From the waters of the Red Sea to the Ethiopian plateau, a file is taking shape that could redraw maps of influence in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia’s renewed ambition to secure maritime access.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said during the African Union summit held last Saturday and Sunday that his country “cannot continue as a landlocked state,” stressing that the security and stability of the Horn of Africa are tied to Ethiopia obtaining a sea outlet.
The Ethiopian prime minister’s remarks have further heated an already volatile regional scene, where the potential secession of southern Yemen, divergences between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Israel’s recognition of “Somaliland” as an independent state, and intensifying competition over the Red Sea as a vital artery for global trade and energy all intersect.
While Addis Ababa frames its demand for access to the sea as a developmental and security necessity, neighboring capitals fear that this ambition could become a gateway to reshaping sovereignty maps across the region.
As a result, the Horn of Africa stands on a hot plate – caught between the provisions of international law that guarantee transit rights for landlocked states and the power calculations that govern geopolitics.
All of this threatens to generate additional tensions in the Horn of Africa and raises the risk of the region sliding into new armed conflicts.
The Legacy of 1993
Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has lost its maritime outlet, becoming the world’s largest landlocked country by population.
This shift was not merely geographic; it carried deep strategic implications and constituted one of the roots of the long war between the two countries. That conflict was later followed by internal upheavals, most notably the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which ended with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in 2022.
In recent weeks, however, signs of renewed tension have emerged in northern Ethiopia amid mutual accusations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, reflecting the fragility of the post-reconciliation balance.
In January 2024, Ethiopia signed an agreement with the Somaliland region recognizing its independence in exchange for the right to use a 20-kilometer coastal strip at the port of Berbera on the Red Sea for 50 years, as well as granting the region a 20 percent stake in Ethiopian Airlines.
Somalia swiftly and forcefully rejected the agreement. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud described the move as a “blatant violation” of Somali sovereignty, asserting that “no one can take a single inch of Somalia.” Mogadishu recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia for consultations before the Somali president signed legislation annulling the agreement. In December 2024, the two sides reached an understanding following a round of Turkish-mediated talks in Ankara that brought together the Somali president and the Ethiopian prime minister. The calm, however, was short-lived, as tensions soon resurfaced.
Escalation Between Two Neighbors
Days ago, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of occupying Ethiopian territory along their shared border. In a message sent this month to his Eritrean counterpart Osman Saleh, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos described the Eritrean military presence as “a clear act of aggression,” not merely a border provocation.
Addis Ababa demanded the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces and called for an end to any potential cooperation with armed groups inside Ethiopia, while expressing readiness to enter “good-faith” negotiations to resolve outstanding issues – foremost among them Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea through Eritrea’s port of Assab.
Mahmoud Abubakar, an Eritrean journalist and Horn of Africa researcher, told Alhurra that Eritrea “has no objection to reaching an agreement with Ethiopia on the use of ports.” He noted that agreements signed in 1993, when Eritrea gained independence, granted Ethiopia “safe and free access to the sea” until 1998, when Addis Ababa unilaterally froze them following the border dispute over the Badme Triangle and shifted instead to Djibouti’s port.
He explained that the agreement was renewed in 2018 after relations were restored, “but the Ethiopian demand goes beyond using ports to owning them – and that is something no state in the region would accept.” He added: “Using military force to obtain ports is a violation of international law and the principle of sovereignty, and it would set an unprecedented precedent for redrawing borders, potentially opening the door to similar claims by more than 16 landlocked African states and 44 countries worldwide.”
The Turkish Move
Amid these developments, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Addis Ababa last Tuesday – his first in more than a decade.
During the visit, Erdoğan stressed the need to prevent the Horn of Africa from becoming an arena for foreign power rivalry, underscoring the importance of regional solutions and strengthening economic partnerships.
The Turkish move coincided with talk of undisclosed security and economic coordination between Ankara, Cairo, and Riyadh, based on a dual approach: safeguarding stability and maritime navigation in the Red Sea while bolstering economic interests to prevent the region from sliding into open confrontation.
Between Law and Reality
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – specifically Article 125 – stipulates the right of landlocked states to access the sea through safe and effective corridors, provided this is done through agreement with the states concerned and in full respect of their sovereignty.
In this context, Dr. Mohamed Mehran, a professor of international law, explained that the text grants a “right of transit passage,” not a “right of ownership or sovereignty,” meaning that any arrangements must be based on bilateral or multilateral agreements rather than the imposition of a new geographic reality.
For his part, Mohamed Al-Arousi, an Ethiopian member of parliament and adviser to Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy, told Alhurra that achieving sustainable economic growth depends on exporting agricultural and industrial products as well as hydropower generated by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which provides low-cost electricity to the entire region. He added that the loss of direct access to the sea since Eritrea’s independence in 1993 has forced near-total reliance on Djibouti’s ports – costing the Ethiopian economy billions of dollars annually in transit fees and logistics, according to World Bank reports.
Between the texts of international law, economic calculations, and maritime security concerns in the Red Sea, Ethiopia’s quest for a sea outlet remains one of the most complex files in the Horn of Africa.
Any unilateral approach could open the door to broader tensions, while regional stability appears contingent on the ability of the region’s states to craft collective arrangements that balance transit rights with respect for sovereignty – and prevent geography from becoming the spark of a new conflict.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
