The Lebanese army has completed the first phase of restricting Hezbollah’s weapons south of the Litani River, in a move that appeared to close a sensitive chapter that had remained open for years.
The army deployed according to the approved plan, and the state appeared to be asserting its presence in an area that had long constituted a real test of its sovereignty.
Yet no sooner had the south-of-the-Litani file been closed than a more complex phase was opened: restricting weapons north of the Litani, extending up to the Awali River. Here, redrawing deployment lines on a map is no longer sufficient. The issue goes beyond geography into the heart of Lebanon’s internal political and security balances, raising a critical question: can the army carry out its mission without sliding into a confrontation with Hezbollah?
In this sense, the area spanning the southern and northern banks of the Litani becomes a quintessential political testing ground. It is not merely an additional zone on a deployment chart, but a fault line between a state seeking to consolidate its monopoly on the use of force across all its territory and a party that views its weapons as part of a deterrence equation extending beyond Lebanon’s borders.
A More Sensitive Phase
Army Commander Rudolf Heikal’s presentation to the Council of Ministers on February 16 was not merely a technical briefing, but a declaration of entry into the second – and most complex – phase. Implementation, as outlined, would require no less than four months, given the area’s sensitivity and its intertwined security and political dynamics.
Hezbollah’s response was swift. Its Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, said that the government’s focus on disarming weapons constituted a “grave sin,” arguing that it served Israeli and U.S. objectives. The stance reflects a categorical rejection of including the party’s weapons north of the Litani in any implementation track.
Writer and journalist Majd Bou Majed, however, told Alhurra that Hezbollah’s handover of its remaining weapons “is not a decision made by the party itself, but by the Iranian regime, which to this day refuses to relinquish these arms.”
Strategic expert retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb said army leadership needs sufficient time to prepare for the next phase. Speaking to Alhurra, he noted that the timeline could extend to eight months at the request of ministers from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, pending greater clarity on the regional landscape and its repercussions for Lebanon’s internal scene.
Hezbollah bases its refusal to surrender its weapons on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for an area free of unauthorized weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani River – while ignoring that the same resolution incorporates Resolution 1559, which mandates the disarmament of all militias across all Lebanese territory.
The party also links any discussion of its weapons to prior conditions, foremost among them Israel’s withdrawal from positions it occupies in southern Lebanon, a halt to its targeting of Hezbollah leaders and members, and the release of detained Lebanese nationals.
Open Scenarios
Observers believe the coming phase holds three main possibilities: the army successfully implements the plan with international backing; internal tensions escalate into friction between the army and Hezbollah; or Israel launches a wide-scale military operation aimed at forcibly disarming the party.
Bou Majed rules out the prospect of direct confrontation between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, arguing that the authorities “have not taken a decision to confront the party in recent months and will not do so at this stage.”
He expects implementation of the weapons-confinement plan to remain slow or in a holding pattern, “pending developments that may ease Hezbollah’s hardline opposition to restricting what remains of its weapons, or curb its residual political influence at home.”
Malaeb, by contrast, outlines scenarios that could facilitate the army’s mission, including “a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal from specific points, Hezbollah adopting an approach of leaving the task to the army as occurred south of the Litani, or the spillover of any regional de-escalation into Lebanon.”
The electoral factor also figures into the calculus, Malaeb says. “If elections are held under the current law, allowing the party to consolidate its parliamentary presence and strengthen its bloc, it may opt to tactically pass this phase – placing responsibility on the state for reconstruction and for consolidating the cessation of hostilities – thereby reducing the cost of direct confrontation at this sensitive juncture.”
The Regional Dimension
Lebanon’s trajectory cannot be separated from the regional context. U.S. President Donald Trump said Thursday that “Lebanon’s problem must be solved,” signaling Washington’s focus on the issue of illicit weapons.
In the same vein, Trump set a timeline for deciding whether to continue pursuing a diplomatic track with Iran or to order a military strike. Speaking during the first meeting of the Peace Council he formed in Washington on Thursday, he said he could decide within 10 days, warning Tehran that “bad things will happen” if an agreement is not reached.
Against this backdrop, Malaeb points to a striking paradox: “The declared headline of this phase is negotiations between Iran and the United States, politically framed as a gateway to peace, while in practice there is mutual military mobilization by Washington and Tehran that raises the likelihood of confrontation.” He argues that this contradiction between political rhetoric and developments on the ground imposes its rhythm on Lebanon’s internal scene and constrains its options, ruling out any flexibility from Hezbollah at this stage.
Bou Majed, for his part, believes that any reliance by Hezbollah or Iran on a deal with the U.S. administration to preserve Hezbollah’s weapons “is misplaced, because the Trump administration is firm in demanding that the Lebanese state monopolize arms.” He maintains that the Hezbollah file will not be part of any U.S.–Iran negotiations.
Bou Majed concludes that the partial success achieved south of the Litani should be followed by a comprehensive step that enshrines the state’s monopoly on weapons across all Lebanese regions – without waiting for external shifts – despite the severity of the political challenges domestically and regionally at this stage.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
