Two years after the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks and the Gaza war they ignited, Israel and Turkey remain locked in one of the Middle East’s strangest rivalries. Though both countries are U.S. allies and closely bound to each other by trade, they are increasingly at odds over Syria, energy routes, and the politics of Hamas.
Israeli government data, cited by Reuters, put annual trade between the countries at about $7 billion before Ankara halted direct commerce in May 2024 over Gaza war concerns.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now openly trade barbs in public, but the deeper contest is about power, geography, and survival. It is less a direct war than a proxy struggle where a single miscalculation could trigger escalation.
The Most Volatile Arena
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule last December, after more than a decade of civil war, created the deepest rift.
“Israel panicked,” says Omar Ozkizilcik of Washington-based think tank the Atlantic Council, noting how the resulting power vacuum set both countries on a collision course. Turkey wants a united Syria under President Ahmed Sharaa, a Sunni Muslim who could serve as a friendly neighbor. Ankara has stationed between 20,000 and 30,000 troops in northern Syria and backs several militias there, which Ankara is pushing closer to Damascus.
Israel, by contrast, fears a strong Islamist government on its border. “Its preference is a divided or at least federal Syria,” with semi-autonomous zones for Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Sunnis, says analyst Yusuf Can of the Stimson Center.
Israel has not waited for threats to emerge. “They strike before a danger becomes real,” said Turkey expert Sinan Ciddi of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. In some cases, Can claimed, Israeli fire has even hit Turkish military bases, though without casualties.
Sharaa’s government has sought reconstruction aid and floated a possible security deal with Israel akin to the 1974 disengagement pact. But its economic goals don’t always align with Turkey’s ambitions, adding another layer of strain.
The Battle for Energy
Beyond Syria lies the second front: Cyprus and the wider eastern Mediterranean. Israel has deepened security cooperation with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, providing them with air defense systems and conducting joint military drills.
“It’s asymmetric geopolitics,” said Can. “Israel is leveraging Turkey’s vulnerable position, since Northern Cyprus remains unrecognized internationally.”
At the heart of the contest is energy. With Europe desperate to reduce dependence on Russian gas, the region has become a hub for new pipelines. Israel, Greece, and Cyprus hope to secure Europe’s needs. Turkey, working with Egypt in joint naval maneuvers, is determined not to be sidelined.
“Unresolved Cyprus tensions fuel instability,” said Gallia Lindenstrauss of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. “But NATO and EU ties help keep the situation under control.”
And Now Turkey
If Syria and Cyprus embody hard power, Gaza provides Erdogan with symbolism — a political tool to rally pro-Palestinian voters at home. Turkey has hosted Hamas leaders in Istanbul and Ankara, and Israel recently accused a Hamas cell operating from Turkey of plotting to kill far-right minister Itamar Ben Gvir, a charge Ankara denied.
Could Israel strike Hamas leaders in Turkey as it did in Qatar? “I’d be shocked, but not surprised,” said Ciddi. “Netanyahu has taken high-risk decisions before, even against advice from close allies.”
Still, Turkey is no Qatar. “A strike on a NATO member would be reckless,” warned Can. “It could even unravel NATO itself.”
Political Theater at Home
Domestic politics drive much of the drama. Erdogan has repeatedly branded Israel a “terrorist state” since the Gaza war erupted in 2023, and he has continued that rhetoric through 2024 and 2025, using it to cast himself as Gaza’s defender and to rally pro-Palestinian voters at home. Netanyahu, for his part, has leaned into a mirror-image narrative. In a September 2025 speech in Jerusalem, he warned that Israel might have to become a “super-Sparta,” a line analysts see as signaling both a more militarized posture abroad and a defiant image at home. Together, the two leaders’ rhetoric feeds a cycle of confrontation, each drawing political strength from the other’s hardline stance.
“Each leader exploits the other ,” said Ciddi. “It’s mutually beneficial political theater.”
Yet experts caution not to confuse speeches with strategy. “The hostility is tactical,” Ciddi added. “Erdogan uses Gaza to distract from Turkey’s economic crisis. If he were serious, he’d stop trade with Israel. He hasn’t. Despite Ankara halting direct government-to-government commerce, private and indirect trade continues.
Washington as Referee
The United States remains the indispensable mediator. “America has many levers to prevent a clash,” said Can. Its influence is military, economic, and diplomatic, and officials would intervene quickly in a crisis.
But Washington’s own strategy is uneven. “U.S. policy in Syria conflicts with Israel’s,” Ozkizilcik noted. Ciddi added, “The Americans have no real Syria strategy. Their messages are mixed, which only complicates matters.”
Still, U.S. officials are quietly pushing both sides to compartmentalize their disputes. American bases in Turkey and joint missile-defense projects with Israel give Washington leverage to keep tensions below the threshold of war.
Meanwhile, both Turkey and Israel are racing to showcase military prowess. Turkey touts its drone industry, but Can argues its broader military infrastructure still “lags years behind.” Israel, for its part, accuses Turkey of stationing advanced missiles in Somalia, capabilities it sees as a direct threat.
Analysts warn that without a clearer U.S. strategy, both Israel and Turkey will keep testing Washington’s tolerance, raising the risk of miscalculation.
A Managed Rivalry
For now, the consensus is clear: open war is unlikely. “Neither Erdogan nor Netanyahu wants direct conflict,” said Ciddi. “It would be catastrophic.”
Instead, the rivalry plays out through proxies, airstrikes in Syria, maneuvering in Cyprus, and covert operations around Hamas. Experts describe it as a suspended conflict: a contest carried out in the shadows, just beyond American oversight.
The stakes go beyond two countries. As Yusuf Can put it, the Middle East is moving toward a multipolar order where powers like Turkey and Israel seek new autonomy. But for all their maneuvering, both remain tethered to Washington.
That paradox, two leaders who thrive on confrontation but cannot afford to win outright, may define Israel and Turkey’s uneasy rivalry for years to come.

Rami Al Amine
كاتب وصحافي لبناني يعيش في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية. حائز درجة ماجستير في العلاقات الإسلامية والمسيحية من كلية العلوم الدينية في جامعة القديس يوسف في بيروت. صدر له ديوان شعري بعنوان "أنا شاعر كبير" (دار النهضة العربية - 2007)، وكتيب سياسيّ بعنوان "يا علي لم نعد أهل الجنوب" (خطط لبنانية - 2008)، وكتاب عن مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي بعنوان "معشر الفسابكة" (دار الجديد - 2012) وكتاب بعنوان "الباكيتان- سيرة تمثال" (دار النهضة العربية- ٢٠٢٤)


