“Civil Mobilization” Plays Expanding Intelligence Roles, Potentially Mirroring Iran’s Basij.”
The call was made last June by an Iraqi lawmaker affiliated with an armed faction close to Iran.
The call is not new. Two years ago, there were attempts to establish an ‘Iraqi Basij.’ What is new, however, is that the efforts of armed Iraqi factions in this regard have intensified following the June war between Israel and Iran.
In statements to Alhurra, an Iraqi civil activist—who requested anonymity for security reasons—said the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are currently recruiting civilians to carry out intelligence roles across most Iraqi provinces.
“In the same context, political analyst Issam al-Faili said that Iraq’s Iran-aligned factions seek to replicate the Iranian Basij experience, but that this is not feasible “from a practical and operational standpoint.”
Speaking on a television program broadcast by a channel affiliated with a pro-Iranian militia at the end of last June, Member of Parliament Hussein Moanes said he wished “the Popular Mobilization would transform into a civil mobilization performing intelligence work in order to regulate intelligence activity, to avoid the scenario of infiltration and espionage that occurred in Lebanon and Iran.”
Moanes heads the ‘Hoquq Movement,’ the political arm of the Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah, which is listed by the United States as a terrorist organization. In January 2024, Washington imposed sanctions on him for “supporting operations of Iran’s Quds Force and its proxies.”
The activist, who heads an NGO in Basra, accused Iran-backed armed groups of recruiting civilians for intelligence tasks. He said he had documented, through a network of field activists spread across most Iraqi provinces, an increase in intelligence recruitment.
The activist—who requested his name be withheld for fear of being assassinated by the militias, as he put it—said that faction headquarters have dedicated offices for these recruitment efforts.
“This intelligence effort targets ‘activists, political opponents, and journalists opposed to the Iranian project in Iraq, “said the activist, who specializes in documenting human rights violations in Basra.”
He said he has been threatened several times on accusations of supporting and leading popular protests.
According to him, the factions also recruit security officers to tap their information and intelligence expertise. Those recruited receive rewards, he added. “Recruits in the civil mobilization are paid monthly salaries of up to 750,000 Iraqi dinars, about 500 U.S. dollars,” he said.
In preparing this report and investigating the civil mobilization project in Iraq, Alhurra spoke with officers, members, and activists within the PMF and close to its factions.
All declined to disclose their identities for fear of reprisals but confirmed information about the project’s expansion.
They said: “The current phase of the project focuses on recruiting Iraqi elites -university professors, doctors, judges, journalists, and influencers – alongside other social groups, to serve as eyes in detecting any breaches that might threaten Iraq’s internal security and the PMF.”
They also said that ‘in the near future, the civil mobilization will function as a counterpart to the Basij, but in an Iraqi version.”
Alhurra sought comment from the PMF Commission on the details and objectives of the civil mobilization project, but its media office declined to provide a statement.
The Iraqi Basij on the Ground
Iraqi political analyst Jaafar Zayara said the expansion of the civil mobilization reflects “signs of declining popular support for the armed wings within the PMF, and weak public interaction with them in light of international pressures, especially from the United States.”
“Amid the internal and external challenges facing the militia groups, the idea of replicating the Iranian Basij experience is resurfacing as a tool that combines mobilization and popular appeal, while providing civil, cultural, and security cover for factions linked to the Iranian axis,” Zayara told Alhurra.”
The aim, according to Zayara, is “to gain new social loyalties outside the military framework, through civil and service activities.’
He added that the civil mobilization project is designed to function as a mobilization wing linking state institutions with the street, taking on security, cultural, and organizational roles within society, while also engaging in “awareness and cultural jihad’ to counter what is described as ‘intellectual invasion’ or ‘moral decadence.”
Civil Militias with a Military role
The militias “Rab Allah, Sons of al-Muhandis, Wulad al-Shayib, Abu Jadaha, and the Ya Ali Popular Formations” are part of what is known as the civil mobilization, which has been announced in stages since 2020.
These groups have always been present in demonstrations organized by armed factions against the United States and Western interests in Iraq.
In recent years, they carried out multiple acts of destruction and vandalism against political, media, and commercial offices in Baghdad, with videos later posted on social media platforms linked to armed factions in Iraq.
These civil militias – whose members usually conceal their faces – also periodically attack liquor stores, beauty salons, and massage centers.
Independent Iraqi politician Intifadh Qanbar, who resides in Washington, rejects the idea of a civil wing for the PMF, saying, “what is known as the civil wing will be a security wing under civilian cover.”
He told Alhurra: “what is said about the civil wing and its tasks is a declared espionage operation, which indicates that Iran cannot live without Iraq and wants to continue controlling it, and penetrating the Iraqi system politically, economically, civically, and in all fields.”
