Three months after Washington released $230 million in security assistance to Lebanon, a new debate has opened in diplomatic and policy circles over what the United States expects in return.
Some reports have framed the issue as a sharp cut in U.S. military support for Lebanon, from about $200 million to $30 million. But that shorthand misses the more important shift. The Trump administration’s fiscal year 2027 budget request proposes $36 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces, not $30 million, and the money would be routed through a counterterrorism fund that Lebanon has not previously used for such assistance.
The proposal has not been enacted by Congress, which has often restored foreign assistance funds sought by the executive branch for reduction. But the request itself is already being read in Beirut and Washington as a political signal: future U.S. support for Lebanon’s army may increasingly depend on whether it can show progress in asserting state authority and confronting Hezbollah’s armed presence.
The proposed $36 million would come through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, a mechanism normally used to train and equip partner forces for counterterrorism missions. For Lebanon, that would mark a change not only in the size of proposed assistance, but also in how Washington defines the Lebanese security file.
The proposal comes after a much larger package released in 2025, near the end of the fiscal year: $190 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces and $40 million for the Internal Security Forces. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack described that assistance at the time as a sign of Washington’s commitment to Lebanese sovereignty and to the disarmament of Hezbollah. A State Department spokesperson said the support would help Lebanese troops “assert Lebanese sovereignty across the country” and fully implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.
The current debate, therefore, is not simply about whether aid is rising or falling. It is about the conditions Washington is attaching, implicitly and explicitly, to future support.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been direct about the outcome the administration wants to see. In congressional testimony and public remarks, Rubio has called for training and equipping vetted Lebanese army units capable of dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, “so Israel doesn’t have to,” as he put it in April.
Other Republicans have gone further. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina has warned against additional U.S. assistance unless the Lebanese Armed Forces undergo “genuine, verifiable, and immediate reform.”
Lebanese sources familiar with internal political discussions told MBN that the $36 million figure has been interpreted in Beirut less as a final budget number than as a message of U.S. frustration. The concerns, they said, include the slow pace of progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament, as well as Lebanese political moves that Washington views as insufficiently matched by action on the ground.
The June 3 joint U.S.-Lebanon-Israel statement sharpened that message. The ceasefire framework announced by the State Department was explicitly tied to “a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” The parties also agreed to establish pilot zones under exclusive Lebanese army control, with talks expected to resume the week of June 22.
Hezbollah rejected the deal the following day, and fighting resumed within hours. Its rejection underscored the central question facing both Washington and Beirut: whether the Lebanese state can translate diplomatic commitments into control on the ground.
Since 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces have received more than $3 billion in U.S. assistance, based on the idea that the army could serve as a national institution capable of stabilizing the country and asserting Lebanese sovereignty.
What appears different now is that Washington is asking the LAF to act more directly on that premise in areas where Hezbollah has long maintained military power outside state control.
Whether the army can do that – and whether Lebanon’s political leadership will allow it to try – is the question behind the $36 million proposal. The answer may determine whether future U.S. assistance looks more like the large package released in 2025, or like something smaller, more conditional and more tightly tied to measurable steps against Hezbollah.
