The Gulf’s Grand Bargain: US Arms, China’s Markets?

Not long ago, the Gulf was neatly divided.

Washington handled security; Beijing built trade bridges.

That arrangement no longer holds. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha are no longer balancing between two poles. They are choosing what serves their interests, unapologetically, as the region’s energy map and alliances are quietly redrawn.

Anyone following recent headlines about the Gulf, China and the United States will see a story bigger than trade deals or diplomatic communiqués. Zineb Riboua, a researcher at the Hudson Institute in Washington, does more than recount events. She connects the dots, describing a quiet reordering of alliances in the Gulf and BRICS’ rise from a symbolic platform to an ambitious project aiming to rewrite the rules of the global order.

Here is the full conversation:

The Gulf is no longer just an arena split between U.S. security influence and Chinese trade. Are Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha still playing on the same board, or are they setting the rules themselves? *”There is definitely a shift. It really started with Saudi-Iran normalization through Beijing, though the roots go back further with Beijing’s growing focus on the Middle East. The Gulf, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is essential for China in oil and gas. Alongside its military base in Djibouti and strong trade partnerships in the region, Beijing has expanded without directly confronting the United States.

In what they call the ‘wave of reconciliation,’ China positioned itself as mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia, expressed interest in mediating in Yemen and even in reconciling Palestinian factions. The message is clear: China does not want to be seen only as a trading power but as a force with broader and deeper political ambitions.”*

And what are those ambitions? “At the top of the list is securing access to energy, but also controlling strategic chokepoints and embedding itself in Gulf infrastructure, including technology. China has invested in the tech backbone of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For Gulf states, this is not about replacing the U.S. with China but about meeting specific needs—such as 5G networks that Washington no longer produces and Beijing can deliver at lower cost. It is part of a broader strategy of diversifying partners.”

You mentioned Biden’s treatment of Saudi Arabia. How did that affect things? “Saudi leaders felt Washington was not listening, especially after the Houthi attacks on their oil facilities, when they were told they were part of the problem in Yemen. That led them to question U.S. reliability and accelerate diversification of partnerships.”

Is China’s role in the Gulf political as well? *”Ideally, China wants to project itself as a regional stabilizer. But the Houthis are still attacking Western shipping and targeting Saudi interests. The Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, wants calm to advance Vision 2030 and modernization plans, and China is a useful partner for that.

At the same time, Beijing maintains a close relationship with Iran and aligns with Tehran and Moscow in an anti-Western outlook. That gives China a card to play with the Gulf, presenting itself as able to ‘manage’ Iran.”*

Why didn’t the United States mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran? “Because that goes against Washington’s approach to Iran. For decades, the U.S. tried to contain Tehran diplomatically through the JCPOA and other outreach, but Iran kept developing missiles and funding proxies, and its activities now extend beyond the Middle East into Africa.”

The Gulf hosts U.S. bases while inviting Chinese investment. Is this abandonment of Washington or leverage? “It is genuine diversification, but also a pressure tool when needed and an alternative when options are exhausted. The Trump administration has tried to reclaim tech and AI influence from China and reassert its presence in the Middle East. We are seeing real realignment.”

Let’s talk about BRICS. Once just an acronym, it is now attracting members, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Why does Trump see it as a threat? “Because it has become an anti-Western platform. Creating a parallel financial system undermines U.S. influence. For countries like India, it is about nonalignment, but for China, Russia and Iran, it is about building a counterweight to the U.S.-led order.”

Saudi Arabia says it is interested in BRICS “values.” Is this about values or economics? “Mostly economics. The Gulf will engage with BRICS but will not criticize it openly unless Washington takes a hard stance, which it now has, forcing Gulf states to tread more carefully.”

Could Trump’s tough stance push allies away? “Recent U.S.-Gulf agreements are meant to keep allies close. If forced to choose, I believe Saudi Arabia would stay in the U.S. camp, despite frustrations.”

Trump has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS members. Is this real or symbolic? “Mostly symbolic. It is different from the euro because that involves NATO allies. But building a parallel system still erodes U.S. influence, and Washington believes it has the right to defend its interests.”

Why is a China-led financial system bad for the U.S.? “Because it would restrict U.S. companies, increase surveillance and encourage theft of data and technology. It would not be an open, competitive environment for the U.S.”

Let’s move to “nonalignment.” From Africa to Southeast Asia, countries are taking aid and arms but joining no alliances. Is this hesitation or a new kind of power? “It is a new kind of power enabled by a vacuum in the global system. China speaks of the ‘Global South,’ Russia pushes for a ‘multipolar world.’ Both court Africa, Latin America and Asia. For the U.S., the lesson is to focus on what matters to these countries—security, trade and development—instead of political lectures.”

So you don’t believe in relying on soft power alone? “Exactly. Soft power works when backed by hard power—real economic and trade partnerships. Without that, it is just talk.”

China offers infrastructure; Washington offers security and debt relief. Are countries playing both sides? “Yes, and often they have no other option. Ethiopia is a clear example, rich in resources but high risk. China is present; the U.S. is largely absent. American companies need to be bolder and more present.”

Is there a danger in everyone playing both sides? “It depends on the country. Some African states take Russian support without being explicitly anti-U.S. It is case by case.”

Does Trump follow that approach? “He is pushing countries to choose. South Africa has clearly chosen China, Russia and Iran, and now faces U.S. sanctions. Others will maneuver until they are forced to decide.”