The Gulf Arab states were not given advance notification when the United States and Israel launched their joint strikes on Iran at dawn on Feb. 28. Residents of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Manama woke up to a new reality they had not chosen: a full-scale regional war unfolding on their doorstep — with none of them having a say over the outcome.
Less than two days later, Tehran’s response confirmed their worst fears. For the first time in history, even though none of them had participated in the attacks on Iran, all six Gulf Cooperation Council states were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. There were casualties and injuries. Oil and gas production was disrupted. And the trust built over years of quiet diplomacy with Tehran was shaken.
Now, more than a month into the war, the Gulf finds itself in its most paradoxical position: it is affected by the conflict more than any other region yet its representatives are excluded from efforts to end it.
The numbers alone tell the story. Two thousand commercial vessels and around 20,000 sailors are stranded in the Strait of Hormuz, the passage through which one-fifth of the world’s oil flows daily. Energy prices have surged sharply, maritime insurance premiums have doubled, and global supply chains are stuttering. Experts describe what is happening as the worst trade disruption in 80 years.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which hinges on transforming the kingdom into a global tourism and investment destination, is facing an existential test. Who would invest in a region where missiles are falling? And how can you promote tourism when you are within range of drones from an open war? The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has built its reputation as a safe haven for business and technology, is waiting for the war to end before it can resume reaping the benefits of its international policies.
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman — small but economically powerful states — are experiencing the same situation to varying degrees. They now find themselves in the line of fire without having fired a single shot.
What is currently unfolding at the diplomatic level reveals a structural flaw. Washington and Tehran are exchanging messages through intermediaries—Pakistan, Oman, and Turkey—over a 15-point American proposal demanding that Iran dismantle its entire nuclear program, relinquish its stockpile of enriched uranium, and open all its facilities to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran has rejected the proposal as “impractical and unreasonable” and has submitted a more modest counterproposal.
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Yet no one in Washington is asking about the needs and worries of the Gulf, home to some of its loyal allies.
The Gulf Cooperation Council states are not merely Iran’s geographic neighbors. They are the parties that will live with the consequences of any agreement — or any failure — for decades to come. They share the Gulf basin, with its oil resources, fisheries, and maritime routes, with Iran. They host millions of foreign workers on whom the region’s entire economy depends. And they will bear the burden of reconstruction and stabilization once the guns fall silent.
As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan stated: “[I]t is important for the Iranians to understand that the kingdom, but also its partners who have been attacked and beyond, have very significant capacities and capabilities that they could bring to bear should they choose to do so.” This is not an empty threat — it is a reminder that the Gulf is a strategic actor that cannot be ignored.
History teaches us that agreements imposed on the region from the outside do not endure.
There are three fundamental reasons why any negotiations without the Gulf are destined to fail. First, maritime security. The Strait of Hormuz is not an Iranian passage but a shared lifeline. Any security arrangement to ensure freedom of navigation after the war cannot hold without the participation of the states along its coast. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are not mere observers — they are partners in managing the most critical waterway in the global economy.
Second, the nuclear issue does not end with the destruction of a facility. Even if the strikes succeed in delaying Iran’s nuclear program for years, technical knowledge cannot be bombed away. Iran will rebuild unless there is a sustainable diplomatic framework that includes genuine regional security guarantees. The Gulf countries are best positioned to offer Iran economic and security incentives in exchange for lasting nuclear concessions — because their relationship is existential and long-term.
Third, the future of proxy networks must be addressed. Hezbollah is under attack in Lebanon, the Houthis are recalculating, and Iraqi militias are watching clo sely. The dismantling of Iran’s “axis of resistance” —if it occurs — will create massive political and security vacuums in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Filling these vacuums requires massive Gulf investments and diplomatic influence that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv possesses. Simply put: The Gulf will pay the post-war bill, so why should it not help shape its terms?
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It is no secret that Gulf states are not entirely unified in their positions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE lean toward maintaining military pressure on Iran after their territories were directly targeted. Oman, true to its diplomatic tradition, is calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Its foreign minister stated clearly: “[T]he national interests of both Iran and America lie in the earliest possible end to hostilities.”
But this division — despite its challenges — can be a source of strength if properly leveraged. Collectively, Gulf states possess a unique diplomatic spectrum: from Saudi firmness to Omani neutrality, from Emirati pragmatism to Qatari willingness to mediate. This diversity gives them the ability to speak to all parties with credibility, something Washington alone cannot achieve.
Paradoxically, the war has restored cohesion within the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudi-Emirati rift that deepened in recent years has significantly eased in the face of shared anger over Iranian attacks. This rare moment of alignment should be seized before it fades.
On Apr. 6, the temporary U.S. suspension of strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure is set to expire. Either the war will resume with greater intensity, or a genuine diplomatic channel will open. In both scenarios, Gulf states will be the most affected by the outcome.
History teaches us that agreements imposed on the region from the outside do not endure. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was drawn in London and Paris and produced a century of instability. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran was concluded in Vienna without meaningful Gulf participation, and it collapsed. Any new regional arrangement that ignores those who live in the region and bear the cost of its wars will meet the same fate.
What the Gulf needs today is not only a seat at a future negotiating table, but a voice that is heard. We are not a battlefield for proxy wars, nor are we a margin on the maps of great powers. We are partners in making peace because we pay the price of war.
And a world that ignores this voice today will hear it tomorrow — but at a far greater cost.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Abdulaziz Alkhamis
Abdulaziz Al-Khamis is a Dubai-based writer and political analyst specializing in Middle East and North Africa affairs.
