Muscat is not only about centrifuges. It is also about Iran’s proxies, and Washington treated it that way from the start.
U.S. and Iranian envoys met Friday in Oman with a narrow purpose: preventing a regional war driven less by Iran’s nuclear program and more by the armed network Tehran uses to project power across Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Israel’s borders. A senior State Department official told MBN the goal was blunt. “This was about stopping momentum toward confrontation,” the official said. “There was no illusion of a breakthrough. The priority was to keep the channel open.”
Washington insists the real threat is Iran’s proxy structure, not the nuclear file. Tehran insists that the proxy structure is untouchable. Muscat reminded both sides that they are negotiating two different conflicts.
To anchor this framing, Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, told MBN the U.S. view has been consistent for years. “There are a series of obstacles to improved U.S.–Iran relations,” he said. “The nuclear program is only one of them. Iran’s missile program, its treatment of its own people, and its connection to nonstate actors across the region remain major concerns.”
Those “nonstate actors” form what Iran once branded the Axis of Resistance: Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas in Gaza. Shia militias in Iraq. The Houthis in Yemen, and a network of IRGC-linked groups stretching from Syria to the Gulf
Tehran views them as strategic depth, not bargaining chips. As Weitz put it: “These groups are really one of the core means of deterrence Iran thinks it has against the U.S. and Israel. The IRGC considers Hezbollah part of its own force. They will not give those up through negotiations.”
Inside Iran, state media openly showcases that red line. Muscat was sold domestically as a nuclear-only track designed to cap escalation and secure sanctions relief, while excluding missiles and proxies. Hardline outlets praised the exclusion as proof that Tehran forced Washington back into a narrower lane. The message was unmistakable: enrichment is flexible; proxies are not.
On the U.S. side, the debate is sharper. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argue that nuclear-only understanding leaves the core threat untouched. Others close to Steve Witkoff are described by officials as more willing to accept a narrow deal now and push the proxy fight to a later phase. President Trump continues to praise diplomacy while building military pressure.
Weitz says Washington’s calculus is tied directly to Iran’s battlefield losses. “Iran’s military is much weaker than before last June’s war,” he said. “Israel destroyed much of Iran’s air defenses. The U.S. hit major nuclear centers that haven’t been fully restored. Iran used up many of its ballistic missiles. That means the U.S. and Israel face less risk of retaliation.”
Tehran knows that perception is dangerous, so it counters displays of strength, including missile showcases and escalatory rhetoric timed to coincide with diplomatic tracks. Weitz describes this as Iran’s attempt to “push the image that they can inflict severe damage on Israel and the U.S., if not directly then through attacks on U.S. bases or by stirring up tensions among U.S. partners in the Gulf.”
The U.S. delegation to Muscat reflected this dual approach: diplomacy, backed by force. Alongside dealmakers sat in senior military leadership, including the CENTCOM commander. Weitz notes that this was intentional. “It reflects the U.S. desire to show Iran that if negotiations don’t go well, the U.S. could resort to military force. It is a visible reminder.”
Still, Muscat produced no shift on proxies. Weitz calls Iran’s position “non-negotiable unless forced by the Supreme Leader.” Even then, he says, Tehran would not dismantle the proxy network as part of a diplomatic bargain. “They’re going to have to be dealt with separately or contained,” he said. “The Iranians will not give them up.”
A Gulf diplomat told MBN the stakes were understood in every regional capital. Ending the channel would mean “the next phase is military, and everyone pays the price.” For now, that pressure has kept diplomacy alive.
But the structural divide remains.
From Washington’s perspective, Iran’s proxies are the confrontation. From Tehran’s perspective, they are the last functioning deterrent after a costly war. As Weitz summarized: “These groups are Iran’s advantage. They won’t trade that away.”
Muscat bought time. It did not touch the core conflict driving U.S.–Iran tensions.
Andres Ilves
Andres Ilves is Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at MBN. His career as a journalist and writer includes two decades at the BBC and Radio Free Europe.
Houda Elboukili
Houda Elboukili, an award-winning Moroccan investigative journalist based in the United States, holds a master’s degree in journalism and Institutional Media from the Higher Institute of Information and Communication in Rabat and a bachelor’s degree in economics from Cadi Ayyad University in Marrakesh.
