Emirati statements have sparked debate—particularly on social media—about how Abu Dhabi is rearranging its regional and international relationships in the post-war phase with Iran.
Among these statements was what Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, wrote on the platform X, noting that the UAE will review its map of relationships “carefully” to determine “who can be relied upon,” adding that this assessment will also include the “structuring of an economy and financial system” that strengthen the resilience of the Emirati model.
Parallel to official discourse, discussions expanded on social media regarding the positions of Arab countries during the war. In this context comes what Emirati writer Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi published, criticizing Arab states which, he said, “stood with Iran or remained neutral.” He added in another post that an unnamed Arab country received extensive Gulf support and then took a different stance during the war.
This firmness in reassessing partners also derives its context from the cost of the war itself for the UAE, which appears—based on what has been publicly disclosed so far—to have been the most exposed to attacks among Gulf states. The latest Emirati military tally as of April 9, one day after the start of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, reported intercepting 537 ballistic missiles, 26 cruise missiles, and 2,256 drones, with 224 injuries and 13 deaths, including two members of the armed forces. The war also disrupted energy flows in the region and, according to Reuters and Kpler data, led to the loss of more than 500 million barrels of oil and condensates and losses exceeding $50 billion over fifty days. Meanwhile, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding disruption continued to pressure trade, prices, and supply chains.
Dr. Salem Al-Ketbi, a political science specialist, says that the UAE today adopts “clear pragmatism” in managing its foreign relations, adding that relationships are no longer based on shared history or untested diplomatic promises, but on a fundamental criterion: “Who stood with us when we needed it?” According to Al-Ketbi, this criterion now determines who enters the circle of trust and who remains outside it.
One of the notable signals of this shift is the UAE’s official discourse using the term “sisterly” when referring to South Korea—a term traditionally associated in Arab official discourse with Arab, and sometimes Islamic, countries. Nevertheless, Mohammed Khalfan Al-Suwafi, a researcher in Gulf affairs, believes this does not change the priority of the Gulf circle for the UAE. He notes that the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries remain the closest, despite some differences in assessing threats, because Gulf security “is indivisible,” and because the war has shown that all Gulf states remain within the scope of Iranian targeting.
Al-Suwafi adds that the criterion of trust is not limited to political positions, but also includes the partner’s willingness to provide its ally, as he puts it, “with full knowledge of the type of technology used in weapons and other tools that strengthen the ally.” He believes that the United States does this more than others.
This logic finds some of its roots in earlier trajectories, including the UAE’s relationship with Israel following the Abraham Accords, which quickly extended into defense and security technology. Since 2022, a $53 million defense contract emerged to supply the UAE Air Force with defensive systems. This was followed in 2023 by the announcement of the first bilateral naval training and the unveiling of an unmanned vessel developed jointly, then the participation of 34 Israeli companies in the IDEX defense exhibition in Abu Dhabi.
This logic is also reflected in the UAE linking its review of relationships to the resilience of its economic and financial model. Accordingly, “circles of trust” are not limited to defense and technology, but extend to financing networks, digital infrastructure, ports, and computing systems, reflecting the overlap between the economy and national security.
The Hormuz Test
In the Strait of Hormuz, the “circles of trust” moved from the level of discourse to practical testing. Al-Ketbi believes that countries which moved alongside the UAE to protect maritime routes “rose in the trust ranking, while others that chose silence or maneuvering declined. This reading gains greater weight because the UAE did not limit itself to calling for keeping the strait open but declared that any settlement with Iran must guarantee freedom of its use, and that it “cannot be held hostage” by any country. Reports on March 27 also indicated that the UAE informed Washington and Western allies of its readiness to participate in a multinational force to reopen the strait, while pushing for the establishment of a “Hormuz Security Force” and granting any future force legal cover through the UN Security Council.
The importance of this position increases because approximately 20 million barrels of oil pass through the strait daily—around 20% of global liquid fuel consumption—along with about one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade. Thus, Hormuz is no longer merely a security file or a maritime passage, but a practical arena in which the UAE tests the strength of its partnerships and the ability of its allies to protect trade, energy, and economic continuity in a highly turbulent regional moment.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, a Yemeni journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Washington, D.C., holds a master's degree in media studies.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
