Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, recently replaced his profile picture on X with a world map prominently displaying Turkey in a way that appeared to overshadow the Middle East.
Many saw the image as reflecting Turkey’s expansionist ambitions in the region and a nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. But beyond symbolism, there are numerous indicators of an expanding Turkish role in the Middle East, particularly as Iran and its proxies have been weakened in the recent war with the United States and Israel—developments that are creating new concerns in Israel.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett expressed that concern clearly in remarks dating back to February, warning that “Turkey is the new Iran.” He explained that “Turkey, along with Qatar, has gained influence in Syria, and they are seeking to expand that influence elsewhere and across the region,” describing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “cunning and dangerous” and aiming to encircle Israel.
Soner Cagaptay, a specialist on Turkish affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Turkey and Israel are in a state of strategic competition. In Syria, Ankara views Israel as threatening its core interests through its ties with the Druze and the Syrian Democratic Forces—efforts that appear to undermine the central authority of the Syrian state.
Conversely, Cagaptay said, Israel sees Ankara—through its support for “Hamas,” which Israel designates a terrorist organization, and its stance on Gaza—as forming a front that threatens its national security.
Broader alignments are taking shape in the Middle East, influenced by Turkish-Israeli competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, and potentially intensified by the repercussions of the U.S.-Iran war. Cagaptay said two alliances appear to be emerging in the region, stretching from South Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean. Each bloc includes a nuclear power, a wealthy Gulf monarchy, a Levantine power and an Eastern Mediterranean state. Specifically, these alignments consist of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey on one side, and Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates and Greece on the other.
Cagaptay added that, for the first time, the region now encompasses both the Eastern Mediterranean and South Asia together. “I guess you could also add Horn of Africa to it, where this competition is now apparent in places such as Somalia, when Turkey and Israel support opposing sides,” he said. “So, I think we just need to maybe brace a little bit for not just Turkish-Israeli competition, but also these two alliances emerging of four countries, you know, actors bringing different capabilities to the alliances.”
Mohammad Sarmini, founder of the Jusoor Center for Studies, does not view Turkey’s expansion through the lens of traditional nuclear deterrence potentially provided by its relationship with Pakistan alone. Instead, he said, Turkey is working to establish “technological deterrence” vis-à-vis Israel, driven by its defense industries. While Iran relied on saturating Israeli air defenses with missiles during its war with Israel, Turkey is entering the hypersonic missile arena through the company Roketsan—a weapon Sarmini described in an interview with Alhurra as “highly deterrent for Israel” after demonstrating its effectiveness in the wars of 2025.
Sarmini ruled out the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in any potential confrontation with Israel, citing complex political considerations. Russia, despite possessing nuclear weapons, has not used them in its war with Ukraine. Technically, he said, Turkey’s defense manufacturing is advanced, particularly in drone production. Baykar has maintained its position as a leading exporter of unmanned aerial vehicles, and Turkey’s partnership with Ukraine could further enhance its technologies through Kyiv.
However, Israel’s real concern does not stem solely from missiles, but from what Sarmini described as Ankara’s “energy diplomacy.” Turkey has succeeded in dismantling the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which was designed to isolate it, and has managed to neutralize Egypt and draw it toward strategic options away from what he called “Israeli pressure.” According to Sarmini, transforming Istanbul and Syria into hubs for gas aggregation and export to Europe would deal a major blow to Israel’s economy and render the “Spice Route” project centered on the port of Haifa little more than a stalled ambition in the face of Turkey’s influence in the Red Sea and its alliances in Sudan and Somalia.
Israel’s response to the Oct. 7, 2023 attack by ‘Hamas” led to the neutralization and weakening of several Iranian proxies in the region, particularly “Hamas” and “Hezbollah” in Lebanon. This raises questions about Ankara’s willingness to adopt Iran’s former proxies or create similar networks of its own. Here, Sarmini said, Turkey prefers to work with “states” rather than “organizations.” Despite possible diplomatic protection Ankara may offer Tehran in a post-Ali Khamenei phase, Turkey deals with a “de facto system” and is not inclined to pursue sectarian policies or support Iran-aligned groups.
Strengthening Lebanon’s “Hezbollah” could also harm Turkey’s relationship with the administration of Donald Trump, which Ankara seeks to avoid. Instead, Turkey is focusing on “developing the strength of the Syrian army” to serve as the first line of defense—an approach reflected in Turkish mediation to link Damascus with Kyiv in defense cooperation, training Syrian forces and providing support, as seen during the recent visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Damascus.
This approach positions Turkey as a “new Iran,” but in a “legitimate” form. Rather than arming militias to undermine states, it seeks to reshape neighboring states around Israel into obstacles to Tel Aviv’s ambitions. This helps explain Israel’s existential concern: confronting a “state” with economic power, technological capacity and international alliances is far more difficult than confronting an isolated Iran whose military infrastructure has been weakened by sustained U.S. and Israeli strikes.
According to Sarmini, Turkey has used its diplomacy for years to thwart Israel’s regional plans and appears to have influenced the Trump administration to contain the current war and prevent it from escalating toward the disintegration of the Iranian state—an outcome Israel had sought but which would harm Turkey’s national security.
Personal factors also play a role in intensifying strategic competition between Turkey and Israel, Cagaptay noted. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Erdoğan harbor deep political animosity toward each other, making it very difficult for the two countries to find common ground. Still, Cagaptay believes a solution may lie in both leaders’ good relations with Trump, who could impose a “detent” between the two countries by “telling Turkey [that] Gaza is Israel’s area of influence, and telling Israel [that] Syria is Turkey’s area of influence.” “I think that there’s a way through it,” the Turkish-American analyst stated.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Rami Al Amine
Rami Al-Amin is a Lebanese writer and correspondent for MBN covering political, social and cultural developments across the Middle East. He produces and presents the satirical critique segment Bitter Sweet, which examines current events through a critical lens. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South, a political booklet on Hezbollah, and The Two Mourners, a book on the history of Beirut’s Martyrs’ Statue.
