On December 13, 2025, an Islamic State gunman carried out an attack in Palmyra, in central Syria, killing two U.S. soldiers and a translator.
The attack took place at the entrance to a facility belonging to Syria’s Internal Security Command, following a joint patrol by Syrian and U.S. forces — a striking indication of the group’s ability to exploit security gaps even at sites presumed to be fortified.
Although the operation unfolded in Palmyra, deep in the country’s interior, its implications extend far beyond the city. It has once again drawn attention to the troubling resurgence of ISIS activity across the vast expanses of the Syrian desert and in northeastern Syria, including Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, Manbij and surrounding areas.
The Syrian government said it had shared preliminary intelligence with coalition forces warning of a possible breach or attacks led by ISIS, reflecting an official acknowledgment that the threat is no longer marginal or confined to isolated pockets.
As ISIS regains momentum, Syria’s landscape at the end of 2025 appears deeply chaotic across much of the country.
The greatest concern lies in the north and east, where ISIS activity is concentrated — areas that border or overlap with territory controlled by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
As the SDF seeks to entrench its autonomy as a fait accompli, the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa is pushing to reassert sovereignty at almost any cost. Turkey — the northern neighbor and al-Sharaa’s closest ally — has adopted a hard-line stance toward Syrian Kurdish groups due to its fear of spillover effects across its border.
This is where ISIS sees its opening. The group is lying in wait, targeting all sides through ambushes, lone-wolf attacks and a strategy of attrition.
The Obstacle of the “March 10 Agreement”
A year after the fall of the Assad regime, tensions between al-Sharaa’s government and the Syrian Democratic Forces have reached a peak.
The “March 10 agreement,” which promised the integration of the SDF into state institutions, has yet to be implemented just days before the end of 2025, the deadline set for completing the merger.
The agreement was signed by transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, with the stated aim of unifying the country militarily and administratively.
Damascus insists on an integration formula that would dismantle the SDF’s military structures and absorb its fighters individually into the Defense Ministry.
The SDF, by contrast, wants to preserve its forces as a unified bloc within a new national army, while maintaining “self-administration” in eastern Syria.
Between these sharply divergent positions, stalled negotiations have become a field-level liability, producing security vacuums that ISIS has been quick to exploit.
There appears to be little hope of implementing the agreement in the near term.
“It is difficult to implement the agreement by the end of the year, because the two sides do not trust each other and have different visions regarding the mechanism of implementation,” said Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a journalist and Middle East expert, in comments to Alhurra.
With prospects for compromise dim, tensions flared again this week in Aleppo, where violent clashes erupted in the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods, areas controlled by the SDF.
ISIS Prisons
As Damascus and the SDF clash over authority and boundaries, northeastern Syria remains a ticking time bomb in the form of prisons and camps run by the SDF, which are long regarded as one of the region’s most sensitive security vulnerabilities.
The Ghwayran Prison in Hasakah is the largest detention facility for ISIS members in the world, holding roughly 5,000 former fighters.
The SDF operates more than 20 detention centers and camps across northeastern Syria, amid fears of renewed prison break attempts similar to an assault in 2022.
That year, ISIS-linked cells attacked Ghwayran prison in Hasakah in an attempt to free detained fighters. The assault lasted nearly nine days and ended with the deaths of dozens of ISIS fighters and inmates, as well as about 140 SDF personnel.
With the group’s ranks now estimated at between 1,500 and 3,000 fighters, decentralization and hit-and-run operations have become its defining features. Small cells move rapidly between Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, carrying out swift attacks and ambushes, exploiting vast open terrain and divisions among Syrian actors.
From Control to Survival
By 2025, ISIS is no longer the organization seeking direct territorial control and urban governance. Instead, it has focused on preserving a resilient core capable of enduring a long war of attrition, exploiting security gaps in fragile areas.
“ISIS follows this strategy by operating as a flexible network of small cells that focus on attacks undermining the state’s claim that it controls security, especially in transitional areas of central and eastern Syria,” said Nick Heras, a researcher at the Newlines Institute, in comments to Alhurra.
Tom Warrick, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, said ISIS sought to capitalize on the fall of the Assad regime by exploiting Damascus’ preoccupation with consolidating control in the more densely populated parts of western Syria.
“Like other terrorist groups, ISIS benefits from ungoverned or weakly governed spaces in eastern Syria,” Warrick said.
Beyond the prisons, the al-Hol camp — home to more than 40,000 people, mostly Iraqis and Syrians — remains a major concern. Many of the camp’s residents are children, raising fears of a new generation growing up in an environment saturated with ISIS ideology.
The Turkish Shadow
Turkey’s intervention further complicates the picture. Ankara has threatened escalation and aligned itself openly with Damascus, while designating the Syrian Democratic Forces as a terrorist organization.
This was underscored by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s recent visit to Damascus.
Standing alongside his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shibani, Fidan adopted a confrontational tone, accusing the SDF of lacking genuine intent to integrate.
This Syrian-Turkish convergence leaves the SDF facing two stark choices: full integration on Damascus’ terms, or the prospect of a Turkish military incursion.
Such an incursion would be welcomed by ISIS, as it would pit its adversaries against one another and create additional security vacuums conducive to its operations.
The American Bet
In the wake of the Palmyra attack, Washington moved swiftly. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowed a forceful response, saying the United States would hunt down ISIS fighters and “kill them without mercy.”
On December 19, Operation Eagle Eye was launched — described as the largest U.S.-led campaign in years. According to U.S. Central Command, the operation struck more than 70 ISIS targets in central Syria, including weapons depots and infrastructure.
The strikes were carried out with support from the Jordanian Air Force.
Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, said the operation was “decisive in preventing ISIS from planning terrorist attacks against the United States.”
Notably, Damascus publicly endorsed the operation. Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who is seeking to shed his past association with extremism, appears eager to signal to Washington that he is a “reliable partner” in counterterrorism.
That effort may collide with the reality that Washington has relied for years on the SDF as its primary on-the-ground partner against ISIS and that tensions between Damascus and the SDF, compounded by Turkish pressure, are creating an ideal environment for the group to survive and gradually reemerge.
In the final analysis, ISIS appears to be one of the chief beneficiaries of the clash of competing projects on the Syrian battlefield at the end of 2025.
As the SDF seeks to entrench its autonomy, Damascus pushes to restore sovereignty without concessions, and Ankara remains determined to dismantle Kurdish armed groups, ISIS moves quietly in the shadows. ISIS utilizes ambushes and lone attacks as it exploits the reality that its rivals are more preoccupied with one another than with defeating it.
