The Trump administration has moved beyond ideological debate in its approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, placing the issue at the center of its 2026 counterterrorism and national security strategy. The administration’s new counterterrorism doctrine describes the Brotherhood as “the root of all modern Islamist terrorism,” drawing a direct ideological line between the group and organizations such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas. Yet despite the sweeping rhetoric, the administration has stopped short of designating the Brotherhood in its entirety as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, instead pursuing a more selective strategy targeting individual branches accused of ties to violence or militant activity.
That strategy began with an executive order signed in November 2025 directing the State and Treasury Departments to examine specific Brotherhood affiliates rather than the global organization as a whole. In January 2026, Washington designated the Lebanese branch, known as al-Jamaa al-Islamiya, both as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. The Treasury Department also imposed SDGT sanctions on the Egyptian and Jordanian branches, while in March the administration moved against Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic Movement, designating it as a global terrorist entity and laying the groundwork for a future FTO listing.
The graduated designations reflect what U.S. officials describe as a shift from the failed attempt in 2019 to label the Brotherhood as a single terrorist organization toward a more legally defensible case-by-case approach. Under U.S. law, an FTO designation carries broader consequences, including criminal liability for “material support” and mandatory financial restrictions, while SDGT sanctions focus primarily on freezing assets and restricting financial transactions. Washington has justified the tougher measures against the Lebanese and Sudanese branches by citing alleged operational links to Hamas, Hezbollah, and armed groups active in regional conflicts. In Lebanon, U.S. officials accused al-Jamaa al-Islamiya of reviving its armed wing, the Fajr Forces, and coordinating attacks against Israel after October 7, 2023. In Sudan, the administration pointed specifically to the Islamist al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, which U.S. officials say deployed thousands of fighters in the country’s civil war with support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Analysts say the administration’s approach reflects both political calculation and legal pragmatism. Lorenzo Vidino, director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, told Alhurra that the second Trump administration appears to be “doing things in a more systematic way.” than the first, focusing on branches where evidence of direct involvement in violence is easier to establish. But Vidino cautioned that the impact of the designations will depend less on political declarations than on enforcement by the FBI, the Justice Department, and financial regulators. “Designation, particularly on the domestic front, has an impact only if it’s enforced, only if it’s implemented,” he said.
Courtney Freer, a Middle East studies scholar at Emory University, said the shift was also shaped by regional developments, particularly Jordan’s 2025 ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and longstanding restrictions on the group in Egypt. Those moves, she argued, gave Washington both political cover and a stronger legal foundation for action. “It is very difficult to ban an entire ideology both legally and practically, and so designating specific branches, especially these branches, was easier to justify,” Freer told Alhurra.
Still, experts warn that sanctions alone are unlikely to dismantle the Brotherhood’s transnational networks, which often operate through charities, media platforms, informal social ties, and local organizations. Financial institutions are expected to become one of the first testing grounds for the new policy, as banks operating in dollars typically adopt an aggressively cautious approach toward entities linked to terrorism designations. At the same time, the crackdown risks deepening tensions between Washington’s counterterrorism agenda and its stated support for democratic participation, particularly because Brotherhood-linked political movements have competed in elections and parliaments across the Middle East, including in Jordan.
Freer warned that an overly broad approach could lead to “securitizing Islamism and Islam writ large.” He added, “If we paint these movements with a broad brush, we could feasibly miss opportunities for dialogue with nonviolent groups that are primarily pushing for political reform.”
Lorenzo Vidino, meanwhile, said European governments are unlikely to follow Washington in adopting blanket terrorist designations, though they may increase financial scrutiny and investigative pressure on Brotherhood-linked networks. Under U.S. law, terrorist designations remain subject to judicial review and can be revoked by the secretary of state if circumstances change or national security interests require it. But once sanctions become embedded in a broader system of financial restrictions, investigations, and institutional caution, reversing them can become politically and practically difficult.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, a Yemeni journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Washington, D.C., holds a master's degree in media studies.
