For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has been associated in the global imagination with oil — and with the recurring question of whether Iran could threaten energy flows through one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Now, however, Tehran is signaling a different kind of leverage, one tied less to crude exports than to the infrastructure of the modern digital economy: the undersea cables that carry internet traffic, financial data and cloud services between Asia, Europe and the Gulf.
As tensions between Iran and the United States intensify, Iranian officials and lawmakers have floated the idea of imposing fees on submarine internet cables running through the depths of the Strait of Hormuz. The proposal has not moved beyond rhetoric, but it reflects a broader shift in Iranian discourse — one that seeks to expand the concept of “sovereignty” over the strait from oil tankers and commercial shipping to cross-border digital infrastructure.
The significance of such a threat lies in the central role undersea cables play in modern communications. According to the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations agency overseeing information and communication technologies, nearly 99 percent of global internet traffic passes through submarine cable networks. These systems connect banks, data centers, governments, energy firms and telecommunications providers. Any attempt to tax them, obstruct maintenance or subject them to political pressure could open a new front in the Hormuz dispute — one centered not on oil, but on the flow of data itself.
Ebrahim Zolfaghari, an Iranian military spokesman, wrote in a post on X that Iran intended to impose fees on submarine internet cables. Mostafa Taheri, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s Industries Committee, estimated that such fees could generate as much as $15 billion annually.
Reports published in mid-April by the Iranian news agencies Tasnim and Fars also raised the possibility of monitoring data flows moving through these maritime networks. The rhetoric marked an escalation from discussion of potential fees to a more sensitive question: whether Iran could realistically interfere with data traffic passing through the strait.
There is no indication so far that cable operators or Gulf states have begun paying such fees. But experts interviewed by Alhurra said that the idea in itself forces Gulf governments and telecommunications companies to confront a new possibility: that internet security could become part of the deterrence equation in the Strait of Hormuz, alongside energy security and maritime navigation.
Maps of regional submarine cable networks underscore the scale of the threat. The Strait of Hormuz not only links the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman as an energy corridor; it also serves as a route for communications systems connecting Gulf states with South Asia, Europe and East Africa. These include cables such as AAE-1 and the Falcon network, in addition to new projects under development by Gulf companies.
Any disruption to those networks would not remain localized. The data they carry belongs to banks, energy companies, trading platforms, government services and data centers across multiple countries. The effects could emerge in the form of slower digital services, disruptions to cross-border transactions or rising operating costs for telecommunications companies forced to reroute traffic through alternative pathways.
Still, turning this leverage into a practical instrument of pressure would be difficult. Undersea cables are typically owned and operated by consortia of international and regional companies, and their routes, maintenance and operational agreements are governed by complex legal and commercial arrangements. Any Iranian attempt to impose direct fees, monitor data traffic or obstruct repairs would likely trigger broad legal and diplomatic opposition, particularly from Gulf states, which could view the move as an attempt to assert Iranian sovereignty over an international waterway.
Experts interviewed by Alhurra said Gulf states were unlikely to accept paying fees on submarine cables, because doing so could establish a precedent granting Iran leverage over digital infrastructure tied directly to banking, energy, telecommunications and government systems. They said the most probable Gulf response would combine legal, diplomatic and security measures, including objections to any such policy, stronger protection for maritime infrastructure and accelerated efforts to develop alternative cable routes.
Faisal al-Shammari, a political analyst and writer, said the most likely scenario would not involve Iran physically cutting cables, but rather what he described as “gray pressure” — obstructing maintenance work, harassing repair vessels or pressuring operating companies. Such escalation, he said, might stop short of military confrontation while still disrupting markets and increasing insurance and operating costs.
“The cable issue differs from the oil issue,” Shammari said. “Oil is a commodity states own and control through production and exports. Submarine cables are part of an interconnected international network extending across borders, territorial waters, ports and companies.” A major disruption, he argued, would not affect one country alone but could reverberate simultaneously across Gulf states, Iran and global markets.
Amjad Arnaout, founder of MarkCognition, an artificial intelligence solutions company, said the practical risk would begin if Iranian rhetoric shifted from political threats to actions targeting maintenance operations or the movement of repair vessels. In that case, telecommunications companies could be forced to reroute data traffic and purchase additional network capacity at higher costs.
The consequences, Arnaout said, could extend to banks, government agencies and companies reliant on foreign data centers or cross-border cloud services. Ordinary users might not experience a complete internet outage, but they could see slower access to international websites, reduced video call quality and disruptions to streaming platforms and applications dependent on servers outside the region.
Khalfan al-Touqi, an economist, said implementing fees on submarine cables would be difficult in practice because of the density of regional networks and the complexity of their ownership and operations. Oman alone, he noted, is connected to roughly 20 submarine cables, in addition to networks linked to the rest of the Gulf and routes crossing the Red Sea.
But, Touqi added, the problem extends beyond feasibility to the political and legal implications. Imposing fees or restrictions on infrastructure near the Strait of Hormuz could be interpreted as an attempt to assert control over an international maritime corridor, potentially triggering broader disputes beyond the telecommunications sector itself.
If the threats were translated into concrete measures, experts said telecommunications, banking, government services, logistics and e-commerce sectors would likely be among the most exposed. Operating costs for telecom providers and service companies could rise before being passed, directly or indirectly, to businesses and consumers.
Arnaout said the energy sector’s core operations would probably not shut down because of internet cable disruptions, since critical systems typically rely on protected private networks. But commercial and operational data exchanges, as well as coordination with international markets and companies, could still be affected if the region experienced widespread connectivity disruptions.
Even if Gulf states refuse to pay any fees, experts said they may still be compelled to treat the threat as a warning sign of broader vulnerabilities in cross-border digital infrastructure. A region that built up part of its economic strength on geography, ports and financial hubs now faces a new question: could that same geography become a source of digital exposure?
Experts said the threat could accelerate Gulf efforts to diversify submarine cable routes, expand landing points, build more local and regional data centers and strengthen terrestrial connections so that data traffic does not depend on a single strategic corridor, regardless of its importance.
In that context, some have raised the question of whether satellite internet services such as Starlink could provide an alternative if submarine cables were disrupted. Experts, however, said such an option would remain limited. Satellite internet may prove useful in emergencies or for connecting sensitive sites, operations centers, ships and field teams, but it cannot independently handle the enormous volume of data transmitted daily through submarine cables between banks, governments, data centers, telecommunications companies and millions of users.
Arnaout said the real role of such services would be to prevent complete isolation during crises, not to replace the maritime infrastructure underpinning the digital economy. Submarine cables, he said, were designed to carry massive and stable flows of intercontinental data, while satellite internet remains an additional support layer rather than a direct substitute.
Ultimately, the debate opened by Iran is not simply about Starlink or hypothetical fees. It reflects a broader transformation in the nature of conflict surrounding Hormuz. The strait long viewed as an energy artery now appears increasingly central to a wider struggle over data, digital infrastructure and sovereignty in an interconnected world.
While Iran presents its proposal as a defense of national rights and sovereignty, Gulf states and telecommunications companies see any attempt to impose fees or restrictions on submarine cables as a move that could pull the internet itself into the arena of geopolitical coercion. The question, therefore, is no longer confined to whether oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz might be threatened — but whether the flow of data through the waterway could become part of the conflict as well.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
