As the scope of military attacks in the region expands, Gulf countries are intensifying their political and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions, alongside initiatives to enhance their defensive readiness. Official Gulf statements stress the ability to respond, while others emphasize the need for calm, reflecting a mix of caution and a demonstration of capacity to engage in a potential U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran.
On Thursday, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said, “Iran is mistaken if it believes Gulf countries are unable to respond” to attacks coming from Tehran.
The remark came amid intense diplomatic activity. On Wednesday evening, Riyadh hosted a consultative meeting of foreign ministers from Arab and Islamic countries to discuss supporting regional security and stability. Meanwhile, last Sunday, the Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers held an extraordinary session with the participation of the British foreign secretary to discuss escalation, focusing on protecting airspace, maritime passages, supply chains, and energy market stability.
In this context, Gulf affairs scholar Abdullah Baabboud says the issue is not only the lack of an explicit strategy announcement but also the nature of the approach itself. He notes that the Gulf statement on March 1, 2026, affirmed unity of position and that “the security of member states is indivisible,” while retaining the right to respond under Article 51, yet simultaneously emphasizing the significance of dialogue and diplomacy. According to Baabboud, this blend of legal deterrence and political containment reflects a defensive orientation rather than a strategic initiative.
From Washington, former U.S. ambassador James Jeffrey offers a similar reading. He told Alhurra that Gulf countries, despite being attacked and seeing their oil exports affected, “do not want to appear” as a party to the fighting, nor do they wish to “be associated with an Israeli military operation.” The goal, as he sees it, is to maintain a margin that allows them to act as a mediator if a negotiation window opens.
The caution Gulf countries show in dealing with Iran is not new. Since the 1980s, the Gulf has faced repeated threats linked to Tehran, ranging from attacks on oil tankers to threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, and extending to strikes on energy facilities and the activation of proxies. What is new this time is the scale and complexity of the attacks.
Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. State Department negotiator, ties the limits of Gulf readiness to its reliance on the United States for security. He notes that air defense systems reinforced by U.S. Central Command mitigated losses but did not eliminate the vulnerability, especially as targeting shifted to critical infrastructure. He concludes that the Gulf remains “structurally vulnerable by geography.”
Although the U.S. and Israel launched their campaign against Iran on February 28 without being entirely unexpected, Gulf capitals have sought from the outset to pursue undisclosed diplomatic channels to avoid direct involvement. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman expressed concern over the implications of any strike and emphasized their refusal to allow their territories to serve as launch points for military operations.
However, this approach did not prevent Iran from expanding its response to the U.S.-Israeli attacks. This, Baabboud says, reflects the limits of diplomatic tools in a power-driven environment.
On the defensive side, Tom Warrick, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary for national security, says Gulf countries have shown adaptability, even drawing lessons from experiences such as Ukraine in countering drones. He notes, however, that the approach remains defensive, and the option to shift to offense has not yet been resolved.
Salem Al-Yami, a former adviser at the Saudi Foreign Ministry, explains the hesitation as an awareness of the sensitivity of engaging in an open conflict. He says Gulf states tend to avoid unresolved confrontations, especially since the crisis affects their vital interests more than it represents a direct war for them.
In the background, pressures are mounting. A Reuters report cited Gulf sources saying that regional states have not pushed Washington into war, but some believe limited strikes may not suffice to deter Iran, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, diplomatic sources reported U.S. pressure to encourage broader Gulf involvement, as President Donald Trump seeks to demonstrate regional support for the campaign.
So far, Gulf countries have not determined their stance on using offensive capabilities. Miller says this option is still under study, amid clear fears of an Iranian response that could target oil infrastructure.
In a broader reading, political philosophy professor Mohammed Al-Wuhaib argues that what appears as hesitation is in fact a calculated choice. He explains that the nature of the conflict, with its complexities and interconnections, pushes Gulf states to manage the confrontation using indirect tools through alliances, diplomatic pressure, and strengthening defenses, aiming for gradual deterrence without sliding into full-scale war.
Al-Yami aligns with this view, saying there is an undeclared strategy based on maintaining the legal right to respond while avoiding being drawn into war and preserving independent decision-making. He acknowledges, however, that the challenge lies in translating this political consensus into more effective tools.
Baabboud believes this approach may not be sufficient in the long term, given the absence of a clear strategic doctrine defining red lines and mechanisms for collective response.
Ibtisam Al-Ketbi, head of the Emirates Policy Center, articulates this concern clearly, stating, “Gulf countries know that any direct confrontation with Iran will not remain at the level of symbolic strikes, but could extend to energy, ports, navigation, aviation, markets, and supply chains.” She adds that containment, despite its cost, remains less risky than an open attrition war.
Figures released by the UAE Ministry of Defense reflect the level of escalation and intensity of attacks, with a total of 338 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,740 drones intercepted since the start of the war. These attacks have killed six civilians and wounded 145 others, including citizens and residents of various nationalities.
In the same context, Bahrain announced the interception and destruction of 129 missiles and 233 drones, indicating a similar pattern of threats facing Gulf countries in terms of targeting nature and severity.
Amid this scenario, Gulf countries face a complex equation: how to defend themselves without becoming a direct party in a war they do not control.
Baabboud says the answer lies in moving from reactive management to building a clearer Gulf position, based on treating any attack on a state or critical facility as a collective target requiring a multi-tool response without sliding into open confrontation. He notes that this requires enhanced coordination, expanding deterrence tools to include economic, cyber, and legal aspects, while keeping the door open for negotiations under clear conditions.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
