The renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz, amid the war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, has revived longstanding questions in the Gulf about alternative oil export routes. This comes as the vital maritime passage has become increasingly vulnerable to disruption or threat, intensifying economic pressure on countries in the region.
With around 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies passing through the strait, securing energy flows has become more urgent and complex for Gulf states. These countries have found themselves compelled to search for alternative outlets that reduce reliance on this strategic artery.
In this context, Yemen is once again emerging as a potential option—at least theoretically—to provide an alternative route for Gulf oil exports.
A source speaking to Alhurra, who requested anonymity, said that “the idea of creating an alternative route to export oil through Yemeni territory emerged early on, with proposals to extend a massive oil pipeline passing through Hadramawt or Al-Mahra to the Arabian Sea, providing a safe outlet away from the Strait of Hormuz.”
The source added that a similar proposal was also discussed in cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, but it faced complications that prevented its implementation. The source noted that the idea had been discussed in earlier stages, including during the rule of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. At the time, disagreements centered around sovereignty over the pipeline route and mechanisms for securing it, amid Yemeni concerns over the possibility of full Saudi control over the pipeline and its security management.
Despite these challenges, the source confirmed that this option has remained present within Saudi strategic thinking, based on viewing Yemen as a potential and secure outlet for oil exports, alongside existing projects such as the East-West pipeline (Yanbu). This reflects a Saudi orientation toward diversifying export routes and reducing reliance on traditional pathways.
The two regions of interest constitute roughly half of Yemen’s territory: the oil-rich Hadramawt region bordering Saudi Arabia, and Al-Mahra governorate adjacent to Oman.
On the Hadramawt coast lies the port of Mukalla, geographically closest to potential pipeline routes extending from within the Arabian Peninsula. Meanwhile, Nishtun port in Al-Mahra is located along the open Arabian Sea shipping lanes, making it a suitable option for direct export projects that bypass any chokepoints.
Despite the current limitations of infrastructure at these ports, they could transform into alternative gateways if political will and financing are secured.
“The most important issue for Yemen in the long term will be renewed Saudi interest in bypassing the Strait of Hormuz by building a pipeline to the Arabian Sea, either through Hadramawt or Al-Mahra,” April Longley Alley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute focusing on Yemen and the Gulf, told Alhurra.
Khaled Al-Shamiri, head of the Political Studies Center in Yemen, believes that the search for a maritime outlet through Yemeni ports is not new, but rather represents “an extension of an old Saudi ambition.”
“Saudi Arabia views eastern provinces such as Al-Mahra and Hadramawt as potential corridors for oil pipelines and seeks to link southern coasts to its oil interests,” Al-Shamiri added to Alhurra.
However, several economic and political challenges stand in the way of such a project, particularly given the conflict conditions in Yemen and regional competition—especially between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Since the launch of the war on April 21, 2015, led by Saudi Arabia to support the internationally recognized Yemeni government against the Houthis, increasing questions have emerged in political and media discourse regarding the strategic dimensions of this intervention, foremost among them the issue of Yemeni ports.
This discussion is not dissociated from developments in the war and has grown stronger over time, particularly with the Saudi military presence in Al-Mahra governorate since 2017, which has been associated with widespread speculation about Riyadh’s efforts to secure a potential oil pipeline route to the Arabian Sea.
However, interest in Yemeni ports predates the outbreak of war by years. In 2008, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh granted Dubai Ports World the right to manage the port of Aden and other ports for 100 years. This agreement did not last, however, as it was canceled following the Yemeni revolution that ousted Saleh, by decision of the Aden Gulf Corporation’s board.
At the time, Yemen’s Minister of Transport called for amending or canceling the agreement, considering it unfair to Yemen and arguing that it had been concluded in a context dominated by political considerations at the expense of economic interests.
The justifications for cancellation reflect a broader view concerning the nature of the UAE’s role in managing a port that is a direct competitor to its own ports. Questions arose as to whether the goal was to develop the port or to control its performance and slow its pace in order to preserve the superiority of UAE ports.
With the outbreak of war in Yemen, the UAE returned to a presence at the port of Aden, but within a different context linked to operations described as “restoring legitimacy,” reopening debate about the nature and limits of this role.
As the conflict expanded, discussion was no longer limited to the port of Aden but extended to a broader range of Yemeni ports. Indications increased of Emirati efforts to establish influence over southern Yemeni ports—from Mukalla in the east to Aden in the west—as well as interest in ports along the western coast, alongside attempts to control strategic ports such as Mokha and Hodeidah.
From this perspective, Majed Al-Madhaji, head of the Sana’a Center for Studies, believes that talk of direct Emirati “takeover” of ports may be exaggerated. He explained that the management of these facilities was conducted through local allies, and that any logistical support passed through these frameworks.
Al-Madhaji pointed to the absence of direct commercial contracts or legal arrangements in the UAE’s name, given that legal authority to conclude agreements lies with the legitimate government and local authorities. At the same time, he acknowledged the existence of security influence on the ground, though it was often exercised through allied local forces rather than direct control.
Nevertheless, the impact of competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen on this file cannot be ignored.
“The recent tension with the UAE is partly linked to competition over maritime influence and shipping lanes between the two sides,” Al-Shamiri said.
Politically, this is one dimension. Economically, however, the feasibility of moving forward with such a project faces a similar set of challenges.
Among the most prominent challenges is the limited current capacity of Yemeni ports in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, as well as the high cost of building integrated infrastructure that includes pipelines, ports, and storage facilities. Even if these were available, the continuation of conflict in Yemen and the deterioration of infrastructure increase investment risks and make implementing such projects highly complex.
Geographical constraints also emerge, not limited to Yemen but extending to Saudi Arabia as well, due to rugged terrain and the long distances pipelines would need to traverse, which raises production costs.
From this standpoint, Saudi researcher and writer specializing in international affairs, Saad Abdullah Al-Hamed, believes that the success of the idea depends on several factors, most importantly achieving political stability in Yemen, securing Gulf partnerships, and ensuring security guarantees.
“The idea of replacing Hormuz with ports in Yemen remains theoretically possible, but this proposal is closer to a complementary option that cannot fully replace the strait,” Al-Hamed added.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