He argued that the missions assigned to the PMF and its branches – whether civilian, military, or engineering such as the al-Muhandis Company, which is one of the PMF’s fronts – serve the purpose of consolidating Iranian hegemony inside Iraq.
Since the start of this year, U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government has intensified to curb Iranian influence and push for the disarmament of pro-Iranian militias.
According to a video report posted on August 5 on the Persian-language page of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” Iraqi factions conducted more than 500 ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel and U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and November 2024.
In a phone call with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on July 22, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio voiced concern over the draft law on the PMF Commission, still under debate in parliament, warning that “passing such laws would entrench Iranian influence and the armed terrorist groups that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty.”
Political analyst Ahmed al-Sharifi told Alhurra that these pressures have forced PMF militias back onto the streets in “a camouflage operation to protect their existence from dissolution and to preserve their weapons and military strength behind the military wing.”
Al-Sharifi added that “The factions realize their social capital has become very weak, so they promote the idea of civil mobilization to generate public support for their political choices, and even to defend them in their military actions.”
Iraq is Not Iran
The Basij Organization, which means “Mobilization” in Persian, was founded in Iran in November 1979 by order of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ruhollah Khomeini.
Khomeini called for creating an “army of 20 million men” to protect the revolution and its political and religious system.
In April 1980, the organization was officially established, and in 1981 it was integrated into the structure of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Over the years, the Basij’s role expanded to include many areas beyond its original military mission during the Iran–Iraq War, and today it covers:
- Internal security and law enforcement: The Basij is a core force in maintaining internal security and suppressing dissent, playing a major role in confronting anti-government protests, enforcing social norms, and acting as a morality police.
- Social and cultural control: Present in almost every city and town, the Basij enforces adherence to Islamic dress and conduct, and counters what the regime considers “Western cultural influence” in universities and public spaces.
- Intelligence gathering: With its extensive membership network, the Basij collects information on individuals and groups viewed as threats to the regime.
- Social and community services: It engages in pro-government activities such as providing aid during natural disasters, carrying out reconstruction projects, and offering social services to members.
In Iraq, the PMF’s civil wing has publicly taken on social, service, and relief roles since the liberation of cities from ISIS in 2017.
In recent years, PMF factions have established civil wings that include research and educational centers, relief organizations, and volunteer teams managing community initiatives such as river cleanups, support for civil defense during floods, and firefighting.
Their civil efforts have also extended to mediating tribal disputes, removing encroachments in markets and public areas, and running media and promotional campaigns through electronic armies tasked with surveillance, monitoring, and hacking of social media networks and phone communications.
In recent years, groups from the militias’ civil wings have also taken part in dispersing protests in Iraqi cities, carrying out intelligence tasks such as infiltrating demonstrations, photographing activists, and gathering information on protest leaders – who were later arrested by PMF security and other agencies, according to activists and protesters interviewed by Alhurra.
The PMF’s Directorate of Moral Guidance oversees all civil mobilization activities and has formed civilian teams under the name “Husseini Service Brigade.”
According to the Al-Abbas Shrine Media Center, the brigade includes people from diverse social, academic, and media backgrounds. It was established in 2016 under the sponsorship of the General Union of Iraqi Radio and Television, a branch of the “Islamic Radio and Television Union,” managed and funded by Iran.
According to Al-Abbas Shrine media, “In addition to its main role in religious service activities, the service brigade carries out other tasks in awareness and security-related community work to counter the danger of rumors spread by terrorist groups seeking to destabilize society.”
“Later, other service brigades emerged, including the Husseini Service Brigade of the “Haydariyun,” one of Kataib Hezbollah’s civil wings – and the “Path of Light Cultural Team,’ the civil wing of the al-Muntadhar Brigade, a formation of the Supreme Islamic Council.
However, Iraqi political analyst Issam al-Faili noted that while establishing a Basij-style organization in Iraq is theoretically possible, it faces significant political, legal, and social challenges that make its implementation difficult.”
“The nature and structure of Iraq’s system and society are completely different from Iran’s, which is ruled by a religious system,” al-Faili said.
He told Alhurra: “There is also competition within Iraq’s Shiite factions, even among faction leaders themselves. Therefore, it is difficult for them to unite on the idea of creating an Iraqi Basij, even if some of them have such tendencies.”
Iraqi political researcher Rafeed al-Atwani acknowledged that factions and Iran-aligned parties are seeking to establish an “Iraqi Basij” as part of an ideological project. However, he said the initiative is unlikely to succeed due to external international pressures.
“Among Shiites too, a large percentage do not want to recreate this formation in its Iranian guise, or what is known as the Basij. Therefore, I believe the matter is difficult, but it is part of a political and popular maneuver aimed at avoiding the loss of Iraq as Iran’s last stronghold compared to Syria and Lebanon,” al-Atwani said.
