After more than four decades since its founding, the Gulf Cooperation Council is once again facing questions about its ability to maintain cohesion as a regional bloc, at a time when internal disputes have resurfaced and political divergences among its member states have widened, amid a growing reliance by Gulf capitals on bilateral moves rather than collective action.
The council was established in 1981 at an exceptional regional moment, as a direct response to the transformations brought about by Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the accompanying security and ideological threats that reshaped the GCC’s balance of power. Since then, the GCC has built its approach around managing contradictions and containing disputes rather than dismantling them, favoring a logic of temporary de-escalation over decisive resolution—an approach that enabled it for decades to preserve a degree of apparent cohesion and relative stability.
But the transformations the region has witnessed in recent years, coupled with the recurrence of crises within the GCC house, have exposed the limits of this model’s ability to contain disagreements.
Disputes Embedded in the Structure
Analysts say that Gulf-on-Gulf disputes are neither new nor the product of fleeting crises, but rather stem from historical accumulations that predate the council’s establishment and continued after its founding.
Border issues early on became one of the pillars of competition and tension, contributing—and continuing to contribute—to obstructing the emergence of genuine and sustainable cohesion within the GCC system. This is in addition to other factors related to balances of influence, the intertwining of familial considerations within ruling elites, cross-border tribal interconnections, and differing foreign policy priorities.
With the rise of oil as a central determinant of wealth and power, disputes shifted from a traditional political framework to conflicts with economic and strategic dimensions, at times reaching the level of military friction, particularly in resource-rich areas whose legal status remained unresolved.
The first clear political rift within the GCC emerged in the early 1970s, when Qatar declined to join the United Arab Emirates upon its establishment in 1971. Divergences later deepened following the political shift in Doha in 1995, sending GCC relations into a volatile trajectory marked by temporary thawing and recurring tensions.
These dynamics reached a peak in 2014, when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, a move that reflected the transition of the dispute from an implicit level to an openly declared diplomatic confrontation. Although Kuwaiti mediation led to the Riyadh Agreement, the crisis underscored the limited ability of temporary solutions to prevent the recurrence of disputes.
The imbalances were not confined to the Qatar crisis. Other Gulf relationships also followed turbulent paths, including Emirati-Omani ties, where tensions oscillated between border demarcation issues, security trust crises, and symbolic disputes carrying political significance. Renewed tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen have also reaffirmed that disagreements persist within the GCC house and remain liable to resurface in the absence of effective institutional mechanisms to manage them.
From the Qatar Crisis to Rivalry Among Allies
Dr. Abdullah Baabood, an academic specializing in international and GCC affairs, says the effectiveness of the GCC has undergone two decisive tests over the past decade.
“The first test was represented by the sharp political division imposed by the Qatar boycott crisis between 2017 and 2021, while the second lay in the escalation of competition within what was supposed to be a single axis, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over regional, economic, and strategic files—from Yemen to energy and the economy.”
Baabood argues that these developments helped shift the council from a binding integrative framework to an entity operating on a selective and pragmatic basis.
“The Qatar crisis paralyzed the core of joint GCC action, foremost political trust, security and media coordination, and freedom of movement within the system. Although the crisis officially ended with the Al-Ula Declaration in January 2021, its roots were not addressed structurally, but rather frozen politically.”
He adds that Saudi-Emirati disagreements weakened the ability to formulate a unified Gulf position on sensitive regional files, while simultaneously highlighting features of economic and regulatory competition, and even divergences in energy arrangements, as seen in the OPEC+ production quota dispute in 2021.
“The council did not break down, but it was reshaped, as institutional integration gave way to situational coordination and the influence of summits and the general secretariat diminished in favor of decisions driven by national capitals.”
At both the regional and international levels, Baabood says, these divisions have weakened the image of the GCC as a unified negotiating bloc and made it easier for external powers to adopt bilateral approaches, particularly on energy, maritime security, and regional crises.
A Less Pessimistic Reading
By contrast, Qatari journalist Abdullah Al-Wathin Al-Marri adopts a less pessimistic reading of the trajectory of recent tensions, viewing them as an extension of previous crises that were eventually contained.
“Recent indicators, particularly statements issued by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflect a tendency toward de-escalation and regulating the political tempo,” he says.
He adds that the GCC remains capable of regaining its integrative cycle.
“Raising the question of the council’s future sometimes suggests that the situation is more dangerous than it actually is, whereas the council’s history demonstrates its ability to overcome more complex crises, some of which were not visible to public opinion.”
Al-Marri believes that GCC disputes, despite their impact on citizens’ daily lives, have not caused a genuine shake-up of the council’s entity, which has maintained its institutional cohesion.
Absence of a Dispute-Settlement Mechanism
Experts say one of the most prominent weaknesses in the council’s operation lies in the absence of an effective dispute-settlement mechanism. Although the GCC’s charter has, since its founding, provided for the possibility of establishing a body dedicated to resolving disputes, this mechanism has remained outside the realm of activation.
Baabood notes that the legal and political literature related to the council shows that such mechanisms have remained dormant in favor of direct political settlements and ad hoc mediation.
“Even major crises, foremost the Qatar crisis, were contained through political tracks outside the council’s institutional framework, via regional and international mediation, without recourse to any organized GCC arbitration process.”
He attributes this to a deeper structural flaw: the absence of binding authority within the GCC system.
“In disputes of a highly sensitive political or security nature, states tend to avoid activating institutional frameworks that might constrain their room for maneuver, preferring to keep dispute management within the scope of bilateral understandings.”
The Council’s Future Between Continuity and Reform
For his part, former Kuwaiti National Assembly member Saleh Ashour offers a critical reading of the council’s future that combines acknowledgment of achievements with a warning about shortcomings.
“After nearly 44 years since its establishment, the council has succeeded in entrenching a degree of security and stability and preserving a unifying Gulf identity, but it has failed to achieve its core objectives, foremost real economic integration.”
Ashour points to the faltering of the unified Gulf currency project, the persistence of border issues, and the absence of serious treatment of imbalances in demographic structures as clear indicators of a gap between founding ambition and practical reality.
He adds that social transformations are no less important than political ones, with the emergence of a young generation carrying a shared GCC awareness that calls for a new political response.
“In this context, Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role stands out, given its political and economic weight, alongside Oman, which brings experience and a long-standing tradition of mediating disputes, to advance the path of GCC integration.”
Ashour concludes that maintaining the status quo without genuine institutional reforms will have negative repercussions for the council’s future.
“Returning to the core idea of the council’s founding—based on political, economic, and social integration—remains an essential condition for enabling the GCC to confront upcoming challenges with unity of position and greater confidence.”
Sukina Ali
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
