Saudi–Houthi Talks: Why Now?

In the Jordanian capital, Amman, Saudis and Houthis sat face to face in the latest announced meeting between the two sides. On April 19 and 20, the office of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen held meetings within the framework of the Military Coordination Committee, bringing together representatives from Riyadh and Sana’a to discuss de-escalation and the continuation of security dialogue.

Although the meetings were held within a technical UN framework, they carried clear political weight. The Houthis presented them to their audience as a direct meeting with Saudi Arabia “without the mercenaries of aggression,” referring to the internationally recognized Yemeni government. For Riyadh, meanwhile, the meetings reflected the continuation of communication channels with the Houthis, even after the group’s delayed involvement in the regional escalation at the end of March, following the outbreak of war between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

Military Coordination Committee between representatives from Riyadh and Sana’a (United Nations)

Days earlier, the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom published a report linking the Houthis’ delayed entry into the confrontation to financial arrangements within the “roadmap” with Saudi Arabia, citing a Yemeni journalist who said the group waited for funds designated for salaries to arrive before engaging in fighting.

However, this link remains unconfirmed independently, as no Saudi or UN sources have supported it. Nevertheless, the continuation of direct channels with the Houthis raises a broader question: Has Riyadh redefined its priorities in Yemen?

Abdul-Samad Al-Faqih, director of the Washington Center for Studies, told Alhurra that what is happening “is not a Saudi shift” so much as it is a continuation of a path that began with the “roadmap” years ago, when Riyadh began dealing with the Yemeni file as a mediator more than as a party in an open war.

In his view, the recent meetings appear to be part of prior arrangements, “not a real change,” even if that seems surprising to many—especially after the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump redesignated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization.

The Kingdom is not seeking political normalization with the Houthis, nor full recognition of them, but rather a formula that prevents the return of war to its borders. Since the UN truce in 2022, Riyadh has gradually moved from the logic of open confrontation, which began with “Operation Decisive Storm” in 2015, to a logic of containment. In September 2023, Riyadh received a Houthi delegation in the first official visit of its kind to the Kingdom since the outbreak of the war.

During that visit, the Houthi delegation met Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman. The talks continued for five days before Houthi officials announced the conclusion of their visit and their return to Sana’a. At the time, Saudi Arabia welcomed what it described as the “positive results” of discussions aimed at supporting a roadmap for the peace process in Yemen.

Two months later, in December 2023, UN envoy Hans Grundberg announced the parties’ commitment to a roadmap that includes a comprehensive ceasefire, the resumption of oil exports, easing restrictions on Sana’a airport, and on the port of Hodeidah, which is the most important maritime outlet in areas under Houthi control.

Two years later, in December of last year, Muscat witnessed a large-scale prisoner exchange deal involving 2,900 detainees, including seven Saudis.

Saudi Defense Minister meets a Sana’a delegation in Riyadh (September 20, 2023 – SPA)

In the Saudi reading of the situation, the bet is no longer on changing the Houthis ideologically or completely separating them from Iran, but rather on regulating their behavior from a security standpoint in a way that ensures calm borders, missiles that do not return to airports, and a Yemen that does not turn into a permanent platform for attrition. Al-Faqih links this to broader Saudi calculations, saying that the length of the war has made Yemen “a burden on everyone, internally and externally.”

From the same perspective, political analyst and international consultant Ahmed Al-Khazai told Alhurra that Saudi Arabia’s shift from direct confrontation to de-escalation does not mean acceptance of a new balance of power in Yemen but rather reflects “a flexible management of the conflict,” allowing Riyadh to reduce the security and political costs of the war and redirect its energy toward other strategic priorities such as economic development and Vision 2030.

But this path does not move in a vacuum.

The Houthis are no longer merely a local group controlling Sana’a; they have accumulated military and political capabilities that make ignoring them costly. Since the Gaza war expanded into the Red Sea, the group has engaged in a regional confrontation with Israel, subjected international navigation to unprecedented pressure, and received U.S. strikes, before later entering into an understanding with the Trump administration to stop targeting American ships. Therefore, Riyadh does not appear to be betting on the Houthis as much as it is betting on constraining their room for maneuvering.

Al-Khazai says Saudi Arabia understands that the Houthis are part of Iran’s network of influence and therefore deals with them “with a logic of managing influence, not a logic of surrender,” setting safety margins and regional and international guarantees for any potential understanding.

The Yemeni government itself does not present a narrative far from the Saudi approach. It says that peace with the Houthis remains an option but ties it to the group’s engagement in the political process, while keeping “security and military readiness” on the table if the Houthis refuse, as stated by Presidential Leadership Council member Abdulrahman Al-Mahrami during his meeting with the British ambassador to Yemen in Riyadh a few days ago.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.