The Saudi Role in Hadramawt: A Guarantee or a Guardianship?

Two notable developments concerning Hadramawt have emerged in recent days, revealing a tangible reordering of the governorate’s representation and internal balance.

The first was a photograph taken about two weeks ago showing the vehicle of Hadramawt Governor Salem Al-Khanbashi bearing the “Hadramawt flag.” This came after Saudi airstrikes targeted positions of forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in early January, following their withdrawal from the governorate.

The second development was the dismissal of Faraj Al-Bahsani, Hadramawt’s representative on the Presidential Leadership Council, and the appointment of Al-Khanbashi himself as his replacement—a move that shifted the governorate’s representation from a figure associated with Emirati-linked power centers to an official seen as an extension of arrangements led by Saudi Arabia.

With this, Hadramawt has entered a new phase. The governorate—long relatively insulated from the main arenas of conflict during years of war—now finds itself at the heart of a regional landscape being redrawn amid a decline in Abu Dhabi’s influence and an expansion of the Saudi role.

What does Riyadh want from Hadramawt? And what do the Hadramis themselves want in return?

Geography and History

Hadramawt is Yemen’s richest governorate in terms of oil, holding nearly 80 percent of the country’s proven reserves. Despite years of conflict across much of Yemen, the governorate has remained relatively calm. It also shares vast desert borders with southern Saudi Arabia along the 1,458-kilometer Yemeni-Saudi frontier.

Despite its economic importance, Hadramawt has a low population density and a distinct history and rich culture. Its modern name and administrative outline only took shape in 1967, following the end of rule by the Qu‘aiti and Kathiri sultanates, which had governed parts of the region under British protection.

The two sultanates were later merged, incorporating Hadramawt into the state of South Yemen, and subsequently into unified Yemen in 1990. Nevertheless, residents retained a strong sense of local identity and distinctiveness.

After unification of Yemen and amid centralized governance and weak local representation of Hadrami interests, segments of the population felt increasingly marginalized.

During Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (2013–2014), held after the ouster of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a six-region federal model was proposed, granting Hadramawt the status of an “independent region” due to its size and wealth.

However, the collapse of the transitional phase following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, and the outbreak of war in 2015, froze these federal aspirations.

Hadramawt in Riyadh’s Vision

In Riyadh’s calculations, Hadramawt is not merely a Yemeni governorate, but a direct extension of Saudi national security and border defense. Securing it, according to Saudi official narrative, prevents the infiltration of armed groups and smuggling networks into the Kingdom and closes off potential avenues for Iranian influence and its militias.

For this reason, Saudi Arabia has pushed to strengthen the presence of the Yemeni state and its institutions in Hadramawt, so that it does not become an uncontrollable “soft underbelly.”

From this perspective, Saudi Arabia’s direct intervention—including the use of warplanes in early January 2026 to expel STC forces from the governorate, just weeks after they had seized large areas—can be understood.

Saudi journalist Ghazi Al-Harthi told Alhurra that Riyadh’s position toward the STC’s moves was a “clear rejection of unilateral actions that create an atmosphere of tension and mistrust,” adding that Saudi Arabia is “trying to spare the governorate from sliding into internal conflict.”

After the military intervention was completed and achieved its purpose, a political step of notable symbolic significance was taken. Al-Khanbashi entered Mukalla in an official vehicle bearing the Hadramawt flag—marking the first time the flag has been displayed on the vehicle of a senior Yemeni official.

Days later, Al-Khanbashi took part in the inauguration of what is known as the “Hadramawt National Council,” an event accompanied by playing the Hadramawt anthem for the first time at an official ceremony.

In January, Al-Khanbashi stated that Hadramawt would “lift the cap on its demands for a Hadramawt state if other parties continue to override the will of its people.” He affirmed that the “state option” remains on the table unless the next political settlement guarantees a genuine federal arrangement that recognizes the region’s uniqueness and grants its people authority over decision-making and resources.

Thus, the Hadrami message appeared twofold: acceptance of coalition support as a security guarantor, coupled with an insistence on Hadramawt’s right to determine its political future.

The question remains: Is Saudi Arabia merely seeking to restore stability, or is it engineering a different kind of settlement for Hadramawt?

Scenarios for Hadramawt’s Future

Despite broad agreement on the priority of internal stability and far-reaching self-rule, Hadramawt’s residents hold divergent views on the optimal political arrangement for the governorate. “It is not possible to speak of the Hadramis as a single political bloc,” says Nabhan bin Nabhan, a researcher at the American University in Cairo, in comments to Alhurra.

Many residents favor remaining within a Yemeni—or southern—state, provided Hadramawt enjoys extensive autonomy. Others, however, are drawn to the idea of full independence or even “joining Saudi Arabia” to spare the population “the problems of Yemenis, north and south,” as Hadrami political activist Omar bin Hellabi puts it.

Bassam Dahi, a university professor from Hadramawt, advocates a vision that blends Hadrami identity with a broader southern framework. He sees the solution in a “strong Hadramawt within a southern federal system” that preserves its uniqueness and grants it local decision-making authority. He warns that the independence option, though attractive to some, is fraught with the risk of becoming a “fragile entity in constant need of external protection or masked guardianship.”

Similarly, Bin Nabhan argues that instead of pursuing an isolated entity, Hadramawt can be an effective partner within a larger state. He notes that Yemen’s experience with unification and the failure to implement federalism have rendered federalism within a unified Yemen largely theoretical.

By contrast, Bin Hellabi calls for granting Hadramawt full-fledged self-rule within a “federal Yemen,” retaining at least 80 percent of its resources, with 20 percent going to the central government.

Under such a formula, Bin Hellabi believes Hadramawt could become “the best and most successful region in Yemen, north and south,” given its potential. He adds, however: “Better than all of this would be to join the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and enjoy security, safety, and stability in a state with significant global weight.”

Guarantee or Guardianship?

The Saudi-led coalition now plays a direct role in Hadramawt following the expulsion of STC forces. Hadramis’ views of this role range from cautious welcome to calls for a full strategic partnership.

Dahi acknowledges the importance of the Saudi role, provided it remains within the framework of a temporary security partnership that strengthens local capacities without infringing on sovereign decision-making. “I accept a Saudi role as a temporary partnership that guarantees and supports local security,” he says; “a partnership that is transparent, has a well-defined timeframe, and free from guardianship.”

At the same time, Dahi draws red lines that must not be crossed lest the partnership turns into domination—chief among them the imposition of political decisions from outside, or the transformation of “military cover” into a tool for forcibly reshaping society.

Bin Nabhan, for his part, views Saudi Arabia as a source of support and stability amid a complex regional landscape. He stresses that a successful partnership is built on coordination, trust-building, and respect for the will of the local community. The more the Saudi role is “aligned with the aspirations of Hadrami society and complementary to its efforts to manage its own affairs,” he adds, the more acceptable and sustainable it will be.

Overall, Hadramawt commands significant Saudi attention. The decisive issue, however, is not the attention itself, but its nature, limits, and how it is translated on the ground.