In a short period of time, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar each announced the dismantling of cells linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah on their territories.
The separate announcements regarding the arrests of these cells came amid the ongoing “Iran war” and continued attacks carried out by Tehran against Gulf states. According to observers, this lends the developments a significance that goes beyond isolated incidents, suggesting they are part of a broader regional security context.
According to official statements, the activities of these cells ranged from espionage and money laundering to planning terrorist operations.
On March 4, Qatar announced the arrest of two cells linked to the IRGC and detained 10 individuals. Bahrain followed on March 11 with the announcement that it had uncovered a cell engaged in surveillance and espionage targeting vital sites.
For its part, Kuwait announced on March 18 the dismantling of a cell and the foiling of terrorist attacks that Hezbollah members had been planning. This came just days after a similar announcement about dismantling a Hezbollah-linked cell of 16 individuals. Authorities said the group was involved in an organized plot aimed at undermining national security and harming the country’s sovereignty, noting that it included 14 Kuwaitis and two Lebanese nationals.
Announcements by Gulf states of arrests and the dismantling of Hezbollah-linked networks on their soil are not unprecedented. What is new, however, is the timing and its implications.
Commenting on the simultaneous exposure and dismantling of these cells, Emirati political and military analyst Ismail Al-Mansouri said that “Gulf states are sending a message that responding to external escalation cannot be separated from dealing with proxy networks inside the region.” He added that the timing also reflects a level of intelligence coordination among Gulf security agencies, noting that information obtained from detained suspects contributes to the early identification of valuable intelligence that is shared among these agencies.
Meanwhile, Salman Al-Jou’anah, head of the political journalism department at the Kuwaiti Journalists Association, explained that the financing of cells linked to the IRGC and Hezbollah in Kuwait and other Gulf states is not new, but rather a recurring pattern since the 1980s. However, he noted that the near-simultaneous exposure of such cells draws attention in terms of timing, particularly as it comes amid ongoing war.
Why Qatar?
A well-informed Qatari source, who requested anonymity, told Alhurra that the arrest of the cell in Doha came as a major surprise to Qataris. He explained that “this development raised many questions in Doha, particularly regarding the timing and how Iran succeeded in recruiting members of this cell, especially in the period following the Gulf diplomatic rift, when Tehran was close to Doha.”
The source added that “the presence of such cells on Qatari territory, despite the rapprochement between the two countries, ran counter to expectations, especially since this pattern of activity had previously been associated with countries whose relations with Iran were more tense. This made the incident a source of surprise and raised questions about its motives and timing.”
Relations between Qatar and Iran took a more cooperative turn after the “June 2017 crisis,” when Tehran emerged as one of Doha’s most prominent supporters in the face of the Gulf boycott.
This shift contributed to a higher level of coordination between the two countries, reflected in growing trade exchange and economic cooperation, as well as the restoration of Qatar’s diplomatic representation in Tehran.
Dormant Cells in Bahrain
Relations between Iran and Gulf states have fluctuated between tension, détente, and economic cooperation since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Many of these states have long accused Iran of planting dormant cells within their territories. Bahrain, for instance, accused Iran in 1994 of being behind acts of violence in the country. These accusations continued at later stages. In 2010, Bahrain’s Public Prosecution announced the referral of a Bahraini citizen and two Iranians to trial after “their involvement in espionage with the IRGC and providing it with military and economic information between 2002 and 2010 was established.”
This trajectory is not much different in other Gulf countries, with the exception of Oman, which has not announced the discovery of any Iran-linked cells, and Qatar, which only recently announced, for the first time, the arrest of two IRGC-linked cells.
Dr. Ali Al-Hail, professor of political science and media at Qatar University, explained that the presence of such cells linked to Hezbollah and the IRGC in Qatar and other Gulf states during wartime is a recurring phenomenon. He noted that Iran seeks to expand its influence in the Gulf, with the exception of Oman, which maintains strong and strategic relations with Tehran—explaining the absence of such cases there.
Al-Mansouri added that “describing these cells as having remained dormant for years under civilian and commercial cover, then becoming active with the outbreak of war, reflects a clear shift in their role. They are no longer merely latent networks but have become security pressure tools tied to broader regional developments.” He noted that some indicators suggest these elements had entered stages of planning, coordination, and identifying vital targets—signaling a transition from dormancy to operational preparation.
Why Now?
With the exposure of cells linked to Iran and Hezbollah, a key question arises regarding the ability of Gulf states to take preemptive measures to prevent such cells from carrying out attacks on their territories.
Al-Jou’anah confirmed that Gulf security agencies typically rely on long-term surveillance. However, he said the timing of the recent announcements came after evidence had been fully established and threat levels had risen, in addition to a desire to send a public deterrent message to networks linked to the IRGC and Hezbollah. He noted that Gulf states have moved toward preemptive steps by strengthening security coordination and accelerating intelligence sharing.
Al-Mansouri believes that Gulf states no longer treat such cells as a new phenomenon but have accumulated experience in dismantling networks linked to the IRGC and Hezbollah after repeated cases in recent years. He pointed out that this experience has enabled security agencies to better understand how these networks operate—whether in recruitment, financing, or concealment—allowing them to monitor them for extended periods before taking action.
The recent exposure of these cells has also revived concerns about the threat posed by dormant cells linked to Hezbollah or the IRGC within Gulf states.
“Describing these cells as having remained dormant for years under civilian and commercial cover, then becoming active during the war, reflects their transition from dormancy to more advanced stages such as planning, coordination, and identifying vital targets,” Al-Mansouri said.
He added that “handling these cases is no longer done quietly through intelligence channels as in the past. Instead, it is moving toward public disclosure and explicitly naming Iran and Hezbollah as part of a deterrence strategy aimed at raising the cost of affiliation with these networks.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
