The sounds of explosions are no longer confined to Gaza or southern Lebanon.
In Doha – where Qatar has long hosted rounds of negotiations between Israel and Hamas – Israeli warplanes carried out an unprecedented strike targeting Hamas leaders.
Doha condemned the “cowardly attack,” Gulf capitals quickly warned of its repercussions, and U.S. President Donald Trump called it “regrettable.”
For many, the attack marked a turning point that could redraw the boundaries of the conflict and shatter what little remains of mediation efforts to halt the war in Gaza.
The strike on Doha falls within a broader trajectory that has taken shape since October 7, when Israel and its allies shifted their priorities from seeking normalization to adopting the principle of “security first.”
Phrases like “regional peace” and “economic partnerships” once rolled frequently off Israeli officials’ tongues, as if they were keys to the future.
But on the morning of October 7, 2023, those words vanished—replaced by a new and clear refrain: “Security first, above all else.”
At the same time, October 7 did not end the trajectory of Arab-Israeli normalization, but it transformed it. Instead of overt diplomacy and economic cooperation, the focus shifted to secret, security-driven coordination, fueled by shared fears of Iran. The Palestinian issue, however, remained the central stumbling block to any attempt at full normalization.
“We must first finish the mission in Gaza—free the hostages and defeat Hamas—then think about the next step,” said Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of research in Israeli military intelligence, in an interview with Alhurra before the Israeli strike on Qatar.
After October 7
In the aftermath of October 7, the Arab world and the Middle East underwent a radical shift.
Peace, traditionally understood through diplomacy and political settlements, was no longer the highest priority for Israel and its potential allies.
Five years after the signing of the Abraham Accords, a new trend has emerged in Israel: security takes precedence over diplomacy, laying new foundations for regional cooperation and alliances.
“Once we complete the mission in Gaza, we can focus on translating the changes we achieved—together with the Americans (the Abraham Accords)—into a better strategic position for everyone in the Middle East,” Kuperwasser told Alhurra.
In 2020, the world witnessed an unprecedented diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East with the Abraham Accords, as the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco moved toward normalization with Israel under U.S. sponsorship.
These agreements opened a new era of political and economic cooperation, with countries focusing on economic diplomacy, boosting trade, investments, tourism, and mutual recognition.
Things went smoothly, and speculation grew about more Arab states joining—most notably Saudi Arabia.
But the “shock” Israel experienced on October 7 changed everything.
“I don’t think anyone in Israel doubts the overall importance or long-term potential of cultivating positive relations with new Arab states or strengthening Abraham Accords ties. But practically, I think that goal has been pushed to second place behind the need to fight and win in Gaza,” says Dan Feferman, co-founder of the Israel-Gulf “Sharaka” partnership.
Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. diplomat and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, believes Israel’s security focus reflects the constraints October 7 imposed on normalization.
Those constraints, he says, “made significant progress in relations between Israel and the Bahrainis, Emiratis, and Moroccans—as well as future Abraham Accords participants—far more difficult.”
Under the Table
Based on available information, no official, public security agreements have been signed between Israel and Arab states since October 2023.
However, media reports and intelligence analyses point to secret, and perhaps growing, security and intelligence cooperation between Israel and some Arab countries—especially those sharing concerns about Iran.
Despite public condemnations of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, security meetings and coordination reportedly continued behind the scenes.
Some reports noted meetings between Israeli military and intelligence officials and their Arab counterparts, particularly from Gulf states, under U.S. auspices.
This cooperation focused on regional threats such as drones and missiles launched by Iran-backed groups. It became especially visible during Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel, when reports said Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and others helped intercept missiles and drones that crossed their airspace.
Analysts describe the current situation as “cold peace” or “security normalization.” Public signs of normalization—like tourism and cultural exchange—waned due to Arab public anger, but security and intelligence channels remained open, and in fact more vital than ever.
Overall, October 7 did not lead to new public agreements, but it pushed existing security cooperation deeper underground, centered on building a joint front against regional threats.
“There are already existing security arrangements between Israel and major Gulf states—mostly under the table, with the Emiratis, and I’m sure with the Saudis too,” says Miller.
“Security ties between Israel and the main Arab states—excluding Egypt and maybe Jordan—are like an iceberg: one quarter visible above the water, three quarters hidden beneath it.”
He adds: “I saw this in April 2024, and again during the 12-day war—the extent of Gulf cooperation in missile defense coordination was remarkable, unprecedented in Arab-Israeli conflict history. Arab states were providing intelligence directly to Israel.”
What once seemed like a “dream” is now a reality.
“We can imagine all kinds of security arrangements with our neighbors that could later translate into gradual normalization and maybe even formal diplomatic relations,” says Kuperwasser.
“This could be with Syria, it could be with Lebanon, and of course with other Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia and Oman.”
The “Palestinian Question”
Major obstacles still block normalization, led by the Palestinian issue.
In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia was closely monitoring the situation. The kingdom was on the verge of signing a normalization agreement with Israel before October’s events, but the attack temporarily halted the process.
For decades, Saudi Arabia has been one of the strongest advocates for the Palestinian cause.
“Israel cannot build a comprehensive regional security architecture without fully addressing the Palestinian issue,” says Alon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at New York University.
“In fact, I think the Saudis made it very clear they will not enter into any substantive negotiations with Israel, tying normalization in any form to a clear pathway toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Ben-Meir told Alhurra.
Yet on the ground, from Saudi Arabia to the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon—all of these states now interact with Israel in one way or another, and none have severed ties even after the Gaza war erupted.
“There’s now the best Israel-Lebanon relationship ever, maybe even efforts from both governments to finalize border demarcation. There’s greater coordination between the Lebanese army and the Israeli army under U.S. mediation,” says Miller.
“With Syria, there are extraordinary unofficial contacts between Ahmed Shar’a’s government and Netanyahu’s government.”
Despite the Gaza war, relations with Egypt and Jordan—Israel’s formal peace partners—remain intact, as do ties with Bahrain and the UAE.
“Who’s left?” Miller asks. “Qatar, Oman, Iraq—and if there’s a way, they too could benefit from some coordination measures with the Israelis.”
Ghassan Taqi
صحفي متخصص في الشؤون العراقية، يعمل في مؤسسة الشرق الأوسط للإرسال MBN منذ عام 2015. عمل سنوات مع إذاعة "أوروبا الحرة" ومؤسسات إعلامية عراقية وعربية.
