Iran’s Ground War Dilemma

“We are waiting for them.” With this contradictory phrase—one that suggests both confidence and readiness—Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded to a question about the possibility of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran. The remark quickly spread online and was reinforced by Tasnim News Agency, which is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claiming that Iran is preparing more than “one million fighters” to confront any potential incursion into its territory.

But to what extent does this number reflect reality on the ground?

With a scarcity of sources offering precise estimates, the size of Iran’s combat force remains shrouded in ambiguity, says Ben Connable, a military expert and security studies researcher at Georgetown University, in remarks to Alhurra. He notes that “any discussion of an accurate estimate of this force may be exaggerated to the point of being difficult to believe.” At the same time, such figures do not necessarily reflect a unified force on the ground, nor do they imply the existence of a cohesive, field-ready formation capable of fighting a single conventional battle.

Members of the Iranian army take part in military exercises near the Strait of Hormuz (Reuters)

After a month of escalation in confrontation with the United States and Israel, the figure of “one million fighters” has been accompanied by reports of volunteers flowing into the army, the Revolutionary Guard, and the mobilization forces known as the Basij—together forming Iran’s military system.

Available estimates cited by some research centers suggest that Iran’s regular forces number around 400,000 personnel, including approximately 350,000 in the ground forces. Despite their size, these forces carry less political weight than the Revolutionary Guard, whose system is estimated at more than 190,000 personnel, including over 150,000 in its ground forces.

The Guard’s primary mission is to protect the regime. It leads the missile program, exerts deep influence over security decisions, and maintains a structure parallel to the state’s authority.

As for the Basij volunteers—a local mobilization network formally placed under the Revolutionary Guard’s command since 2007—estimates indicate that their membership reaches several million, including roughly one million categorized as “active.” This classification, however, is organizational and does not necessarily reflect regular combat readiness.

Raphael Cohen, director of the strategy and doctrine program at the RAND Corporation, told Alhurra that Iran has recently expanded recruitment, including allowing younger age groups to join the Basij, “some no older than 12,” noting that these recruits “will not be trained to the same level as more experienced soldiers.”

Geography also plays an additional role in the effectiveness of this force. Retired Brigadier General Khalfan Al Kaabi, a military expert, explains to Alhurra that the issue lies not in the scale of mobilization but in the ability to transform it into an effective force on the battlefield.

According to his assessment, if the confrontation shifts from mainland Iran to the islands, the challenge is no longer the size of the declared mobilization, but rather the actual ability to transport, equip, and deploy these forces to the combat zone—making the figure closer to a propaganda tool than a force ready for decisive field operations.

An Iranian fighter jet inside an underground shelter (Reuters)

All of this comes as U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that Iran’s ground and air forces, although among the largest in the region, still rely on outdated systems and face constraints in training and modernization. This reflects a gap between numerical size and actual combat readiness.

To understand the shape of a potential ground war, one must examine the structure of the Iranian military, which is based on a dual model combining a regular army responsible for conventional defense and a parallel Revolutionary Guard tasked with protecting the regime and managing strategic warfare.

According to estimates from the Middle East Institute and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s regular army is responsible for traditional defense and absorbing the initial shock, while the Revolutionary Guard leads asymmetric operations and ensures continuity of command. Meanwhile, the Basij operates as a local deployment network capable of turning cities into complex combat environments that are difficult to control.

Drawing on its experience in the Iran–Iraq War, Iran has developed what is known as the “mosaic strategy”—a defensive doctrine based on small, decentralized units capable of continuing operations even if command structures are disrupted, with the aim of containing any breach and turning it into a prolonged war of attrition.

Thus, the most realistic scenario is not a rapid decisive battle, but rather a shift toward urban warfare and a long war of attrition. Reports from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency describe Iran’s doctrine as based on “guerrilla warfare tactics” and the creation of rapid substitutes.

Iranian Defense Ministry spokesperson Reza Talaei stated: “We have three levels of replacements for every commander.”

On the other hand, Raphael Cohen believes that strikes targeting senior leadership “weaken top-down command and control,” but also push toward “greater decentralization, where lower-level commanders gain more room to act independently.”

For this reason, the hypothesis of internal collapse has not materialized so far, while maritime borders remain the most sensitive point for a potential invasion—prompting Iran to develop a naval doctrine aimed at preventing any possible amphibious landing.

Members of the Iranian army during military exercises near the Strait of Hormuz (Reuters)

Naval Power and the First Line of Defense

After weeks of strikes that targeted more than 150 Iranian vessels, it may appear that the naval balance of power has been quickly decided—or “neutralized”—according to data from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and official American statements.

But in this war, destroying ships does not necessarily eliminate the threat.

According to several research centers, Iran’s navy relies on an asymmetric doctrine aimed at disrupting the adversary and raising the cost of its movements from the earliest stages. This is achieved through tools such as fast boats, mines, coastal missiles, and drones, rather than engaging in direct conventional naval battles—an approach classified under “anti-access” capabilities, as noted in analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

This approach is particularly evident in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global oil trade passes, making even limited disruption capable of impacting markets and exerting pressure.

Iran also retains a key advantage: its ground forces—or the “one million fighters”—have not yet entered a large-scale direct engagement.

From here, the question is no longer: can access be achieved? But rather: what happens after access?

To illustrate, one can look at a city like Bandar Abbas, home to around 500,000 people and located along one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.

Operations could begin with landings or the seizure of specific sites around the city, supported by air power, at a time when U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth speaks of “complete control of Iranian airspace.” Yet this superiority, despite its importance, may not be decisive, according to experts.

Iran’s air force has never been the centerpiece of Tehran’s strategy, and the nature of combat—especially when it shifts into dense urban environments—limits the impact of such superiority.

Ben Connable notes that cities of this size may be “easier to enter than to control,” citing examples such as Ramadi in Iraq, where operations took months despite military superiority.

This is reinforced by U.S. military literature, which estimates the need for roughly 20 personnel per 1,000 inhabitants in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations. This means that the challenge lies not in entering a city, but in the ability to deploy and sustain forces within it.

If this challenge applies to a single city, it multiplies when considering a country the size of Iran, with a population of over 90 million and a vast territory exceeding 1.6 million square kilometers. This makes any attempt at full control an extremely complex task in terms of manpower, deployment, and sustainability—at least in theory.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.