A Possible Saudi Policy Shift in Yemen

As senior air force commanders from the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia were meeting in Muscat, images began circulating on social media showing Saudi fighter jets carrying out what were described as “warning strikes” over Yemen’s Al-Mahrah province at its border with Oman. The area has witnessed a rapid expansion of influence in recent weeks by forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates. According to sources speaking to Alhurra, the STC is now close to announcing an independent state in areas under its control.

In remarks to Alhurra, however, STC spokesperson Anwar Al-Tamimi dismissed the possibility that Saudi Arabia would undertake military action against STC forces.

Nevertheless, the British newspaper The Guardian recently revealed a large Saudi military buildup of approximately 20,000 fighters from Yemen’s “Homeland Shield” forces along the border.

If confirmed, this move would signal a shift in Saudi policy toward the Yemen conflict and toward former Yemeni allies. It would also point to a major change in the balance of positions and influence within the anti-Houthi camp.

Saudi journalist Ghazi Al-Harithi told Alhurra that “Saudi Arabia does not see the STC’s moves as consistent with the objectives of the coalition.”

This military buildup appears aimed more at drawing new “red lines” to curb the eastward expansion of Abu Dhabi’s allies than at escalating against the Houthis. But how accurate is this reading?

Disagreement or a Division of Roles?

Since the launch of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, the declared priority of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has been to halt the advance of the Houthi movement—designated by the United States as a terrorist organization—and to restore the internationally recognized government’s control.

This approach has formed the backbone of Saudi military and political efforts over the past decade, within a broader strategy aimed at containing Iranian influence, which backs the Houthis, and securing Saudi and Gulf borders.

Since April 2020, the parties have been operating under a declared truce, during which land, air, and naval offensive operations inside Yemen declined, in exchange for a reduction in Houthi attacks on Saudi territory.

Recent political and military developments, however, suggest that the equation has changed. According to an analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the speed with which STC forces seized territory in eastern and southern Yemen surprised many observers.

As the institute’s report notes, these moves sparked early speculation about a tacit understanding between Saudi Arabia and the UAE to accept the new fait accompli in favor of the STC, widely regarded as the strongest military ally within the pro-government camp.

These assumptions were reinforced by the initial silence of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi during the STC’s advance, as well as the rapid conclusion of fighting in Hadramawt province, according to the report.

Further signs of this shift appeared in the withdrawal of Saudi-trained “Homeland Shield” forces—estimated to include around 80,000 fighters—which handed over positions they had been protecting in Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah, in addition to fully withdrawing from their base near Aden.

The analysis concludes that the “deal” hypothesis gradually weakened: Al-Alimi later condemned the STC operation as a dangerous unilateral move undermining the legitimate government, while Riyadh publicly demanded a full withdrawal of STC forces. Emirati officials, according to the analysis, acknowledged the need to de-escalate, before both countries sent a joint delegation to Aden in an attempt to contain the crisis.

Saudi Priorities Reassessed

On the ground, as tensions escalated in Al-Mahrah and Hadramawt, signs emerged of a shift in Riyadh’s priorities—from treating the STC as an ally to focusing on containing or even deterring it, rather than concentrating exclusively on fighting the Houthis.

Under this reading, the crisis moved beyond the battlefield into Saudi media, where outlets—particularly those close to the official line—began launching sharp criticism of STC actions.

In an interview on Al Arabiya, Yemeni Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Al-Nu’man, speaking from Riyadh, attacked the STC’s moves and suggested that calculations tied to “preserving unity” could push some forces—such as “unity-minded figures within the legitimate government”—toward extreme options. He said he “rules nothing out in politics,” hinting that engagement with the Houthis, Saudi Arabia’s principal adversary, could be floated as a forced option if the imposition of facts on the ground in the south and east continues.

He added that “Saudi Arabia is patient, and its patience is long—but if it becomes angry, the response will be difficult,” warning: “We are heading toward a small state in southern Yemen, like Somaliland.”

Between “Somaliland” and “Kosovo”

What is unfolding in southern Yemen is no longer merely a struggle over influence, but a gradual drift toward a de facto entity. As the STC expands its presence within state institutions and public facilities, and as statements of support emerge from officials and ministers within the government, Yemen’s presidency responded with an explicit rejection of what it described as the exploitation of public office for political gain. It warned that “using an official position to achieve political objectives undermines state legitimacy” and called on partners to prioritize wisdom and dialogue.

Al-Nu’man’s reference to “Somaliland” is not metaphorical. The region declared independence in 1991 and built governing, security, and administrative institutions, yet has remained for decades without broad international recognition.

Regionally, the experience of the Port of Berbera—under Somaliland’s administration—offers a practical example of this model: operating and development contracts and investments tied to Gulf of Aden logistics corridors, without full political recognition.

Within this framework, the STC has sought to present itself to Washington as a pragmatic security partner. However, the caution that has characterized U.S. policy toward Somaliland appears present here as well. A Congressional Research Service document notes that the United States approaches Somaliland with extreme caution, despite limited engagement that has never risen to the level of recognition.

Regarding Yemen’s internal dynamics, Yemeni researcher Munir Al-Maouri told Alhurra that “what is happening could reproduce proxy conflicts, but with different tools.”

On the other hand, some supporters of southern secession point to a contrasting example: Kosovo, which gained broad international recognition, including U.S. recognition in February 2008.

In any case, it remains difficult to predict the direction Yemen’s trajectory will take in the coming period, particularly given the divergences among the states backing the various parties to the conflict.