Elliott Abrams: Gaza Strategy is Failing

The narrative we’ve been told about the Middle East is collapsing.

For years, the Middle East was explained through a neat script: Iran’s “axis of resistance” was on the march, propped up by Russia and China, defying American power. That script is now falling apart: Hamas is battered. Hezbollah is under strain. Syria is hollowed out, and Iran itself looks weaker than it has in decades. But what replaces the old story is not clarity. It is a vacuum. And in the Middle East, vacuums don’t stay empty for long.

Israel, while militarily effective against Hamas, has no political plan for the “day after.” The Palestinian Authority is on the sidelines, Arab states are hesitant, and Washington has been unable to produce a coherent strategy. This lack of a plan is the greatest risk of all, threatening to turn a military victory into a long-term political catastrophe.

In an exclusive analysis for the show The Diplomat, veteran diplomat and former U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams argues that the biggest threat to regional stability isn’t a powerful Iran, but the lack of a coherent plan for a post-Hamas Gaza. He said that Washington seems paralyzed, unable to put forward a viable path forward. He calls out the strategic miscalculations of every major player: Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States. And he offers a sobering assessment of what must be done to prevent an even greater catastrophe.

His answers cut through the noise with the bluntness of someone who has played this game at the highest levels.

Kawly: You’ve called this moment a rare opening. Iran looks strategically weaker—Hamas, Hezbollah, even Syria’s regime, all have taken hits. If Iran is genuinely weaker, what are the strategic openings for the U.S. and its allies, particularly in Gaza and the broader region?

Abrams: There are two parts to this. First, keep Iran weak. That means tightening economic pressure, including the snapback of U.N. sanctions, so Tehran doesn’t have billions to funnel into Hezbollah or the Houthis. We’ve seen before that when Iran’s cash dries up, its proxies feel it.

The second part is local. In Lebanon, the president and prime minister have said Hezbollah must disarm. The United States, Europe, and Gulf donors should back that moment. In Iraq, even many Shia want independence from Iran. And in Syria, though it may fail, there’s at least a chance to push for sovereignty free from Tehran’s grip.

We’ve never had a better moment to try. But the goal isn’t regime change in Iran overnight. It’s limiting its reach, its influence, its stranglehold on Arab capitals. That’s what this window allows.

But haven’t we underestimated Iran’s ability to survive pressure before? The regime has outlasted sanctions, wars, and uprisings. Why would this time be different?

The aim is not to topple the regime tomorrow. The aim is to limit its resources. When pressure was highest in the past, Hezbollah received less money, and its operations stalled. Tehran kept what little cash it had to protect its own survival rather than fund proxies. That is what pressure achieves. It starves Iran’s network even if the regime itself survives.

You’ve said Lebanon has a chance to reclaim sovereignty, but Hezbollah still claims to defend the country against Israel. How can anyone expect them to give up weapons when the Lebanese army is weak and the south remains contested?

The claim that Hezbollah is Lebanon’s shield is a myth. Last year showed clearly that neither Hezbollah nor the Lebanese army could stand against Israel’s military. True sovereignty comes when no militia is stronger than the state. That means not just Hezbollah but other armed groups in Palestinian camps must also disarm. Hezbollah can remain a political party, but a government must have a monopoly on force. Only then will outside powers push Israel to step back as well.

Iran insists it has allies in Russia and China. Do you see this as a real axis or an illusion?

Illusion. When Iran was attacked, neither Russia nor China lifted a finger. China buys Iranian oil, but only at a discount that benefits Beijing. Russia sells weapons, but not its best. Their interest is not in Iran’s survival but in weakening American influence. That strategy has backfired. Instead of reducing U.S. power, they created a situation where Washington bombed Iran for the first time in decades, leaving Tehran weaker than it has been in 25 years.

So the idea that China and Russia are standing by Iran is exaggerated?

Exactly. It is more propaganda than partnership. Both Moscow and Beijing use Iran for their own gain. They do not care about the Iranian people or their struggle against repression. Which is why Washington’s drift away from human rights is such a mistake. Ninety-five million Iranians despise this regime. They are the true allies of the United States and Europe, the foundation of a future democratic Iran. Abandoning them for short-term deals undermines both morality and strategy.

China and Russia both do not care about Iran or the Iranian people, especially when it comes to human rights and the way Iranians are protesting the brutality of the regime. Does Washington still see human rights and democratic reform in Iran as a core strategic interest, or has that priority faded into the background again?

The priority is certainly reduced, and I think it’s a big mistake because Iranians are the greatest friends not only of their own country and freedom but also of the United States and the West. People in the Trump administration called this realpolitik, but it is not realistic at all. It assumes Iran is just a black box with an Ayatollah on top. We know what’s inside. Ninety-five million Iranians, the vast majority of whom hate the regime. They are the best allies of the West. They are the hope for a different Iran, a democratic Iran, a peaceful Iran, which is exactly what they want. Reducing the importance of human rights is not realism, it’s blindness.

