Securing Hormuz… Why Are Gulf States Hesitant?

As regional tensions escalate, the contours of a potential international move to reopen the Strait of Hormuz are beginning to take shape.

In this context, the diplomatic adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Gargash, indicated that his country is considering the possibility of engaging in international efforts led by the United States to ensure the security of navigation in this vital passage.

Gargash explained, during his participation in an event organized by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, that these efforts are still under discussion and have not yet evolved into a fully integrated operational plan. He also noted that the post-military confrontation phase will necessitate arrangements that limit Iran’s ability to use its nuclear program, missile capabilities, or drone technologies as tools to threaten regional security and stability.

Other Gulf states have also expressed firm positions regarding threats to freedom of navigation, but these have remained at the level of statements.

The Kingdom of Bahrain called for a strong international response to protect navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, warning against “Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping,” which it described as “a violation of international law and the law of the sea.” Manama also emphasized “the importance of protecting international navigation and securing oil supplies and global trade through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.”

For its part, Kuwait reaffirmed its categorical rejection of the use of force against civilian vessels, considering any closure of the strait to be “a serious violation and a blatant attack on freedom of navigation,” in a clear affirmation of its commitment to international maritime law.

Nevertheless, the overall Gulf response has remained within the bounds of condemnation and warning, without reaching the level of practical engagement in direct security arrangements. The UAE alone has, so far, declared its readiness to join international efforts to secure the strait.

Emirati writer and political analyst Mohammed Faisal Al-Dosari believes that Gargash’s remarks reflect “a calculated Emirati approach that goes beyond the narrow Gulf framework to the broader global economic sphere, where the Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely a regional pressure card, but a vital international corridor that cannot be left vulnerable to threats or coercion.”

Al-Dosari adds that the absence of a final, comprehensive plan does not negate the existence of advanced international discussions, stressing that if a broad international mechanism to ensure maritime security materializes, it would be natural for the UAE to be part of it.

International Moves to Secure the Strait of Hormuz

U.S. Central Command announced that it carried out strikes using bunker-buster bombs targeting fortified Iranian missile sites near the Strait of Hormuz. It stated that these sites housed anti-ship cruise missile batteries that had been recently deployed and had become a direct threat to commercial shipping and oil tankers transiting the strait daily.

This comes amid ongoing military escalation between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, which has directly impacted maritime security. Commercial shipping traffic through the strait has sharply declined as the confrontation enters its fourth week, nearing a near-total halt. This has led to noticeable disruptions in energy markets and a rise in oil prices due to the disruption of a significant portion of global supply.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most sensitive maritime corridors in the world. It separates Iran to the north from Oman to the south, linking the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Approximately 20 percent of global seaborne oil supplies pass through it.

Large volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizer products also transit the strait, making it a central component of the global energy and trade system.

Its geographic characteristics further increase its vulnerability to threats. At its narrowest point, it is about 29 nautical miles (54 kilometers) wide, and it consists of two shipping lanes, each two nautical miles wide—one for inbound traffic and the other for outbound—separated by a buffer zone. Water depth reaches approximately 200 feet.

This narrow configuration provides a favorable environment for targeting operations, whether through missiles, drones, or fast attack boats, in addition to the ease of deploying naval mines.

During the current escalation, commercial vessels and oil tankers have already come under attack, alongside reports suggesting that Iran may resort to laying naval mines. This has prompted some insurance companies to suspend coverage for vessels transiting the strait, a clear indication of rising operational risks in this corridor.

The repercussions of disruptions in the strait have extended beyond the energy sector, affecting supply chains and increasing transportation and insurance costs, which in turn have impacted the prices of various goods in global markets, given the heavy reliance on this vital passage.

On the international front, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan announced their “readiness to contribute to efforts necessary to ensure safe passage in the strait,” including participation in “preparatory planning.”

These countries had previously refrained from responding to U.S. President Donald Trump’s call to participate in securing the strait during the period when it was closed by Iran.

As the war continues and its market impacts deepen, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration is considering deploying Marine forces to help reopen the strait and secure navigation, amid mounting pressure driven by rising fuel prices. According to the newspaper, Trump is pressing allies to find a practical mechanism to restore operations in the corridor.

Securing Hormuz… Why Are Gulf States Cautious?

The reactions of Gulf states to the issue of securing the Strait of Hormuz reflect structural differences linked to the degree of direct dependence on this vital corridor, as its importance is not evenly distributed across the Gulf system.

While the strait represents the only maritime outlet for Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain—making it an irreplaceable artery for oil, gas, and trade flows—other countries enjoy greater strategic flexibility.

The UAE, for example, has developed port infrastructure outside the strait, most notably the ports of Fujairah and Khorfakkan on the Gulf of Oman, providing relatively alternative routes. However, the recent Iranian shelling of these ports has also exposed the limitations of these alternatives under military pressure.

Saudi Arabia benefits from its access to the Red Sea through its western ports, particularly in Jeddah and Yanbu, as long as the Bab al-Mandab Strait remains open.

Riyadh has already launched an emergency plan to reroute its oil exports, diverting shipments through a pipeline stretching approximately 1,200 kilometers to the port of Yanbu, alongside attracting large numbers of oil tankers to that port.

The Strait of Hormuz holds limited strategic weight for Oman, which benefits from ports beyond its reach along the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

Despite these differences, the states most dependent on the strait have not moved toward practical engagement in securing it, limiting themselves to political positions based on condemnation. This reflects a gap between the scale of economic dependence and the level of security action.

Explaining this behavior, political and security analyst Dhafer Al-Ajmi notes that Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain—face direct Iranian threats, while simultaneously seeking to push the United States to neutralize this threat without direct military involvement, in order to avoid a potential escalation that could target their vital infrastructure.

He points out that joining a military coalition to secure the strait may achieve its reopening in the short term but carries the risk of greater escalation by pushing Iran toward more aggressive asymmetric tactics, including mines and drone attacks, which could prolong the crisis rather than contain it.

From another perspective, Saudi writer and political analyst Suleiman Al-Aqili argues that any participation in securing the strait would be interpreted as direct entry into the war, explaining the reluctance of regional states—especially as major powers in Asia and Europe are also moving to avoid military involvement. He adds that expanding regional participation could prolong the conflict and transform it into a broader confrontation.

In contrast, Mohammed Faisal Al-Dosari offers a different reading, arguing that Iran is using the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure card by turning geography into a political tool, which justifies the idea of internationalizing responsibility for securing it.

He suggests that the Emirati proposal, which views the flow of trade and energy as a shared responsibility, reflects a push to elevate the issue to a broader international level based on burden-sharing among states benefiting from the corridor.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.