Iran has actively sought to export its ideology to Africa since the 1979 revolution, but its aims and tactics have shifted considerably over time from promoting its brand of Shia Islam to a broader effort to counter Western influence and gain access to key materials.
Africa’s 19 Muslim-majority countries mostly practice Sunni Islam. Post-revolutionary Tehran initially took that on, setting up cultural centers, mosques, and branches of the Al-Mustafa International University to further Shia Islam. That theological focus yielded one notable success: the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. It converted thousands of Nigerians to Shiism and drew the enmity of the government, to which it poses much less of a threat than does the Sunni insurrectionist group Boko Haram.
More recently, Iran has managed to rebuild its influence in African countries through a more universalist Islamist claim and by leveraging anti-West sentiment. This tack resonates in countries with complicated colonial histories and tensions with the West, according to Eric Lob, an associate professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University. And it pays off for Iran.
“One of the ways that Iran has been able to ingratiate itself with these countries again is through security assistance and partnership,” Lob said. In particular, he added, Tehran has shared and exported its drone technology to African partners, “which also benefits the Iranian military-industrial complex.”
While trade between Iran and Africa remains modest, local Iranian media reported before the war started that it had increased by 66 percent to $944 million from April to December of last year compared to the same period a year earlier. That growth points to an evident push from Tehran to focus on Africa to counter international trade sanctions that have severely hampered its economy.
Learning from Old Tactics
Iran has historically asserted its soft power in Africa through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a coalition of 121 countries not formally aligned with any major power bloc. NAM has repeatedly issued formal statements defending Iran’s legal right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and uranium enrichment. Iran heavily relies on NAM resolutions in its effort to delegitimize U.S. banking and oil sanctions, framing them as illegal violations of state sovereignty that disproportionately harm civilian populations.
The recent scaling back of U.S. embassies in Africa and the shutdown of USAID has left a possible gap for non-Western influence. China is Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner, with trade hitting a record $348 billion, and Russian forces provide direct military support and personal protection to several ruling regimes in exchange for lucrative economic concessions. Iran, analysts say, can also reap advantage from the U.S. drawback.
“The most dangerous aspect is that this makes pro-Western regimes more fragile,” said Ilan Berman, senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council. “Pro-Western regimes that could push back against Iranian infiltration, against Iranian subversion, used to be able to, I think in a very real sense, count on the United States.”
In South Africa, where anti-West sentiments are actively promoted by the president, Iran has taken part in joint military exercises.
“A partnership with Iran really nests very nicely there because Iran is a revisionist state,” Berman said, using a term that refers to countries that want to fundamentally alter the international power structure. “It’s a political statement on the part of the South African government, but it also gives power projection capabilities to Iran.”
Africa’s Resources
Like many other countries active in Africa, Iran seeks access to resources it lacks at home. The most controversial of these is the uranium it needs to run its nuclear program. In 2024 the French website Africa Intelligence and British-based Iran International reported that Iran negotiated a multimillion-dollar deal to supply Niger with military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of highly refined yellowcake, a purified uranium ore. Niger has stopped all nuclear exports to France and nationalized French nuclear assets in the country since the 2023 military coup that deposed a pro-Western government. Both Iran and Niger have denied that any such deal exists.
Iran also seeks agricultural agreements, hoping to alleviate the strain on its local food resources. In bilateral commissions with East African nations such as Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, agricultural agreements are a mandatory fixture. Iran uses its position as one of the world’s largest producers of urea and other nitrogenous fertilizers as a bargaining chip.
“Even though Iran has a robust agricultural sector, we’ve seen Iran recently facing major issues with water scarcity,” Lob said. “And so, it seems that Iran is trying to look towards Africa as a place where it could diversify its agricultural production.”
In many of its bilateral trade agreements with African nations, Iran’s financial commitments take the form of export credit guarantees rather than direct cash injections. These lines of credit are designed exclusively to help Iranian firms sell products or win contracts abroad, and since Iran cannot easily transact in U.S. dollars or utilize the SWIFT banking system, it structures its agreements around barter rather than traditional investment. Iran’s contribution, Lob said, often amount to “technical and engineering services,” such as sending Iranian contractors, machinery, and drone technology to Africa. And the promises aren’t always borne out in reality.
“We have to differentiate between what’s on paper in these agreements and then what’s actually implemented,” Lob said.
Iran exports primarily petroleum or petroleum-related products to Africa, and African countries export largely primary goods and commodities. Since petroleum has higher value, this leads to trade deficits between Iran and these African nations — and to friction.
Kenya and Ghana are pushing for Iran to invest in manufacturing and processing plants within Africa, rather than just using the continent as a dumping ground for Iranian goods and a source of raw extraction. But because Iran lacks the liquid capital to build factories abroad, it continues to push the unequal goods-for-commodities trade, leaving African nations highly wary of signing long-term deals that drain their foreign reserves.
Yet African countries rely on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz for resources such as oil and fertilizer supplies. The war has disrupted both, leading to food insecurity. Many countries are exploring alternatives such as the Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), the GCC railway network, and the Fujairah Port expansion and The Habshan–Fujairah Pipeline in the UAE.
Security Investment with a Catch
Iran also faces fierce competition in Africa from the Arab Gulf states, Turkey and Israel, particularly in the Horn of Africa near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where Iran’s Yemen-based allies, the Houthis, have repeatedly attacked oil shipments. With an eye to sidestepping that vulnerable spot, the UAE is developing the Berbera Port in Somaliland and Somalia, and Saudi Arabia has secured a port agreement with Djibouti, on the western flank of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Ankara acts as a primary security guarantor for Somalia, operating its largest overseas military facility (Camp TURKSOM), and Israel has zeroed in on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden with intelligence alliances.
Iran has also contributed drones or transferred drones and drone technology to Ethiopia during the Tigray War. It did the same with the Sudanese Armed Forces during the Sudanese ongoing Sudanese Civil War. These are the same Shahed drones Russia is reproducing and even improving for the war in Ukraine.
“They’re much more sophisticated than anything that exists on the African continent,” Berman said. “And so, the Iranian involvement in Sudan, where they’re picking winners and losers and they’re putting a finger on the scale of the current conflict by providing this sort of game-changing battlefield technology, is significant because it internationalizes the conflict.”
These transactions have not only increased arm sales profits for Iran, but also to regain a foothold in the Horn of Africa, which is a critical geostrategic asset since this war, argued Lob. “We saw Iran doing with the Strait of Hormuz, like we saw the Houthis doing in 2024 2025 with the Bab al Mandeb in the Red Sea. These choke points are becoming critical or integral to Iran and its proxies and partners security strategy against their enemies and adversaries.”
Ultimately, Iran uses its relationships on the continent to actively avoid sanctions through bilateral economic agreements, despite their implementation being debatable.
Tehran’s soft power push in Africa, Lob said, “shows that Iran is pushing back against international isolation.”
“It sends a message to its allies and adversaries in the international system, but also to its constituents at home, that it does have friends and allies and partners out there and it’s not alone.”
