Nearly a year after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria remains splintered and volatile. In the country’s northwest, forces loyal to President Ahmed al-Sharaa have battled the “Ghuraba Brigade,” a faction of foreign jihadists led by the French militant Omar Diaby – better known as Omar Omsen – in one of the most serious confrontations since the regime’s fall.
Analysts say the clashes near Idlib reflect more than a local power struggle. They expose the fragility of Syria’s post-war landscape and the uncertain fate of thousands of foreign fighters who once joined the rebellion. The violence, they warn, could reverberate far beyond Syria’s borders, unsettling the delicate balance of power from Turkey to the Mediterranean and stoking fears of a renewed transnational jihad.
A Battle at the Edge of Harem
The fighting broke out last Wednesday in the al-Firdan camp on the outskirts of Harem, in Idlib Province. The settlement shelters members of the Ghuraba Brigade and their families – mostly French or French-speaking – who have lived there since the war’s early years.
According to Syria’s Interior Ministry, security forces surrounded the camp after residents reported “serious violations,” including the abduction of a girl allegedly taken by an armed group under Diaby’s command. When police demanded his surrender, the statement said, Diaby barricaded himself inside, prevented civilians from leaving, and opened fire, “terrorizing residents and provoking security personnel.”
Hours later, Diaby’s son Jibril appeared in a video on social media pleading for help. “Security forces are preparing to storm the camp,” he said. “We have families, children, orphans, and elderly women here.”
Another group of foreign militants known as the “Uzbek Brigade” moved to join the fight, responding to Diaby’s call, before officials announced that both sides had agreed to a truce. Under the deal, Diaby’s men handed over their heavy weapons, averting a wider bloodbath.
Dueling Narratives
The government’s account was immediately questioned. Rami Abdulrahman, director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, dismissed the official story as incomplete. “If this were only about a kidnapped girl,” he told Alhurra, “why did other factions – including the Uzbeks – intervene on the side of the French?”
Abdulrahman believes the operation was part of a deeper effort to capture Diaby, who along with two others is wanted by French authorities on national-security charges. “It appears the Syrian authorities were trying to detain them,” he said.
Anna Borshchevskaya of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy agreed that the timing was not coincidental. “French officials are deeply concerned,” she noted. “In July, Damascus, Paris, and Washington reached a trilateral agreement on counterterrorism cooperation. These clashes need to be seen within that framework.”
A Familiar Name in Global Jihad
Diaby, a French citizen of Senegalese origin, rose to prominence a decade ago for posting French-language recruitment videos on YouTube urging Muslims to join the fight in Syria. France issued an international arrest warrant for him in 2014, and two years later the U.S. State Department designated him a global terrorist. At the time, officials said he commanded roughly 50 French fighters aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra, then al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, which later evolved into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa – now Syria’s president – known in his militant days as Abu Mohammad al-Julani.
The Foreign-Fighter Dilemma
The United Nations estimates that some 30,000 foreign combatants fought in Syria after 2011. Many have been killed or repatriated, but roughly 5,000 remain active, according to the Soufan Center, a New York-based security think tank.
Most come from East Turkestan (Xinjiang’s Uyghur region) and belong to the Turkistan Islamic Party, whose numbers range between 1,500 and 3,000, the Syrian Jusoor Center for Studies reports. Others hail from at least 14 countries, including France, Albania, Chechnya, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Sudan.
“Their presence is not a mere remnant of war,” the Soufan Center warned. “They continue to wield influence, as seen in their participation in March’s massacres against the Alawite community in northwest Syria.” The group described the fighters as “battle-hardened and experienced – assets for Sharaa but a liability for their home countries.”
Integration or Infiltration
Since taking office in December, Sharaa’s government has sought to fold thousands of foreign fighters into the Syrian army, awarding some command roles. It has even created a new unit – the 84th Division – composed of about 3,500 fighters, mostly Uyghurs and other foreigners.
During last week’s clashes, several foreign commanders were dispatched to negotiate with Diaby. According to Abdulrahman, those attending included Abu Mohammad Turkistani, commander of the 84th Division; Sheikh Abdulaziz Uzbek, head of the Ubaidah bin al-Jarrah Brigade; Sheikh Saif al-Din Uzbek, the brigade’s military officer; and Sheikh Abu Anas Tajik, leader of the Tajik faction.
“Their presence underscores how deeply embedded foreign fighters have become within Syria’s new military structure,” Abdulrahman said.
Hussam Taleb, a researcher on extremist movements, said the government views these militants as part of the revolution’s military legacy. “Authorities are pursuing a policy of integration, absorbing them into the army and into Syrian society after nearly 15 years in the country,” he told Alhurra. Those refusing to comply, he added, “will be treated as outlaws.”
A Dangerous Gamble
That policy has drawn sharp criticism. Rights groups and analysts warn that incorporating radicals accused of sectarian atrocities risks legitimizing them. During massacres on the Syrian coast in March and in Sweida in July, militias aligned with the government – including foreign fighters – were accused of executing civilians in cold blood.
“These government-linked militias killed more than 1,600 Alawite and at least 100 Druze civilians,” said Dania al-Arisi of the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington. “Their continued activity shows how entrenched sectarian violence remains.”
Al-Arisi warned that foreign fighters now hold institutional power. “Six of the 49 senior leadership posts in the new Syrian army are occupied by foreigners with ranks up to brigadier general,” she said. “Roughly 30 percent of new recruits are former foreign combatants who have married Syrian women and settled in local communities.”
Ripples Beyond Syria
For Al-Arisi, the danger extends well past Syria’s borders. “Sharaa’s government cannot simply expel these fighters without risking mass defections to extremist groups or a renewed civil war,” she said. “The Islamic State has already called on disaffected fighters inside the government to defect and join its ranks – a pathway that could feed global jihadist networks.”
The implications, she added, “reach far beyond Syria. Many of these men embrace borderless ideologies and see Syria as a launch pad for their jihad – toward the Middle East, Europe, and beyond.”
For now, Idlib remains a frontline not just in Syria’s unending conflict but in a wider struggle over what kind of order will emerge in a region where the wars never truly end.
Ghassan Taqi
صحفي متخصص في الشؤون العراقية، يعمل في مؤسسة الشرق الأوسط للإرسال MBN منذ عام 2015. عمل سنوات مع إذاعة "أوروبا الحرة" ومؤسسات إعلامية عراقية وعربية.
