Talk of changes within Hezbollah is no longer limited to whispers behind the scenes or passing leaks. Information circulating—whether from figures within the leadership or from journalists close to the party—points to a phase of internal reorganization, taking place without any official announcement or formal organizational statement so far.
These developments come at an extremely sensitive moment for Lebanon and the region, following a war with Israel in which Hezbollah suffered what has been described as its heaviest loss since its founding. The impact of that loss was not confined to the military arena; it exposed deep breaches in the party’s security and organizational structures and sent shockwaves through its support base. According to observers, this has prompted the party to introduce changes in sensitive internal positions.
As the contours of these changes continue to emerge, they have become the subject of broad debate: are they evidence of a genuine transformation in the party’s structure and a gateway to repositioning itself on both the Lebanese and regional stages, or merely cosmetic adjustments aimed at absorbing the repercussions of defeat and buying time until the regional picture becomes clearer?
The Starting Point
The process began with leaked reports of the resignation of Wafiq Safa from his post as head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit—a figure who for decades represented Hezbollah’s most influential channel of leverage within Lebanon’s security and judicial institutions.
While the party moved quickly—through statements by Mahmoud Qomati, deputy head of the Political Council—to deny Safa’s marginalization, stressing that he remains part of the party’s “organizational core,” that the resignation concerned the position rather than membership, and that he would be “transferred to another role within the party,” observers say his departure from one of the most sensitive posts reflects a clear attempt to reduce confrontational front-line figures whose records have generated significant controversy. This includes threats directed at the lead investigative judge in the Beirut port blast, Judge Tarek Bitar, and the defiance of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s decision not to illuminate the Raouche Rock with an image of former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
A Transitional Phase
Available information indicates that Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem is working to implement a series of steps aimed at avoiding the mistakes of the previous phase, by tightening control over political, media, and security performance within more clearly defined and disciplined frameworks.
These directions come in light of what the results of the recent war revealed: structural flaws in security and intelligence performance, along with a widening gap between political assessments and realities on the ground. This has forced an internal review of decision-making mechanisms and operational management.
Following the war, the party found itself compelled to accept an agreement that observers described as tantamount to “surrender,” placing its weapons in question by stipulating their removal from all Lebanese territory in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
In this context, Ali al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Janoubia news website, explains that the underlying reasons behind the restructuring stem primarily from “the need to change what remains of the leadership circle surrounding former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, alongside the appointment of a new secretary-general who seeks to form a team aligned with his vision and style.”
In comments to Alhurra, al-Amin notes that “under Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General’s office was the center of decision-making, planning, and execution, with extensive authority and intense centralization—something that obliges Qassem to introduce changes in personnel, positions, and roles, as part of the natural transformations that accompany any leadership transition.”
Two Currents Within the Party
These developments intersect with a new domestic and international climate, led by the Lebanese government’s decision to restrict weapons to the authority of the state, based on the ceasefire agreement with Israel, the ministerial statement, and the inaugural address of the president.
Political analyst and journalist Youssef Diab believes the true reasons behind Hezbollah’s restructuring lie, at their core, in “an implicit acknowledgment of defeat in the recent war, and the party’s realization that it can no longer continue with the same approach it adopted before the war and before Nasrallah’s assassination.”
According to Diab, what is happening is closer to a symbolic repositioning, as two clear currents have now emerged within the party:
- A hardline core, represented by Safa and what are known as the “hotheads,” which calls for escalation in confronting state measures and mobilization in the streets, even to the point of threatening civil war.
- A more pragmatic bloc, represented by Qassem and a number of political figures within the party, including head of the Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc Mohammad Raad and former minister Mohammad Fneish, which argues that the current phase requires a different approach and avoiding confrontation with the presidencies of the republic and the government.
Diab also points, in remarks to Alhurra, to an additional factor: “the position of Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri is no longer as aligned with the party as it once was,” which, he says, explains why Qassem emphasized in his most recent speech the continuation of the alliance with the Amal Movement.
Security and Political Changes
The changes within Hezbollah have not been limited to the Liaison and Coordination Unit. According to media reports, they have extended to other security nodes, most notably the Protection Unit. This move is seen as part of an effort to tighten control over the security apparatus and reorganize it after the major breach the party suffered—reflected, and still reflected, in a series of assassinations targeting its leaders and cadres.
There is also talk of scenarios involving a reordering of the party’s leadership hierarchy. Among them is the proposal to appoint Mohammad Raad as deputy secretary-general, with the leadership of the parliamentary bloc passing to MP Hassan Fadlallah, while assigning a senior leadership role to Fneish. Reports also suggest a move to task MP Ibrahim Mousawi with overseeing the party’s media institutions, in an attempt to address the inconsistencies that characterized messaging and positions in the previous period.
In this context, al-Amin argues that the party “is still experiencing a clear state of confusion, stemming from its inability to settle its major strategic choices,” questioning whether it is a party that possesses weapons or one moving toward relinquishing them; a resistance movement or a civilian Lebanese political party; a national entity or an extension of a regional project linked to Iran.
Restructuring or Repositioning?
Former MP Fares Saeed does not believe that what Hezbollah is witnessing today falls within the framework of routine “restructuring” or a simple handover of responsibilities and sidelining of certain leaders. In a post on the X platform, he wrote: “We are not dealing with the Green Party in Scandinavia, but with the fiercest and most hardened party in the region’s history,” arguing that what is taking place is “undoubtedly a delineation of power centers and wings” within the party.
As for the possibility of Hezbollah abandoning its weapons and transforming into a fully political party, Diab dismisses this scenario, arguing that the decision does not lie with the party itself but with Tehran. He notes that Qassem’s statements—particularly his assertion that the party “is not neutral in any battle against Iran”—confirm that “the weapons will remain a regional card used within the framework of a broader conflict.”
Diab concludes that a full picture of these transformations “will remain postponed until the outcome of the confrontation between U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other, becomes clear,” given the direct repercussions this struggle will have on the roles of affiliated forces in the region, foremost among them Hezbollah.
Al-Amin, for his part, believes the party faces a genuine existential challenge. “Relinquishing weapons,” he argues, “given its ideological structure and the nature of its founding, would effectively mean the end of its existence.” At the same time, he notes that the party also stands before a pivotal opportunity: “Can it transform into a Lebanese political party committed to the state and the requirements of its sovereignty, instead of being tied to a foreign state?”
So far, according to al-Amin, the party does not appear ready, able, or bold enough “to conduct a comprehensive self-critical review of what happened during its most recent war with Israel and the period preceding it.” He stresses that “between the option of restructuring and the option of reproducing itself through the same mechanisms, the scene remains open to contradictory possibilities—awaiting a decisive regional moment that will determine the features of the next phase.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
