An airstrike that targeted a house in Baghdad and killed “Iranian advisers” has brought renewed attention to Tehran’s cross-border advisory strategy used to manage what it calls the “Axis of Resistance” across the Middle East.
While focus often centers on local armed factions in Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen, the role of these advisers remains less visible, even though they frequently form the backbone of coordination, planning and linkage across multiple arenas stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
The strike, which took place last Tuesday in the Iraqi capital, suggests that the confrontation between Washington and Tehran is expanding to include networks run behind the scenes by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, not just the field leadership of allied factions, as tensions escalate across the region amid the war.
Former U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey described the role of these Iranian advisers as “extremely important in transmitting Iranian directives to Tehran’s proxies, as well as providing advice, funding and weapons.”
Renad Mansour, a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center, said IRGC leaders operate in multiple regions and are increasingly being targeted, including in Baghdad by U.S. forces as the conflict unfolds.
The strike last Tuesday targeted a house rented by the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, killing five Iranians, including an adviser working with Shiite armed factions known as “Ansari,” an expert within the IRGC, according to information provided by a source in Iraq’s Interior Ministry to Alhurra.
For years, Tehran has relied on a model based on deploying military and security experts to countries experiencing conflict or weak state institutions—such as Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, as well as Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These individuals are officially presented as advisers providing support to governments or armed groups, but their role often extends beyond that.
In Iraq, Tehran has, since 2003, found an opportunity to expand its influence by backing Shiite armed factions, many of which later became part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition established in 2014 to fight ISIS before being formally incorporated into Iraq’s military structure under the armed forces.
The Popular Mobilization Forces include brigades affiliated with Iran-aligned factions that operate independently and are also part of what is known as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” which has claimed attacks against U.S. interests in the country since the United States and Israel launched strikes on targets in Iran on Feb. 28.
Iranian advisers have played a key role in reshaping these factions in terms of organization, armament and combat doctrine. They also contributed to coordinating operations against ISIS during the war that began in 2014, giving them additional legitimacy in some Iraqi circles.
Their role has extended to managing relations among factions and calibrating escalation or de-escalation, particularly regarding attacks on U.S. interests.
A former Iraqi government official told Alhurra that the work of Iranian advisers in Iraq is “a secretive world about which little is known, except that they were present in the past and that others were sent before the war.”
The former official, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue, said “the advisers are present but not officially acknowledged. They operate under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces rather than within other formal military institutions.”
He added that “there is confirmed information that Iran, as part of its preparations for the current war with the United States and Israel, has sent officers from the IRGC in addition to the advisers who were already there.”
The Popular Mobilization Forces provide their logistical needs, the former official said, while the advisers are responsible for issuing orders that the PMF then “executes on the ground.”
“There is a group of key drivers within the PMF—not ordinary individuals, but decision-makers. These are either Iranians working as advisers, Iraqis who hold Iranian citizenship, individuals who lived in Iran for long periods, or people with Iranian nationality living in Iraq—a mix of all these,” he added.
Spokespeople for the Iraqi government did not respond to a request for comment sent by Alhurra on the matter.
Since the start of the war, facilities belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces and other Iran-aligned Iraqi factions—some of which Washington designates as terrorist organizations—have been targeted. The United States and Israel have not confirmed carrying out these strikes.
Jeffrey said that “the Popular Mobilization Forces possess extensive military expertise and capabilities, but they still rely on Tehran for certain systems characterized by high precision and significant destructive power.”
Washington views Iran’s cooperation with the PMF as the most significant issue in U.S.-Iraq relations, according to Jeffrey.
“Given Iraq’s vast geography and enormous hydrocarbon wealth, this cooperation is also seen as a potential threat to regional security, particularly if Iran succeeds, through its instrument represented by the PMF, in creating a second Lebanon in the region,” Jeffrey added, referring to Hezbollah.
Before Iraq, Syria was the primary arena where Iran tested its “adviser” model. With the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011, Tehran quickly sent military advisers to support the Syrian government.
Initially limited to advisory roles, their involvement soon expanded to include direct oversight of military operations and the organization of local and foreign militias, including fighters from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. These advisers also played a role in restructuring pro-government forces into a more effective fighting force.
Under Assad, Syria became a hub for the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” where multiple factions’ operations were coordinated under direct Iranian supervision.
In Lebanon, Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah dates back to the 1980s, when Iranian advisers played a central role in founding, training and arming the group.
The Lebanese model demonstrates greater local autonomy compared to other arenas, but this does not negate the advisers’ role in areas such as missile development, strategic planning and regional coordination, as well as maintaining coordination channels at various levels.
In Yemen, the situation differs somewhat due to geographic distance. However, media reports indicate the presence of Iranian advisers providing support to the Houthi group, either directly or through informal channels. This support focuses on transferring military technology—particularly drones and missiles—as well as offering operational guidance.
Amid these dynamics, experts say Tehran’s strategy for managing armed groups in the region has evolved since 2020, following the killing of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, in a U.S. strike in Baghdad.
“The way this model was designed was largely shaped by Soleimani and relied heavily on a centralized leadership style, as he maintained highly informal ties with many of these groups,” Mansour said during a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council on Tuesday.
“He was the ultimate decision-maker and the de facto leader of this system, but with his death and the rise of Esmail Qaani to lead the Quds Force, the model has changed to some extent,” Mansour added.
Under the new model of the Quds Force led by Qaani and others, the structure has become significantly more decentralized, according to Mansour.
Reports in recent years have also indicated that officials from Hezbollah have traveled to Baghdad and Yemen to provide security training to Iran-aligned factions in Iraq and to the Houthis.
“Advisers are present, and although the structure has become more decentralized, their role is still viewed as supportive in every possible way. Whenever Iran needs them to take action, they will certainly move to do so,” Mansour said. “They remain active on the ground and continue to be targeted across all these countries.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
