As tensions with Iran intensify, the Gulf region is entering an exceptionally fragile phase, amid mounting signs that several Gulf states are recalibrating their response to Iranian attacks in ways not previously seen.
In that context, The Wall Street Journal reported on Monday that the United Arab Emirates carried out strikes against Iranian targets during the latest escalation, in retaliation for Iranian attacks on Emirati facilities.
According to the newspaper, the operation included targeting Iran’s Lavan Island before a cease-fire was declared on April 7 — a development that could expose Abu Dhabi to the risk of direct Iranian retaliation, particularly if the current truce collapses.
In a related security development, Kuwait announced the arrest of at least four members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who were allegedly attempting to carry out “terrorist attacks” on Bubiyan Island, Kuwait’s largest island, located along the country’s northern coast.
Reuters also cited two Western officials and two Iranian officials as saying that Saudi Arabia had conducted undisclosed strikes inside Iran in response to attacks launched by Tehran against the kingdom during the war.
The Saudi strikes — not previously reported publicly — marked the kingdom’s first direct military operation on Iranian territory, according to a Reuters report published Tuesday.
Yet the developments also reveal a widening divergence in Gulf approaches toward Iran. According to analysts, Abu Dhabi has moved toward a more assertive strategy centered on direct military retaliation, while Riyadh has sought to contain the escalation and prevent the region from sliding into open war, even as it keeps political and diplomatic channels open.
The current Gulf landscape reflects an emerging split between two tracks in dealing with Iran: one favoring de-escalation and dialogue, and another leaning toward deterrence and direct confrontation. The concern among regional observers is that, should the current cease-fire collapse, the next round of conflict could draw Gulf states directly into a war unlike previous proxy confrontations.
The debate comes as the Pentagon announced that the cost of the war with Iran had risen to roughly $29 billion, nearly $4 billion higher than estimates issued just two weeks earlier.
Against that backdrop, a central question is emerging: Are some Gulf states moving toward direct confrontation with Iran, or do the recent military moves remain within the bounds of deterrence and efforts to avoid a broader regional war?
The Question of Confrontation
Questions about the possibility of a broader military alignment intensified after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi visited Egyptian fighter jets stationed in the United Arab Emirates alongside Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan last week. The visit drew attention because of both its timing and the accelerating regional escalation.
The Emirati state news agency WAM said the two leaders toured the Egyptian fighter detachment deployed inside the country to review operational readiness and preparedness for “various challenges,” without disclosing details about the aircraft or their mission.
At the same time, Iranian media reported that the port of Sirik, in Hormozgan Province, had come under direct bombardment, while other reports described the attack as being carried out by an unidentified party. No official statement clarified who was responsible or the extent of the damage.
The reports coincided with speculation linking the attack to the Emirates — a theory some analysts say could explain the subsequent Iranian drone and ballistic missile attacks on Emirati territory.
Khaled al-Tarrah, a Kuwaiti journalist and former diplomat, said in an interview with Alhurra that Gulf Cooperation Council states had demonstrated a credible military deterrent capability against what he described as Iranian aggression and Tehran’s attempts to target Gulf interests through affiliated networks and proxy cells operating under the banner of exporting the revolution.
Tarrah said Gulf states had responded through political and diplomatic coordination and a division of regional and international roles that reflected what he called “the resilience of Gulf unity in the face of Iranian escalation.”
Maj. Gen. Mohammed al-Qubayban said the arrival of an Egyptian squadron of Typhoon fighter jets, alongside reports of Israeli forces being present in the Emirates, could point toward “limited and specialized military operations rather than a prolonged comprehensive war.”
Qubayban said the possibility of limited military operations involving the Emirates, Bahrain and Israel on one side and Iran on the other remained plausible. But he argued that the absence of an American green light made the prospect of a full-scale war unlikely for now.
He added that the Emirates’ acquisition of defense systems such as the Iron Dome reflected preparations for a more volatile phase, while warning that “any unilateral move outside the American umbrella” could carry dangerous consequences for the entire region.
Mohammed al-Wuhaib, a professor of political philosophy at Kuwait University, said he doubted that Bahrain or the Emirates would enter into a direct and open war with Iran “unless the two states were subjected to a large-scale direct attack or a regional escalation forced such a scenario.”
He said growing talk of “unknown aircraft” carrying out operations deep inside Iran — amid speculation they may belong to Gulf states or the Emirates — remained unconfirmed.
Wuhaib added that Gulf states understood that any full-scale confrontation with Iran would come at a high security and economic cost, arguing that Gulf policy remained focused on what he described as “cautious deterrence” rather than open confrontation.
The Gulf Defense Pact
Article Two of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Joint Defense Agreement stipulates that an attack on any member state constitutes an attack on all member states, and that any threat against one Gulf country is considered a collective threat to the security of the Gulf as a whole.
That provision has fueled growing questions over whether the agreement could be activated in the event of a military confrontation between Iran and one of the Gulf states — particularly if a Gulf country were to strike Iran in retaliation for Iranian attacks.
Qubayban argued that some states might adopt different positions or become involved in the conflict to varying degrees, “but that does not automatically mean the rest will be dragged in behind them.” He pointed to NATO, which despite its military capabilities and American leadership, “did not move toward direct confrontation or comprehensive war against Iran.”
According to Qubayban, the Gulf trajectory remains centered more on de-escalation efforts and diplomatic maneuvering aimed at containing the crisis than on collective entry into an open conflict.
Tarrah, meanwhile, said Gulf Cooperation Council states had remained consistent in principle regarding Iranian threats, particularly in viewing Gulf security as “indivisible,” and that any threat to one member state represented a direct threat to the security of the others.
Wuhaib likewise said Gulf states appeared aligned in rejecting Iranian escalation, but without any genuine desire to become involved in “a comprehensive collective war.”
The article is translated and adapted from Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
