A new agreement between Damascus and Moscow over Russia’s two main military facilities in Syria is set to significantly reduce the Kremlin’s presence in the country, raising a central question: Is Russia effectively losing its Syrian foothold, or merely accepting a smaller role under Damascus’s authority?
After a year and a half of negotiations, the two governments have signed a memorandum of understanding to begin what they described as a “reorganization of the Russian presence on the Syrian coast.” Under the memorandum, the Syrian government will assume control of the Hmeimim airport and part of the port of Tartus and convert them from military use to joint training and development centers.
The two sides also agreed to redefine the role of military bases and installations, converting them from Russian military bases into joint training and development centers.
For years, Hmeimim and Tartus were the twin pillars of Russia’s military presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
From Hmeimim air base, Russian aircraft carried out operations in support of Bashar al-Assad’s government after Moscow intervened directly in the Syrian war in 2015. The naval facility at Tartus, meanwhile, provided a crucial hub for supplying, maintaining and deploying Russia’s Mediterranean fleet.
A satellite image shows a Russian naval facility in Tartus, Syria, on Dec. 6, 2024.
While Damascus has portrayed the agreement as the beginning of a new phase built around Syrian sovereignty and mutual interests, assessments from Russian foreign policy experts have been divided. Some see it as Moscow adapting to a changed political landscape; others regard it as another defeat for Russian policy and a sign of its declining influence in the region.
The Syrian government’s announcement did not clarify the legal status of earlier agreements that granted Moscow long-term privileges, including a 49-year arrangement for the use of the Tartus facility and open-ended arrangements governing Hmeimim.
After the fall of the Assad government in December 2024, Russian forces withdrew from several positions across Syria but maintained their presence at Hmeimim and Tartus as Moscow negotiated with the country’s new leaders.
In theory, the new formula ends Russia’s exclusive administration of the facilities and puts them under Syrian control.
But the agreement doesn’t state whether Moscow will be able to keep troops and equipment at the sites, or if Russian weapon systems will remain there. And if Russia does retain some capability there, will its officers require Syrian approval before carrying out operations?
Ammar Jallo, a researcher at the Dialogue Center for Research and Studies in Washington, said the agreement was part of an effort by Damascus to dismantle the legacy of Russia’s support for the Assad government and rebuild the relationship on new terms. Syria, he said, is too unstable to ignore Moscow or shift toward an openly adversarial relationship.
Given the longstanding political, economic and military ties between Syria and Russia, dating to the Soviet era, a full rupture would be difficult on both countries, Jallo said.
Moscow needs access to Tartus and Hmeimim to preserve a foothold in Syria and the Mediterranean. The Syrian coast is also strategically important as a gateway for Russian operations in Africa.
Damascus, for its part, needs Russia for leverage in its dealings with the West and to maintain cooperation on economic and energy issues.
Jallo also noted that neighboring Turkey has pushed that line of thinking to Damascus and Moscow as a hedge against rising Israeli and western influences.
Since the fall of the Assad government, Damascus has sought to redefine its relationship with the United States, Europe and other countries in the Middle East. But Jallo said the memorandum should not be interpreted as a definitive Syrian alignment with the West at Russia’s expense. Syria’s new foreign policy, he said, is aimed at avoiding rigid alliances and blocs.
A Defeat for Russian Policy?
In Russia, the agreement has produced sharply contrasting assessments of what the new agreement means for Moscow.
Alexander Zasypkin, Russia’s former ambassador to Lebanon, said the fundamental premise of the agreement does not signal an end to military cooperation between the two countries.
“The central idea of the Syrian-Russian statement is to develop long-term bilateral military cooperation in accordance with current circumstances and in a manner consistent with the shared interests of both countries,” Zasypkin told MBN.
Sergei Shashkov, a former Russian Army colonel and military analyst, offered a starkly different assessment. He told MBN that the agreement reflected Moscow’s declining influence in the region.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
