hardline foreign policy that rejects surrender, while maintaining limited diplomatic channels when necessary to preserve the regime.
Rezaei replaced Ali Larijani, who had been leading the council before being killed early Tuesday in Tehran alongside several Iranian officials in an Israeli airstrike.
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed his death in a statement, noting he was killed along with his son and several aides.
Iran expert Ali al-Shammari said the center of power, influence and decision-making has shifted from the supreme leader to the IRGC following Ali Khamenei’s death.
“The IRGC has effectively become the strongest player in the system, especially amid war and security conditions. Its influence is now central within the regime. Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise to power signals that the hardline faction and the military-security establishment dominate the system,” al-Shammari told Alhurra.
He added that Rezaei, Vahidi and Ghalibaf represent the core of the security and military authority, working alongside the supreme leader’s office — despite the leader’s absence — in managing Iran and directing the war. He noted that the IRGC’s influence tends to grow during crises and wars, potentially surpassing that of the clerical establishment, and did not rule out a shift from a religious system to a military-security state led by the IRGC.
According to Alhurra’s reporting on the current council, Mohsen Rezaei is one of the most prominent hardline IRGC leaders. He served as its commander from 1981 to 1997, leading the force during the Iran-Iraq War and playing a key role in developing its capabilities, particularly its ballistic missile program.
In recent years, Rezaei has worked to expand the IRGC’s influence inside and outside Iran and was considered close to former supreme leader Ali Khamenei. He is known for rejecting compromise and advocating continued warfare.
Ghalibaf, the current parliament speaker and also a former IRGC figure, shares Rezaei’s hardline views and security background. He has extensive experience overseeing and coordinating with economic networks affiliated with the IRGC, which operate as fronts to generate funding and manage the organization’s economic activities during wartime. He is also considered part of the conservative faction.
The third member, IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi, is the first leader of the force with an intelligence background. He is among the few top-tier IRGC commanders to have survived assassination attempts during the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June and the current conflict.
Vahidi maintains strong ties with mid-level IRGC commanders who now oversee operational activities. He represents the hardline faction that favors military solutions over diplomacy in addressing Iran’s challenges. Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy IRGC commander in December, and he assumed leadership of the force after its previous commander was killed in a joint U.S.-Israeli missile strike earlier this month.
Iran analyst Soran Balani said the expansion of the IRGC’s authority is tied to Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as supreme leader.
“Mojtaba Khamenei is closer to the IRGC and more hardline than his father. Over the past years, he has worked to consolidate his power within the IRGC and Iran’s security institutions, effectively acting as his father’s shadow within these bodies and the real executor of authority,” Balani told Alhurra.
Balani added that under Mojtaba Khamenei — if he survives the current war — Iran is likely to become more isolated and face deeper internal and external collapse. He warned that a policy of revenge could drag the country into a major catastrophe, though he expressed confidence that the current system would ultimately surrender due to systemic breakdown.
Hours before Larijani’s death, Iranian media reported Monday that the supreme leader had appointed Mohsen Rezaei as his military adviser. Observers and Iran experts who spoke to Alhurra said this signaled the transfer of most military and security powers — and rapid decision-making authority — to Rezaei and the three-member council, reflecting full control by the IRGC’s hardline faction amid the turmoil gripping Iran.
Iran expert Massoud al-Fak said describing the supreme leader as merely a figurehead is an exaggeration, noting that Iran’s constitution and political structure designate the leader as commander-in-chief with final authority over strategic decisions.
“However, the killing of Ali Khamenei and the rise of his son Mojtaba to the position of supreme leader opens a different phase in the balance of power within the system. The new leader came to power under highly complex domestic and regional conditions, making him more reliant on what is known as the ‘hard core’ of authority — the network of security and military leaders linked to the IRGC,” al-Fak told Alhurra.
He said the most likely scenario is not that the supreme leader becomes a front for the military, but rather the emergence of a partnership or overlap between religious authority, represented by the leader, and hard power, represented by the IRGC. In this framework, the supreme leader would retain ultimate legitimacy, while the IRGC becomes a central pillar in governance.
Al-Fak added that the shift in the center of gravity from the supreme leader to the IRGC does not mean the leader will lose control over the force, but rather signals closer alignment between the religious establishment and the military institution.
He predicted that this transition could mark the end of the relative balance between reformist and conservative factions, and the rise of a current more closely tied to the regime’s ideological and security.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
