Iran Expands the Hormuz Threat

Tehran is speaking about the Strait of Hormuz as a broader maritime arena, not a narrow waterway, for testing the limits of power and deterrence in the Gulf.

In a move that appeared closer to a political and military redefinition of the strait, the naval forces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the expansion of what they consider a “maritime operational zone,” stretching from Jask in the east to Sirri Island in the west. In this sense, Hormuz, in Iranian discourse, is no longer merely a navigational chokepoint between the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, but rather a domain for pressure and controlling the rhythm of tension.

The sensitivity of this shift lies in the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy arteries. According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, around 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through it in 2024, equivalent to nearly one-fifth of global consumption. Around one-fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade, most of it from Qatar, also passed through the strait. The International Energy Agency says the strait received approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude exports alone in 2025, representing nearly one-third of global crude trade.

The statements came days after the Revolutionary Guard published a new map of an area it claims falls under its control, marking an eastern line between Mount Mubarak in Iran and Fujairah in the UAE, and a western line between Iran’s Qeshm Island and Umm Al Quwain.

For Gulf observers, the map carries a message indicating an Iranian desire to shift pressure from inside the Strait of Hormuz to its broader surroundings, including alternative routes and ports upon which some Gulf states have built part of their strategy to reduce dependence on the strait.

Dr. Dhafir Al-Ajmi, a political and military analyst, says the Iranian map is “more of a psychological and media escalation than an actual military transformation,” but at the same time reflects Tehran’s desire to keep the region under constant security pressure.

Writer and political analyst Saad Al-Hamed, an expert in international conflicts, points out that including Fujairah in the scope of the threat carries special significance because the emirate has remained in recent years one of the most important strategic alternatives for exporting energy away from Hormuz. Through this, Tehran wants to say that any alternative route “will not be outside the circle of Iranian pressure.”

Fujairah derives its special importance from its location on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. For years, the UAE has used it as an alternative outlet for exporting part of Abu Dhabi’s oil through a pipeline linking the Habshan fields to Fujairah Port. The port has also become an important hub in the oil and fuel market and a major center for ship refueling. Therefore, including Fujairah within the scope of the Iranian threat targets the idea of “safe alternatives” as much as it targets a specific Emirati port.

Al-Hamed distinguishes between Iran’s ability to disrupt navigation or raise its costs and possessing full control over maritime routes. Iran, he says, has field tools capable of threatening ships, from fast boats and drones to coastal missiles and naval mines, in addition to a network of allies and proxies. However, imposing prolonged control over an international passage of this magnitude could lead to the internationalization of the crisis and an expansion of confrontation.

Tehran bases this type of pressure on what maritime security experts describe as “asymmetric warfare”: fast boats, naval mines, drones, and coastal missiles, not necessarily aimed at fighting a conventional naval battle, but rather at increasing the cost of passage, unsettling markets, and forcing major powers to deal with Iran as a party capable of disrupting regional and international calculations. This approach appeared in previous crises, including attacks targeting oil tankers near the Gulf of Oman in 2019, followed by interception and detention operations involving ships in later years.

Nevertheless, Iran’s ability to threaten does not grant it absolute freedom to close the strait or control it for a prolonged period. The strait is a vital international passage, and any broad disruption would pressure Gulf states and the West, as well as energy importers in Asia, including countries attempting to remain outside the confrontation or maintain relations with Tehran. Therefore, Iran’s strategy often tends toward creating a state of “calculated disruption” or “selective control,” imposing political and economic costs without directly reaching a comprehensive confrontation that could provoke a broader international response.

Gulf Economy Under Pressure

These developments come at a sensitive moment for the global economy. Before the outbreak of war, nearly one-fifth of the world’s supplies of oil and liquefied natural gas passed through the Strait of Hormuz, which forms the main gateway for energy exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE.

The economic cost has already begun to appear more clearly. Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and CEO of ADNOC, warned that disruption of navigation in the strait could leave the world facing a gap estimated at one billion barrels of oil.

Al Jaber wrote on X: “One billion barrels lost due to blackmail… and with every day the strait remains held hostage, costs rise for families, farms, factories, and economies around the world.”

In Doha, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said during a press conference with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that Iran should not use the Strait of Hormuz “as a weapon for pressure or for blackmailing Gulf states.”

Qatar appears more sensitive than others toward any prolonged threat to the strait because its liquefied natural gas exports depend heavily on this route. U.S. Energy Information Administration data indicate that Qatar exported around 9.3 billion cubic feet per day of LNG through Hormuz in 2024, compared to around 0.7 billion cubic feet per day from the UAE. This makes the security of the strait a direct component of the security of the global gas market, in addition to the oil market.

