Iran is facing challenges in Iraq that it has not encountered in years. Iraq’s new government, led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, has declared its intention to bring all weapons under state control while pursuing closer relations with Washington, as Tehran and its allies come under mounting regional and U.S. pressure.
Iran’s influence in Iraq, built up since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, extends far beyond armed factions. Over more than two decades, Tehran has cultivated an extensive network of ties with political parties, economic institutions and security agencies, making any assessment of its waning influence more complex than simply counting the armed groups that have, so far, agreed to surrender their weapons and integrate into Iraqi state institutions.
Zaidi’s moves, coupled with his first visit to Washington this week, test whether shifting regional dynamics and sustained U.S. pressure have begun to erode Iran’s position in Iraq, or whether Tehran can preserve its influence by relying more heavily on its political, economic and security networks.
Zaidi held two separate meetings in late June with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani, Iraqi sources close to both the prime minister and the ruling Coordination Framework told MBN last week. According to the sources, both meetings became tense over the issue of Iran-backed armed factions and weapons outside state control.
The sources said Zaidi rejected any external interference in Iraq’s security affairs during his meeting with Araghchi, asking the Iranian official: “Would you accept me interfering in your security affairs or establishing armed factions inside your country?” He argued that the continued existence of weapons outside state institutions undermines Iraq’s sovereignty and its foreign relations.
Zaidi delivered the same message to Qaani, urging Iran to support Iraqi state institutions rather than armed factions as part of his effort to ensure that all weapons fall under government authority before the U.S.-led international coalition concludes its mission in Iraq in September.
Iraq holds significant strategic value for Iran in security, political and economic terms. The two countries share a border of more than 1,400 kilometers (870 miles), Iraq is one of Iran’s largest trading partners, and Tehran views its influence there as a cornerstone of its regional security strategy and its ability to counter the United States and its allies.
Michael Knights, head of research at the New York-based strategic consulting firm Horizon Engage, said it is still too early to speak of the end of Iranian influence in Iraq, but Tehran is facing genuine challenges that did not exist only a few years ago.
“Iran is currently struggling to compete with the United States in Iraq on the security, political and economic fronts,” Knights told MBN.
Zaidi’s government, formed in May, has received clear backing from U.S. President Donald Trump, who opposed the nomination of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the candidate favored by the ruling Coordination Framework, to return to office.
In recent months, the Trump administration has pressed Baghdad to curb the influence of Iran-backed factions and prevent their representatives from securing positions in the new cabinet.
Washington has also imposed sanctions on Iraqi government officials, including a deputy oil minister, accusing him of using his position to facilitate the diversion of Iraqi oil shipments for Iran’s benefit.
The Zaidi government has made the issue of weapons outside state control one of its top priorities. It says it has reached understandings with Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades to place military formations affiliated with the two groups under government authority and further integrate them into state institutions.
However, it remains unclear how those agreements will be implemented. The government has not disclosed what weapons would be surrendered or which units would be restructured, leaving open questions about whether the initiative represents a meaningful shift or merely a limited administrative reorganization.
These efforts come as Iran’s regional position has weakened following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in 2024, Israeli strikes that significantly weakened Lebanon’s Hezbollah and killed several of its senior leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, and the heavy losses suffered by Hamas since its October 2023 attack on Israel.
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which erupted in February, has further increased pressure on Tehran and reduced its ability to support regional allies with the same level of resources as in the past.
Knights said the conflicts that have unfolded since 2023 have weakened Iran’s regional dominance, while recent U.S. sanctions inside Iraq have, for the first time, targeted senior financiers linked to Tehran’s leadership.
“This is the first Iraqi government since 2005 in which the United States has had far greater influence than Iran over the selection of the new prime minister,” he said. “As long as U.S. officials such as Special Envoy for Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack remain actively engaged, and sanctions continue to serve as a credible source of pressure, Iran will remain on the defensive.”
Influence Beyond Armed Groups
Iran’s influence in Iraq is not limited to armed organizations. Over the years, Tehran has built close relationships with political parties, parliamentary blocs and influential figures within state institutions, alongside extensive commercial, financial and religious networks stretching from Baghdad to Iraq’s southern provinces and border regions.
Analysts therefore argue that while bringing weapons under state control could strengthen government authority, it will not, by itself, fundamentally reshape Iraq’s internal balance of influence.
Munqith Dagher, head of the Independent Research Group, said he does not believe Iranian influence is necessarily in irreversible decline. Instead, he expects Tehran to adopt less visible methods to preserve its presence, while Baghdad continues trying to balance its relations with both Washington and Tehran.
“Iran’s influence will not disappear,” Dagher told MBN. “It will evolve and take different forms and channels. What we are seeing today is the result of regional developments that began after October 2023.”
He added that successive Iraqi governments continue to struggle to formulate policies that are fully independent of either the United States or Iran because both powers retain significant influence within Iraq’s political system.
Meanwhile, several major Iran-backed armed factions continue to reject plans to place all weapons under state control, insisting that any such step must be tied to the withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq, scheduled for September.
Among the most prominent are Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, both designated by the United States as terrorist organizations and considered key pillars of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”
The groups argue that Iraq remains subject to an unacceptable U.S. military presence and say they will not surrender their weapons before foreign forces leave the country.
Their opposition presents an early test for al-Zaydi’s government. While it is seeking to convince Washington that it can enforce state authority, it also relies politically on a governing coalition that includes parties with direct ties to the same factions it is asking to disarm.
That dynamic could encourage Tehran to avoid a direct confrontation with the Iraqi government in the near term, instead focusing on buying time, preserving its political and economic influence, and waiting for Washington’s priorities to shift.
“Iran’s best strategy is simply to wait until the United States loses interest in Iraq after the Trump administration ends,” Knights said.
“The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Iraqi proxies are likely to keep a low profile to avoid sanctions, U.S. strikes, or even arrest by the new government,” he added.
Iran may therefore be weaker in Iraq than it was several years ago, but it has not lost the tools that allow it to shape the country’s political decisions. The future of that influence will depend on whether al-Zaydi’s government can translate its promises into concrete action, and whether Washington is prepared to sustain pressure for longer than Tehran can afford to wait.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