Let’s turn to Gaza. Post-war governance or abandonment. You helped shape one of the most controversial post-war ideas: don’t rebuild Gaza, instead resettle Gazans elsewhere. Critics say that’s displacement. You’ve called it a humanitarian reset. Given the humanitarian crisis and political paralysis, do you still think this model is viable?

That idea was not mine; it was Donald Trump’s. But let me explain why I thought it raised important points. Syria went through a murderous civil war and millions of Syrians left for Turkey, Jordan, Europe. Ukrainians fled the fighting. Afghans fled the war. They all intend to return. Why is Gaza the only place in the world where civilians are told they must stay and endure the bombs?

Maybe because Gazans, unlike Syrians or Ukrainians, are often not allowed to return. Israel has a policy of denying Palestinians the right to go back home. Isn’t that a fundamental difference?

I don’t think it has to be. Sinai is a vast empty space. When Syrians fled, the UAE built a refugee camp for eighty thousand in Jordan. That never happened for Gaza because Egypt would not permit it. No one has asked Gazans directly: would you leave for safety now if you knew you could come back when the war ended? That question has never been put to them. They have not been given that opportunity.

Now, what should happen? I think Gaza’s recovery should be overseen by an international body: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the U.S., the EU supported by Palestinians on the ground running schools, hospitals, electricity, construction. It’s a huge, multi-year task, but it is possible. The failure is not in capacity but in planning. Israel has no plan. The Palestinian Authority has no plan. And Washington, above all, has no serious plan. That vacuum is the real crisis.

What does “victory” look like the day after Hamas?

It means Hamas cannot return militarily or politically. That is non-negotiable for Israel and the United States. Hamas is weaker every month, unable to resupply or train. But the leadership in tunnels, not in Doha or among civilians, prolongs the war. Israelis are divided: some demand destruction, others prioritize hostages. But there will be no true day after while Hamas rules.

Does Netanyahu’s focus on hostages will risk isolating Israel diplomatically?

That is a decision Israelis must make. Some countries now plan to recognize Palestine regardless of hostage releases. That is a mistake. Recognition should come with conditions—reform, security, and governance. Otherwise, it rewards inaction.

What about the Palestinian Authority? Is it salvageable, or finished?

It is hollow. Palestinians themselves say their lives were better before the PA. Polls show little confidence in Mahmoud Abbas, who has neither reformed nor called elections in decades. Revitalization is a vague word. Real change would mean new leadership, financial transparency, and democratic accountability. Without that, the PA cannot credibly govern, and no two-state discussion has meaning.

Is the two-state solution still viable, or has it collapsed?

It has collapsed. Support has eroded among both Israelis and Palestinians. Many Palestinians doubt it will ever happen. Some want Israel gone entirely. Many Israelis, even centrists, now see a Palestinian state as too dangerous after October 7. International recognition without conditions only deepens the stalemate.

If not two states, what comes next?

A one-state solution is unrealistic. Partition into a small landlocked Palestinian state is also unlikely to endure. The most plausible path may be some form of confederation with Jordan, which is already half-Palestinian and shares language, culture, and history. That idea will gain traction over time.

How do the Abraham Accords fit into this picture?

Hamas slowed them but did not kill them. No country that recognized Israel has withdrawn recognition. Progress will be slower: trade deals, sports exchanges, quiet visits, but the accords remain alive. Their long-term effect is to reduce Iran’s influence, not expand it.

What role does Syria play now?

Uncertain. It could hold together, or it could collapse further. The outcome is unknowable. But what is clear is that Iran’s grip in Syria is weaker than it once was, and that creates possibilities for greater sovereignty.

Who benefits from chaos in Syria today?

Iran, to some degree. Turkey, to some degree. But in truth, chaos benefits no one in the long run.

You’ve served across administrations in moments of both hope and collapse. What worries you more today: what adversaries might do, or what the United States might miss?

I worry more about what we might miss. This is a historic opportunity. Iran is weaker. Its proxies are struggling. If Washington gets distracted, invests in the wrong places, or fails to act, we will look back and see this as the moment we let slip away.

And what keeps you awake at night?

The fear that the United States would allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. That danger seems less likely now, but it remains the one that matters most.

If you could give this administration, or the next, one sentence of advice for the Middle East, what would it be?

Promote the sovereignty of each state, strengthen cooperation among them, and prevent Iran from rebuilding its network of proxies or advancing its nuclear program.

Thank you.
For Abrams, the Middle East is not a chessboard of endless moves. It is a moment of decision. Iran is weaker than it has been in 25 years. Hamas is battered. Hezbollah is stretched. The question is whether Washington acts, or whether it drifts and watches this rare opening close. In his words: the greatest threat isn’t what Iran does next, it’s what the United States fails to do.