In his youth, former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was influenced by Sayyid Qutb, one of the most prominent theorists and thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He read Qutb’s writings carefully, translated them into Persian, and incorporated them into the lessons he delivered to his students in the seminary.
This fact is key to understanding the evolution of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist, as well as the role the Brotherhood plays in the war currently unfolding in the Middle East, and the rift that the war on Iran has created between Islamist organizations, both Brotherhood-affiliated and Salafi.
Immediately after the outbreak of the war on Iran, Hamas, one of the most prominent branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, rushed to condemn the U.S.-Israeli strikes, expressing its support for Tehran in this battle. The movement was also among the first to mourn Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, describing his assassination as a “treacherous Zionist-American aggression,” and expressed its full solidarity with Iran, leadership and people, praising its “continuous role in supporting the Palestinian cause over decades.”
Paradoxically, this position collided with the reality that many Hamas leaders reside in Qatar, which has been subjected to Iranian aggression since the start of the war. Activists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood inside Qatar expressed support for Iran in the war. One of them, a Palestinian academic, posted a tweet that led to his arrest and deportation along with his family from Qatar. In it, he wrote: “They paid trillions to Trump to protect them, only for him to set their house on fire. So, take heed, O people of insight.”
This tweet reflects the essence of the ambiguity in the nature of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian regime. Describing the historical and ideological nature of this relationship, expert on Islamist groups Ahmed Ban told Alhurra that the Brotherhood’s stance toward Iran is a complex one.
“You will find some factions within the Brotherhood that identify with Iran and consider it a model of a state that has tried to achieve independence away from the West or from Western will, despite the sectarian differences.”
He adds, explaining the structural overlap in the concept of authority: “The Guardianship of the Jurist is, in essence, closer to the model of the Islamic caliphate that the Muslim Brotherhood seeks. There is a degree of intellectual and conceptual alignment between them. We are facing the Guardianship of the Jurist in both its Sunni and Shiite forms. Even in structure, the idea of a supreme guide exists in both cases.”
Regarding the jurisprudential roots of this convergence, Ban explains that “the idea of considering the Imamate as one of the fundamentals of religion is established in the Brotherhood’s jurisprudence, unlike all Sunni schools. In this, it agrees with the Imami or Twelver Shiite doctrine. Hassan al-Banna considered the Imamate to be among the fundamentals of religion, not its branches. Therefore, he meets Shiite thought in the importance of appointing an imam over the entire Muslim nation.”
Researcher on Islamist movements Maher Farghali says that the relationship between political Islam and the state is inherently unstable. These groups do not view the state as a final framework, but rather as an entity that can be utilized or transformed.
He explains that this understanding makes relationships with states (including Qatar) based on temporary benefit, while maintaining a broader ideological vision that transcends the state itself. He adds that the relationship with Qatar historically formed on the basis of mutual interests: Doha provided a supportive environment and political and media backing for the Muslim Brotherhood, while the presence of these groups served as a tool of influence. However, he points out that this relationship has always been governed by a certain سقف (ceiling), based on balancing support with adherence to a specific discourse. With the evolution of events, especially amid regional tensions, imbalances have begun to emerge in this equation.
Farghali notes that these groups’ behavior toward Gulf states has been marked by pragmatism, with positions shifting across different phases—from supporting the Iranian revolution, to varied stances during the Gulf War, to the current inclination toward supporting Iran amid the latest escalation. He also points out that the emergence of voices, whether through media platforms or social media, outside the previously regulated framework of this relationship has put pressure on Qatar, prompting it to intervene to recalibrate discourse and attempt to contain the existing divergence.
In this context, former Jordanian Minister of Culture and Minister of State for Media Affairs Samih al-Maaytah recalls historical experiences with these currents. In an interview with Alhurra, he argues that these movements “were not successful in several of their key political junctures, foremost among them their position on the invasion of Kuwait, when they, as they do today, bet on a potential role for Saddam Hussein’s regime in liberating Palestine. This led them to adopt positions that appeared as bias against Kuwait, despite its historical role in supporting the Palestinian cause and hosting Palestinians and even contributing to the early support of movements such as Hamas.”
He adds that many leaders and members of these movements lived in Kuwait before 1990, yet there was a degree of denial of the support provided by Gulf states, alongside a clear absence of the concept of stable relations and the presence of opportunistic tendencies in dealing with crises. He notes that these groups often lack the political maturity necessary to formulate balanced positions.
According to al-Maaytah, Hamas in earlier stages attempted to maintain a balance between its relationship with Iran and its relationship with Qatar, as it was not forced to make a sharp choice between the two. However, the recent phase has clearly imposed this choice, leading to a tilt toward the relationship with Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
He adds that this shift has not remained confined within Hamas but has also been reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world, where the movement played a role in pushing this direction within the broader organization, resulting in a decline in the level of balance that previously existed.
However, this matter is not entirely agreed upon within the movement. There are different currents within the Muslim Brotherhood, as Ahmed Ban explains: “There is a feeling among broad sectors within the Brotherhood that Iran betrayed Hamas’s battle. The Hamas vision was that there was an agreement for the war to begin and to implement the ‘unity of arenas’ theory. But they believe Iran squandered this opportunity, ultimately prioritized its own interests, and left Hamas to face its fate.”
Ban explains that there is a Salafi current within the Brotherhood that rejects rapprochement with the Guardianship of the Jurist system, as it views Iran as “an enemy of Sunnis,” and a form of extremism against Sunni doctrines, including the issue of insulting the companions of the Prophet. It accuses Iran of carrying a Persian nationalist project that disguises itself in Islamic garb but is not serious about adhering to Islamic rules. This Salafi current intersects in some aspects of its discourse with the interests of certain Gulf states in containing Shiite groups spread in some countries, particularly Bahrain and Kuwait.
For his part, Bahraini writer Jaafar Salman does not separate the position of some Islamist currents today from the ideological nature of the movement. In his interview with Alhurra, he says that these movements may ally with different regimes and intersect with them in interests but ultimately tend to align with what they see as an intellectual extension of themselves.
He explains that Iran represents such an extension for some of these currents, due to ideological overlaps despite sectarian differences. This reflects Iran’s success over the years in building an advanced relationship with Hamas, as al-Maaytah notes, bringing it closer in nature to the pattern of relations it has with other parties in the region (such as Hezbollah), while taking into account the specificity of each case. This occurs within a broader context of tension between Gulf states and political Islam movements in recent years, and the resulting decline in the presence of these movements within the Gulf.
Ahmed Ban agrees with this assessment and rules out strong influence of the Brotherhood within societies in Gulf states or Jordan, noting that “the decline of the Brotherhood in Egypt has had repercussions across the Arab world, not only in Egypt. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s narrative is no longer able to recruit more followers or secure greater loyalty to these ideas.”
At the same time, he expresses concern that this fragmentation and weakness could push some individuals within these organizations toward violence: “We have seen in Egyptian prisons pledges of allegiance by members of the Brotherhood to ISIS. This is natural when an organization collapses and experiences repeated failure—either members withdraw and abandon the idea altogether, or they join more violent organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
