A U.S. Partner Caught in Trump’s Hormuz Pressure

Oman has long occupied a delicate place in Gulf diplomacy: close enough to Washington to be useful, and trusted enough by Tehran to mediate. But when President Donald Trump was asked about a possible arrangement allowing Oman and Iran to manage the Strait of Hormuz, he not only rejected the idea — he warned that Muscat should “act like everyone else” or risk being “blown up.”

The remark immediately raised a larger question: why had Oman, a longtime U.S. partner rather than an adversary, been pulled into the pressure campaign at all?

The answer lay in the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz, which has shadowed more than 80 days of war with Iran. Tehran had halted traffic through the passage, a conduit for more than one-fifth of the world’s crude oil, before it was partially reopened under a fragile truce.

Shortly before Trump’s comment, Iranian state media reported a draft memorandum of understanding that would give Tehran and Muscat joint management of the strait, possibly including transit fees. The Trump administration dismissed the account as “entirely fabricated.” Hours later, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent threatened Oman with measures if it supported fees on passage through the strait, before saying he had received Omani assurances that there was no intention to impose them.

That sequence captured both Oman’s value and its dilemma.

Oman’s relationship with the United States stretches back nearly two centuries, beginning with the 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the arrival of the first Arab envoy in New York in 1840. It continued through a free trade agreement that entered into force in 2009 and Omani mediation that helped pave the way for the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.

Still, Trump’s comments were received in Oman as “shocking and offensive,” said Linda Funsch, an American scholar specializing in Omani affairs. They could not simply be dismissed as “another impulsive outburst or a political joke,” she told Alhurra, because they “touched a matter far deeper, that of national dignity. In that, it certainly crossed a line. For many Omanis, the reaction was not merely one of political anger, but genuine disbelief. Oman has never been an enemy of Washington.”

Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi meets with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Geneva, two days before the outbreak of the war, Feb. 26, 2026. Reuters.

Mukhtar al-Hinai, an Omani journalist, told Alhurra that Trump’s comments appeared to be more of a political pressure tactic than an actual policy. Trump, he said, has repeatedly used verbal escalation with China, Iraq and Lebanon as a media tool before any practical step. In his view, the episode has not reached the level of a crisis.

Abdullah Baabood, an academic specializing in Gulf affairs, described the remark as a “misreading of the Omani position” rather than an institutional shift. But he warned that its real danger lies in creating the impression that Washington no longer distinguishes between a friend, a useful mediator and a hostile party — a perception that could harm U.S. interests in the region before it harms Oman.

For decades, Muscat has served as a back channel between Washington and Tehran, hosting secret and public talks that helped lay the groundwork for previous understandings. One day before the outbreak of the Iran war on Feb. 28, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi was meeting with U.S. officials and speaking of unprecedented progress in negotiations.

Successive American administrations have relied on Oman because it can speak to both sides without becoming a party to the conflict. Tehran also views Muscat with a level of trust it does not extend to other Gulf states. That is what makes Oman a natural presence in any discussion of Gulf security, even when it is not directly involved.

Qais al-Asta, a Kuwaiti writer, said Washington’s threat should be understood as an attempt to “unify the ranks” behind it during negotiations with Iran, while Muscat insists on nonalignment so it can remain an acceptable mediator.

Geography and security interests bind Oman to Iran, while the United States and the sultanate maintain a long security and economic partnership. Oman has refused to allow its territory to be used for strikes on Yemen or Iran, despite the cost of that refusal. Its foreign minister publicly criticized the war, calling it one of the gravest American miscalculations.

There is also an economic dimension to Washington’s concern. Oman may be among the least economically damaged countries in the region by the war, at least comparatively, because its major ports — Sohar, Salalah and Duqm — lie outside both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. As a result, they became alternative hubs for rerouting trade when the passage was disrupted.

Estimates point to a sharp rise in ship diversions toward Omani ports, as well as an increase of about 117 percent in exports handled through Oman on behalf of other Gulf countries since the war began.

But those gains have not been cost-free. Duqm and Salalah were hit by Iranian drone strikes that disrupted operations. War-risk insurance along the Omani coast has been repriced, leaving the sultanate less exposed than others, but not immune.

Analysts say such gains are circumstantial, created by the crisis, rather than evidence of a lasting strategic shift.

Funsch said Oman has “sought to leverage its geographic position for financial gain,” and “sees itself more as an Indian Ocean country. Having today established three major maritime and logistic gateways, deep water ports along its coast to provide services for naval fleets and international commerce. So in fact, it is more of an Indian Ocean country than a Gulf state in many, many respects.” That shifts the focus of American concern away from whether Muscat is profiting and toward a more fundamental question: whether Iran can control the passage.

Another reading adds Israel to the equation. Giorgio Cafiero, chief executive of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy, said “Oman’s relationship with Iran has generated friction between Muscat and both Trump administrations. Yet despite these tensions, relations between Washington and the Sultanate remained fundamentally stable, at least until President Trump’s recent threat to “blow up” Oman and accompanying warnings from his administration about possible sanctions. These developments suggest that the Trump administration may no longer be willing to tolerate Oman’s longstanding policy of relative neutrality and its pragmatic approach to maintaining constructive relations with Tehran.”

Cafiero linked that shift to what he described as an organized campaign in Washington by pro-Israel circles to recast Muscat from a trusted regional partner into a “problematic actor deserving of pressure,” a campaign reinforced by Oman’s position on the war in Gaza.

Kristin Smith Diwan, a senior scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, said there is a troubling pattern in the targeting of mediators. “Oman has been distinguishing itself not just as mediator but for its vocal advocacy of settlement with Iran, both before and during the war.  This does make it more of a target for those championing military escalation,” she said, though she expects Muscat “will find a solution that doesn’t put it at risk with all of its Gulf partners.”

In the end, Trump does not appear to want to “blow up” Oman so much as to enforce a new equation: the sultanate may remain a mediator, but only if it stands at an equal distance from everyone.

Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.