Lebanon faces today one of its most dangerous political and security thresholds in years. The threat of a new war is no longer confined to diplomatic warnings. It has evolved into mounting Israeli military pressure, amid the unresolved issue of illegitimate weapons and a firmly held international conviction that the continuation of this reality poses a grave risk to domestic and regional stability.
Against this charged backdrop, President Joseph Aoun delivered an unprecedentedly forceful message during an interview with Télé Liban, addressing Hezbollah directly: “Weapons are no longer justified, and only the state is authorized to protect Lebanon. A segment of the population is no longer obliged to bear the consequences of these weapons.”
His remarks reopened one of the most sensitive files in Lebanese political life and raised fundamental questions: Why have successive presidents failed to put an end to illegitimate weapons? How has this arsenal affected the office of the president, transforming it from a constitutional authority that holds state decisions into an inbox of political compromises? And why has the balance of power—rather than the constitution—come to define the limits of authority between Baabda (the presidential palace) and Ain al-Tineh (the speaker of parliament’s headquarters)?
Baabda Stripped of Decision Power
Before the 1989 Taif Accord, the presidency stood at the core of executive authority in Lebanon. The Maronite president then wielded broad powers, including appointing the prime minister, naming and dismissing ministers, signing off on cabinet decisions, calling extraordinary sessions of Parliament and dissolving it with cabinet’s approval, proposing legislation, negotiating and concluding international treaties, and serving directly as commander in chief of the armed forces. These broad and actual authorities gave the office of the president a central political weight.
The Taif Accord, however, fundamentally redistributed authority, sharply curtailing presidential powers. The role of commander in chief became largely symbolic after the armed forces were placed under the authority of the cabinet. Executive power was transferred to the cabinet collectively, and presidential authority in legislation, appointments and international negotiations was reduced, subject to shared constitutional mechanisms as stipulated in Articles 49 through 63 of the amended Lebanese Constitution.
The Taif Accord—signed in the Saudi city of Taif by Lebanese factions—marked a pivotal moment that ended the civil war and established the constitutional framework governing Lebanon’s current political order.
Yet the erosion of the presidency, emphasizes political analyst and lawyer Amin Bashir, “was not merely the result of constitutional text, but rather of an imbalance of power imposed by Hezbollah’s weapons and its alliance with the Amal Movement. This reshaped the map of influence within the state, granting the speakership a weight that exceeded its constitutional limits, at the expense of the presidency.”
In remarks to Alhurra, Bashir said this alliance, backed by sub-state military force, “turned parliament from an independent legislative authority into a tool of passage and obstruction according to the balance of power, thereby constraining the president’s ability to exercise his powers.”
According to Bashir, the weakening of the presidency occurred in two phases: “First, when the state’s exclusive monopoly over force was broken and parallel military power emerged—indeed one that is stronger than the state’s. Secondly, with the establishment of a military and political veto power imposed by Hezbollah in tandem with Amal, embodied in the person of Speaker Nabih Berri, enabling them to control parliamentary activity and its outcomes.”
He added that after the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, Hezbollah “began to take hold of the state’s levers through Parliament and government, rallying allies from various sects in an effort to confer political legitimacy on its military power.”
From Baabda to the Southern Suburb
As institutional authority receded and parallel power centers gained influence, official positions alone ceased to determine decision-making. Instead, the real balance of power became tied to military clout and sectarian alliances.
In this context, political analyst Georges Akouri argues that “the speakership, traditionally allocated to the Shiite community, has been transformed into a tool serving the agenda of the Shiite duo. The speaker has effectively become the head of Amal rather than a representative of the entire nation. Political decision-making has been seized from Baabda—not transferred to Ain al-Tineh, but to Amal’s headquarters and Hezbollah’s Southern Suburb.”
In comments to Alhurra, Akouri cited a series of practices he described as constitutional violations, including the paralysis of parliament and governments, the bypassing of parliamentary bylaws, and the manipulation of parliamentary sessions and agendas.
Beyond Baabda
Ever since the Mar Mikhael memorandum of understanding was signed in 2006 between former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and former leader of the Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun, Lebanon’s constitutional authority has been hostage to an unwritten bargain: Hezbollah would secure the presidency for its allies in exchange for consolidating its dominance over state institutions.
Lebanon endured prolonged presidential vacuums, most notably after President Emile Lahoud’s term ended in 2007, delaying the election of Michel Suleiman until 2008. Another vacuum followed between 2014 and 2016 until Michel Aoun was elected. After Aoun’s term expired, the presidency remained vacant for roughly two and a half years due to Hezbollah’s insistence on imposing its candidate, Sleiman Frangieh. Only after Hezbollah’s influence had later waned—following its defeat by Israel and escalating international pressure—was Joseph Aoun elected president in January 2025.
Hezbollah also had extensive influence over the government. Since 2008, it imposed what became known as the “blocking third,” enabling it to obstruct or topple governments at will. It also engraved the mantra “army, people, resistance” in every government policy statement to confer political legitimacy on its weapons—language that was dropped only under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government.
