At Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport, flight announcements mingle with quick embraces between those saying goodbye and expectant smiles on the faces of arrivals. Passports are stamped, planes take off one after another into Beirut’s sky, as if sending reassuring messages that life is proceeding as usual.
A few kilometers away, at the Port of Beirut, cranes move over shipping containers as though defying the heavy memory of the 2020 explosion. Ships dock and others depart; an unceasing rhythm suggests that the economy, though exhausted, is still breathing.
Yet behind this everyday scene looms a darker image: an empty runway, grounded aircraft with no destination, ships halted at the quays, and a heavy silence settling over facilities that once buzzed with life. This scenario could move from speculation to reality if reports circulating about Israeli threats to target Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure materialize—should Hezbollah become involved in a potential U.S.–Iran confrontation—according to Reuters.
Warning Signals
The escalating tension between Washington and Tehran has thrust Lebanon back into the center of regional calculations. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s declaration that the group “is not neutral” in any potential confrontation has narrowed the space for domestic reassurance and raised questions about the state’s ability to keep the country out of conflict.
By contrast, Agence France-Presse quoted a Hezbollah official as saying that military intervention would not occur if U.S. strikes were “limited,” while stressing that any attack aimed at toppling Iran’s regime or targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would constitute a “red line.”
The U.S. State Department’s decision to evacuate non-essential personnel from its embassy in Beirut—while maintaining a Level-Four travel warning—heightened anxiety. Although described as a precautionary step, the move reflected an American assessment of potential security risks.
Subsequently, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji announced that warnings had been received about the possibility of Israel targeting infrastructure should Hezbollah intervene in the war, emphasizing that Beirut is pursuing diplomatic efforts to avert such an outcome.
At the same time, Lebanese media reported that an Israeli official denied any intention to target infrastructure, sparking a domestic debate between those reassured and those remaining cautious.
Government’s Options
Lebanon’s authorities have intensified international contacts in an attempt to secure a political umbrella that would prevent the country from sliding into an open confrontation.
Minister of State for Administrative Development Fadi Makki told Alhurra that the cornerstone lies in the government’s decision to reserve the authority over war and peace exclusively to the state. “This is a decision that has been taken and will not be reversed,” he said, noting that the state previously succeeded in shielding Lebanon from the repercussions of the Iranian–Israeli confrontation last June. “I believe there is awareness among all parties of the need to remain neutral and avoid any involvement.”
Regarding reports of threats conveyed to Lebanese officials about infrastructure, Makki said, “I have not heard of that.”
Retired Brigadier General Chamel Roukoz likewise views confining the decision of war and peace to the government as a critical step. Speaking to Alhurra, he called for a “diplomatic state of emergency” toward key capitals to fortify Lebanon and prevent it from being targeted.
Weakest Link
Observers fear that regional headwinds may prove stronger than the state’s decision to monopolize war-and-peace authority, allowing axis-based calculations to eclipse institutions and once again drag Lebanon into a confrontation it cannot bear.
Political analyst and journalist Youssef Diab argues that the Lebanese state’s options in the event of a U.S.–Iran confrontation are extremely limited. At best, he says, it could attempt to “play the role of mediator between Hezbollah and the United States, in the hope of sparing Lebanon from entering the war.”
Diab stresses to Alhurra that Hezbollah’s decision to participate in any confrontation is not tied to state calculations or the interests of Lebanese citizens, “but rather stems from its ideological, political, and military alignment with Iran. Consequently, if it is asked to enter the war, it will turn Lebanon into a battlefield, with the state having no real ability to prevent it.”
Roukoz, by contrast, believes Hezbollah is unlikely to initiate involvement in a potential war for reasons of capacity and interest—unless fighting is imposed on Lebanon. He warns, however, that “any intervention by the party would place the country in a disastrous situation, with massive human and economic losses.”
According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, more than 4,000 people were killed and around 17,000 wounded during the most recent war between Hezbollah and Israel, which began in October 2023 with Hezbollah’s “support” for Gaza, escalated into a wide confrontation in September 2024, and ended in November of that year with a ceasefire agreement.
Following a meeting chaired by its leader, MP Sami Gemayel, the political bureau of the Kataeb Party expressed “grave concern over statements by Hezbollah officials about their readiness to support Tehran if it is subjected to a military strike,” along with reports of field movements by officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and elements linked to Palestinian organizations in Hezbollah-controlled areas, as well as the widening scope of Israeli airstrikes inside Lebanese territory.
Role of the Lebanese Army
“Lebanese people live in a rapidly changing region experiencing historic turning points, and amid the surrounding risks it is neither in their interest nor acceptable,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said, “for Lebanon to be dragged into an adventure or a new war.” He expressed hope that “everyone will act with reason and rationality, placing Lebanon’s interest above all others.”
Should conditions deteriorate, Roukoz notes that “the Lebanese Army operates under the decision of the political authority,” adding that “the government has declared a clear position regarding the issue of illegal weapons.”
Diab believes the army is unlikely to be part of any confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah “unless a clear government decision assigns it that role,” which he considers improbable given the nature of the conflict. He cautions, however, that “any direct attack on state institutions could impose a different reality, as happened days ago when the Israeli army issued warnings to Lebanese military positions, prompting field preparations in anticipation of possible targeting.”
It is worth noting that the Lebanese Army has requested a four-month extension to implement the second phase of its plan to confine weapons north of the Litani River, after announcing completion of the mission south of the river. Hezbollah has reaffirmed its refusal to hand over its weapons north of the Litani, placing the state before complex political and security challenges.
Cost of a Military Adventure
Experts warn that any renewed targeting of Lebanon’s infrastructure could set the country back years. The cost, they say, would not be solely military, but comprehensive—economic and social.
Khaled Abu Chakra, a researcher at the Lebanese Institute for Market Studies, warns that any new strikes “could again hit the airport, bridges, roads, and water sources, leading to rapid economic paralysis and Lebanon’s effective isolation, especially as the electricity sector already suffers from chronic collapse.”
Abu Chakra told Alhurra that “the economy recorded growth in 2025 of between 3.5 and 5 percent, with GDP rising to between $32 and $36 billion and a surplus in the balance of payments. However, the cost of the 2024 war was estimated at no less than $14 billion, including $11 billion in direct losses.”
Any new escalation, he argues, “would wipe out the economic progress achieved, threaten monetary stability, undermine the tourism season, and push the economy into a new contraction, with rising unemployment and poverty.”
For his part, Diab says the Lebanese authorities—along with citizens—“would bear the cost of any escalation, whether through the destruction of homes and the displacement of hundreds of thousands, or the targeting of vital infrastructure.” He adds that “the Lebanese state will also find itself burdened with trying to contain the war if it erupts.”
Roukoz concludes that Lebanon’s priority “must be to secure its place within any regional trajectory toward de-escalation or peace—so that it becomes a partner in this transformation, not an arena for settling others’ scores or paying the price of their conflicts.”
Lebanon is moving across a political and military minefield. At Beirut’s airport, passengers are still waiting for their flights. At the port, ship traffic remains active. But the question many are asking is: how long can this semblance of normalcy withstand the region’s winds?
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