Writer and political analyst Musaed Al-Mughanam says Gulf states are still managing the escalation with a logic of “cautious containment,” because they realize that any broad military explosion in Gulf waters would directly hit the region’s economies through rising insurance and shipping costs, disruption of supply chains, and declining oil and gas revenues.

Al-Mughanam believes the Gulf states’ commitment to diplomacy reflects a precise reading of the cost of confrontation. However, he adds that escalating threats, from Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab and the Arabian Sea, are pushing some countries in the region to strengthen their maritime security arrangements by expanding cooperation with international coalitions, intensifying defense and intelligence coordination with the United States and Britain and developing capabilities to protect ports and vital corridors.

According to Al-Mughanam, this path indicates a gradual transition toward “active deterrence” that protects economic interests and prevents the Gulf from becoming an open arena for regional conflict.

In Washington, concern is growing alongside the widening maritime threats. President Donald Trump said in an interview with Fox News that he is considering reactivating “Project Freedom” in a broader form not limited to escorting commercial ships through the strait. This opens the door to the possibility of greater U.S. involvement in protecting shipping lanes.

The United States has a long history of protecting navigation in the Gulf when tensions with Iran escalate. In 2019, Washington led maritime security arrangements known as “Operation Sentinel” following a series of attacks on tankers near the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. However, any return today to escorting ships would be more sensitive because it would occur in a broader war environment where any maritime friction could quickly turn into direct confrontation.

Despite the successful passage of several oil tankers through the strait in recent days, this has not dispelled concerns. Navigation is still taking place in a fragile environment under the threat of possible drone or projectile attacks and amid a heavy military presence by the Revolutionary Guard along the maritime corridors.

Gulf Options: Costly Diplomacy or Calculated Deterrence?

Although some Gulf states have invested in ports and pipelines to reduce dependence on Hormuz, alternatives remain limited. Saudi Arabia has the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, while the UAE uses the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline to transport part of Abu Dhabi’s oil to the Gulf of Oman. However, these routes cannot compensate for total Gulf exports, nor do they solve the problem of Qatari liquefied natural gas, which remains closely tied to the strait. Therefore, any prolonged disruption in Hormuz quickly transforms from a shipping crisis into a global energy crisis.

For this reason, the most difficult question facing Gulf states remains how to deter Iran without pushing it to strike oil facilities, ports, and coastal cities, and how to protect trade without turning the Gulf into an open war zone.

Al-Ajmi believes Gulf states today are moving between three options: costly diplomatic waiting, undeclared security coordination with major powers, or a war with uncertain outcomes.

In his view, the first option will remain the most likely as long as the cost of war exceeds the daily economic losses. He says Gulf states, despite the losses they are incurring, fear that military confrontation could lead to direct threats against their infrastructure and oil facilities.

Al-Ajmi recalls the 2019 Aramco attacks as a present model in Gulf security calculations. The concerns are not limited to disruption of navigation alone but extend to the possibility of targeting sensitive facilities such as Ras Tanura, Shuaybah, Al-Ahmadi, Abqaiq, and Zakum with cruise missiles or drones.

Al-Ajmi says some Gulf states may join maritime coalitions led by the United States or European powers, but most likely in a limited form through intelligence and logistical support rather than direct involvement in combat. Any operation to break Iranian control over maritime corridors, he says, would effectively amount to a declaration of war against Iran, an option that remains unlikely unless major international powers move directly.

He also does not rule out Gulf states resorting to economic pressure tools, such as freezing assets or halting indirect trade with Iran, instead of entering military confrontation. However, he believes the equation could change if the threat effectively extends to Fujairah Port or other vital Gulf ports.

He points out that any Gulf military intervention would face major difficulties. Despite massive military spending, Gulf states still rely on Western technologies, while Iran possesses a geographic position that gives it an advantage along the northern coast of the strait, in addition to an arsenal of anti-ship missiles, fast boats, and drones.

Al-Hamed, meanwhile, believes the most likely scenario involves Gulf participation within maritime protection operations and tanker escorts, alongside intelligence cooperation and the use of military facilities when needed, in addition to air and naval defense coordination with Western powers.

He says Gulf states’ caution toward direct involvement in confrontation with Iran is understandable because of geographic proximity, the region’s economic dependence on commercial stability, and fears of attacks on oil and vital facilities. However, he stresses that this caution does not negate military capability, as Gulf states possess defensive capacities capable of inflicting painful strikes if circumstances impose such a course.

Al-Mughanam says that continued threats and their transformation into direct pressure on internal stability, through inflation, pressure on budgets, and disruption of development projects, could push some Gulf states toward more hardline positions.

Ultimately, the challenge extends beyond maritime security to the economy and development: how Gulf states can protect the artery of energy and trade without sliding into a war whose cost may exceed that of the blockade itself.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.