This clout was starkly illustrated in 2006, when Hezbollah and Amal ministers resigned from Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government to block the approval of the draft international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. After the 2020 Beirut port explosion, Hezbollah obstructed efforts to form a government under Mustafa Adib. The filibustering then continued paralyzing government through its ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, prompting Prime Minister Saad Hariri to abandon attempts to form a government in 2021 after nine months. When Najib Mikati formed a government later that year, Hezbollah suspended its meetings for three and a half months, demanding the removal of Judge Tarek Bitar, the lead investigator in the port blast.
Akouri also points to key milestones in Hezbollah’s consolidation of power, including the 2006 National Dialogue sessions launched to address major disputes—chief among them the presidency, illegitimate weapons, a defense strategy and the international tribunal. “Despite Nasrallah’s assurances at the time that the summer would be calm,” Akouri said, “the outcome was that Lebanon was dragged into the July 2006 war.”
He further cites Hezbollah’s repudiation of the Baabda Declaration, a consensus document adopted in 2012 under President Michel Suleiman to insulate Lebanon from regional conflicts. “Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, openly rejected adherence to it,” Akouri said, after which the Party got embroiled in the Syrian war.
The Army’s Undercut Authority
Since Taif, Hezbollah’s weapons have been among Lebanon’s most intractable issues. Although the agreement called for the disbanding of all militias, Hezbollah was exempted under the banner of “resistance.” After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the July 2006 war, international pressure intensified. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a zone free of any armed presence between the Blue Line and the Litani River except for the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL, and stressed the implementation of Resolution 1559, which mandates the disarmament of militias. Nevertheless, Hezbollah retained its arsenal under what it termed an “equation of deterrence.”
This reality directly affected the Lebanese Army. Bashir says the existence of a parallel armed force rendered the army “incomplete in capacity and control,” unable to assert authority over all territory due to the absence of political consensus.
Akouri added that Hezbollah’s lack of cooperation hampers the army’s mission. Providing precise maps of weapon depots, tunnels and bases, he said, would have facilitated the army’s deployment south and north of the Litani. Even so, he affirmed that the army, given due time, was capable of extending the state’s authority across Lebanon.
The Big Opportunity
Today, after the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel and the signing of a cease-fire agreement, the margin for maneuver has narrowed. Last August, the Lebanese government adopted a decision to restrict Hezbollah’s weapons, drawing on the agreement, the presidential oath speech and the ministerial statement—an effort aimed to avert another war and unlock international support and reconstruction.
Analysts say this file opens a political window for President Joseph Aoun to restore the presidency to the center of national decision-making, transforming it from a symbolic post into an active actor.
Political analyst Elias Zoghbi told Alhurra that the president’s role in resolving the issue of illegitimate “is pivotal—not only because he is commander in chief under the constitution, but also because of the popular and political trust he has retained since his election early last year.”
A Firm Tone, Multiple Messages
Zoghbi described Aoun’s position on Hezbollah’s weapons in his recent television interview as “more advanced and decisive than the language he previously used during phases of dialogue with the party,” while remaining consistent with his inaugural address on restricting weapons. “The difference,” Zoghbi said, “is that he called the problem out directly—weapons no longer have a role to play and movement of weaponry has become a burden on their own constituency and on Lebanon.”
Former lawmaker Fares Said told Alhurra that the president is not seeking to amend the Taif Accord or alter the distribution of powers but is operating within a clear constitutional framework that assigns exclusive control of weapons to the state. His direct tone, Said says, is “natural for a man coming from the military institution.”
Writer and analyst Youssef Diab, also speaking to Alhurra, said the president’s stance “stems from a national conviction that maintaining weapons could drag Lebanon into war without any international cover.” By contrast, Aoun’s position, he added, “provides protection for the government, constitutional cover for decisions to restrict weapons, and restores weight and authority to the presidency in managing sovereign issues.”
Constraints and Challenges
Despite the available window of opportunity, restricting possession and movement of weapons in Lebanon remains deeply complex. Alongside the financial and military challenges facing the army, there is internal division and Hezbollah’s refusal to surrender its weapons north of the Litani, tying the issue to political and security conditions. As Israeli airstrikes intensify, pressure on the Lebanese state is mounting.
Diab said “the core obstacle lies in Hezbollah’s noncompliance with government decisions,” noting that “the regional context—particularly Iran’s situation, where the regime is struggling to survive in the face of a peaceful popular uprising—heightens the party’s anxiety.” He argued that Hezbollah is “playing its last cards, seeking to pressure Prime Minister Salam and his government to give concessions.”
Akouri, for his part, said Hezbollah “as an armed militia is heading toward decline after the ‘support war’ it entered on Oct. 8, 2023.” Restoring the state’s authority, he argues, begins gradually with ending Hezbollah’s weapons, as their loss would eliminate its excess domestic power and curb its illicit activities abroad, while leaving its parliamentary role legitimate within constitutional bounds.
Zoghbi noted that implementation of the president’s stance on disarming illegitimate weapons has already begun “south of the Litani River,” while the remaining phases are proceeding cautiously due to Hezbollah’s refusal to cooperate with the army north of the Litani and elsewhere.
In sum, the process of restricting weapons is “moving along its designated track,” Zoghbi said, “even if it slows at times due to realities on the ground and the uncertain fate of Hezbollah’s Iranian patron.”
