At the beginning of this April, after the Israeli Knesset passed a law allowing the execution of Palestinians convicted of killing Israelis, angry protests broke out in the streets of Damascus. Demonstrators chanted in support of Gaza and the “Palestinian cause,” attacked the UAE embassy building in Damascus, lowered the Emirati flag, and replaced it with the Palestinian flag. During these protests, demonstrators also chanted: “Saddam Hussein taught us — we die and Palestine lives.”
This coincided with the announcement by a masked group of jihad (holy war) against Israel from the Daraa region in southern Syria. It later turned out that its members were from groups that had attacked the Druze of Suwayda last July.
Months earlier, a video had surfaced showing factions of the Syrian army chanting during an official military parade: “Gaza, we are with you until death.” This was repeated with government forces affiliated with Sharaa chanting “Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews” after taking control of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo.
All these developments appear contradictory to the path pursued by the new Syrian authority led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—namely, moving toward direct negotiations with Israel and forming a strong alliance with the United States, alongside attempts to display some social openness. These efforts have faced objections from Islamists within the authority and from a broad segment of the public regarding the current trajectory in the country.
Syrian researcher specializing in Islamist groups, Hossam Jazmati, explains to Alhurra that this Islamist opposition has manifested in criticism of laws and behaviors that do not align with an Islamic character. The most recent example was a sports celebration at the opening of a basketball arena, which included dancing and singing—provoking widespread discontent among Sharaa’s supporters, who considered it “indecent.” This reflects the divergence between leadership and grassroots, which has naturally extended into politics, particularly regarding Gaza and the conflict with Israel.
Jazmati explains that this “organizational split” becomes more apparent the closer one gets to the top leadership, where there is greater understanding of the new “political lines” under the pretext of “empowerment” and strategic necessities. However, as one moves down to mid-level leadership and grassroots supporters, questions and objections increase, as they view recent shifts as emptying the project of its ideological and intellectual content.
Jazmati also notes the absence of traditional Islamist groups, in the organized sense, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, whom Sharaa has effectively shut out and given no opportunity to emerge.
Ayman Abdullah, director of the “Independent News Team” platform and a close observer of groups surrounding Ahmed al-Sharaa’s system, told Alhurra that “these contradictions are in fact a natural result of the history of these groups and their relationship with Sharaa.”
According to Abdullah, the protests that occurred were “indirectly organized by the political body affiliated with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.” However, they spiraled out of control due to contradictions among these groups, with some chanting for Gaza, others for Saddam Hussein, and some attacking the UAE embassy.
Jazmati interprets this popular momentum as stemming from a broader Sunni Arab base that remains emotionally charged toward the Palestinian cause, “blending Arab identity, Islam, and chivalry.” This spirit drove people to protest and attack the UAE embassy in response to reports of cooperation with Israel.
Sharaa’s authority finds itself caught between two fires, as Abdullah puts it. On one hand, it seeks to maintain anti-Israel rhetoric to avoid losing popular support; on the other, it aims to show the United States and Israel that it does not allow any military activity against Israel from southern Syria.
Israel has repeatedly spoken of discovering organized cells in southern Syria linked to Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, or even the “Islamic Group” in Lebanon. However, questions remain about the seriousness of these networks and their ability to withstand ongoing Israeli incursions, according to Jazmati.
What has been notable in recent months, however, is that the current authority has adopted a “systematic policy,” as Jazmati describes it, of restricting and arresting Palestinians—especially those linked to what is known as the “axis of resistance.” The “Action Group for Palestinians of Syria” reported that in mid-April, around 40 Palestinian refugees were arrested in Damascus and its surroundings, without official clarification of the reasons. Some were later released.
Jazmati notes that Sharaa’s government arrested a former leader in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham named “al-Zubair al-Ghazi” in April 2025 due to his activity in fundraising for Gaza, and he has not been released to this day. Restrictions and arrests have also targeted remnants of Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in an effort to prevent any escalation originating from Syrian territory. The authority is striving to prevent any popular mobilization that could spiral out of control under the banner of “resistance to Israel.”
However, this instability in the relationship between the new Syrian authority and Islamist groups—which form the overwhelming majority of its base—could open the door for more hardline Islamist groups to gain influence, as happened with “Saraya Ansar al-Sunna,” which carried out operations months ago before being “eliminated,” as Jazmati explains. He warns that ISIS “represents the spearhead in accusing the current leadership of betrayal and collaboration, capitalizing on these shifts.”
ISIS is trying to exploit these contradictions, Abdullah continues, attempting to attract hardline Islamists who are more vocal in criticizing Sharaa’s actions. However, it has so far failed, as most Islamists in Syria still see Sharaa’s project as the most successful despite its flaws, while ISIS’s project would mean the destruction of the country.
Will this divergence in views and opinions lead to a split among Islamists supporting Sharaa?
Abdullah believes it is still too early to speak of a political split within the system, as “the majority are still euphoric about the victory brought by Sharaa and remain convinced that preserving this victory requires maintaining loyalty to him at this stage.”
Jazmati also rules out that the current authority is satisfied with or facilitating what occurred, particularly during the protests. Rather, “it is an expression of public opinion that cannot be fully controlled, as it permeates even the institutions of the system itself.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Rami Al Amine
Rami Al-Amin is a Lebanese writer and correspondent for MBN covering political, social and cultural developments across the Middle East. He produces and presents the satirical critique segment Bitter Sweet, which examines current events through a critical lens. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South, a political booklet on Hezbollah, and The Two Mourners, a book on the history of Beirut’s Martyrs’ Statue.
