The U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran has thrust the Middle East into a new era of direct confrontation. Iran’s retaliation has rippled across the Gulf—from Doha and Dubai to vital energy infrastructure, including LNG hubs, oil fields, and ports—exposing the region’s vulnerabilities and rattling global markets. This escalation, the most consequential since the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel on October 7, has upended long-standing assumptions about deterrence, alliances, and regional order. While proxy networks have been weakened, they remain active, and the Gulf’s security architecture is under mounting strain.
To understand what comes next, MBN’s Editor in Chief, Leila Bazzi, and Iran Editor, Andres Ilves, spoke with Dr. Amin Tarzi, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College and a longtime analyst of Iran and regional geopolitics—who, more than two decades ago, warned that the U.S. invasion of Iraq would destabilize the regional balance and empower Iran, a prediction that proved prescient.
Q: You warned before the Iraq War that the regional order would be upended. Are we at a similar turning point now?
Dr. Tarzi: Yes — but this moment is even less predictable. Back then, Iraq and Iran balanced each other. It was not ideal, but it imposed limits. The United States called it “dual containment.” Once that balance was removed, the consequences were severe — and in many ways, we are still living with them. Today, however, there is no such clarity. The Middle East we knew before October 7 is gone. The attacks, Israel’s response, and the wars that followed have fundamentally reshaped the region. We are not going back.
Q: Are we witnessing the collapse of the Gulf security architecture, or is this still calibrated deterrence?
Dr. Tarzi: The Gulf security architecture was always based largely on external support. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and to a lesser extent Qatar built strong military capabilities, but the Gulf Cooperation Council was never truly a functioning defensive alliance, mainly designed to counter Iran. That aspect never fully materialized and was already weakening before this conflict — tensions over Yemen already exposed cracks.
These countries relied heavily on the U.S., and attempts to diversify toward China or Russia have not produced meaningful alternatives. The Gulf states are now reassessing their security strategies internally, which will likely depend heavily on coordination between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Q: Is the U.S. security guarantee breaking down? Are Gulf states paying the price for decisions they did not fully support?
Dr. Tarzi: The security umbrella is still functioning. Defensive systems — many supported by the United States — have prevented large-scale devastation. But perception matters: even a single successful strike can have major economic and strategic consequences, particularly in hubs like Dubai. The question is not whether the system works — it does — but whether the cost of small breaches is acceptable. Russia and China are not viable alternatives, so Gulf states must rely on internal reassessment and coordination.
Q: How does this conflict affect nuclear proliferation in the region?
Dr. Tarzi: There is a perception that nuclear weapons provide immunity from external intervention, which may drive regional interest. Iran has advanced significantly, enriching uranium to high levels, though weaponization is complex. Iran’s experience may both encourage and discourage proliferation — nuclear capability does not guarantee security and may invite more pressure.
Q: What is happening to Iran’s proxy network — Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others?
Dr. Tarzi: After October 7, Israel decapitated much of Iran’s proxy leadership, particularly Hezbollah. The Houthis largely adhered to an understanding with the U.S. Other groups, including Iraqi militias, have been deterred. These groups are also political actors — they cannot risk massive damage to the societies they operate in. Going forward, we expect more targeted, asymmetric tactics: cells, internal pressure, and small-scale operations rather than large-scale attacks.
Q: Is Iran shifting toward internal destabilization within Gulf states?
Dr. Tarzi: Yes. When large-scale capabilities are reduced, actors adapt. Iran still needs to demonstrate power, which means smaller, targeted actions in Gulf states — enough to signal presence without triggering full-scale war.
Q: How secure is the Strait of Hormuz? Can it be protected?
Dr. Tarzi: The Strait is a chokepoint, giving Iran leverage. But Iran also depends on it economically, as do the Gulf states. Alternatives exist — pipelines or potential canal routes through the UAE — but these require investment and time. In the short term, stability depends more on political decisions than military measures.
Q: Who is making decisions inside Iran right now?
Dr. Tarzi: Power is distributed, particularly within the Revolutionary Guard. The system has multiple layers of command — if one leader is removed, another steps in. Leadership may emerge from unexpected places, not necessarily the most visible figures.
Q: Could opposition figures or exiled leaders shape Iran’s future?
Dr. Tarzi: At this stage, opposition figures lack internal organizational support. Any transition would require backing from internal power structures, especially the security apparatus. The most viable future leaders may come from within the military or existing system.
Q: What role could China play after this conflict?
Dr. Tarzi: China is likely to play a significant role in reconstruction, particularly in Iran. Over time, this could expand its influence in the region, not necessarily through strategy, but by stepping in where others are hesitant or unable.
Q: Who are key figures like Mohsen Rezaei, and do they have a realistic role in Iran’s future?
Dr. Tarzi: Reports of figures like Mohsen Rezaei or Mohammed Reza Jr. exist, but they lack organizational support internally. Future leadership will likely emerge from military figures or those acceptable to internal factions, potentially with some external acknowledgment.
Q: Final question — what should we expect moving forward?
Dr. Tarzi: The region needs space to recover. Decades of conflict have taken a toll. Moving forward will depend on leadership willing to prioritize stability, even if imperfect. That is not guaranteed, but it is necessary.
Leila Bazzi
Leila Bazzi is Editor-in-Chief of MBN
Andres Ilves
Andres Ilves is Iran Editor and Senior Adviser at MBN. His career as a journalist and writer includes two decades at the BBC and Radio Free Europe.
