Each time tensions escalate in the region, Lebanon returns to the forefront of difficult questions. A country burdened by chronic crises once again finds itself standing at the edge of the most dangerous possibility: being transformed into a battlefield in a conflict that transcends its geographic and political boundaries.
That possibility has grown heavier following a statement by Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who declared that the party “is not neutral” if Iran were to be attacked by the United States.
At the same time, field indicators are intensifying. U.S. aircraft carriers and military assets are arriving one after another in the Middle East, a scene that reflects a heightened level of readiness and preparation for open-ended scenarios. Against this backdrop, the region appears trapped in an extremely sensitive equation: escalating deterrence messages and fault lines that could ignite at any moment.
Inside Lebanon, a more pressing question rises between decision and capability: where does Hezbollah stand? Does it possess the will and readiness to engage in a confrontation of this kind after its most recent round with Israel – one that resulted in a major defeat, military attrition, and mounting political pressure over the issue of confining weapons to the state? And more importantly, can Lebanon – economically and socially exhausted – bear the cost of once again becoming an arena for settling regional scores beyond its will and capacity?
Who Pulls the Trigger?
Amid rapidly escalating regional tensions, and with U.S. President Donald Trump repeatedly threatening a military strike against Iran unless an agreement is reached on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies – and after setting a ten-day deadline to decide whether to continue diplomacy or order a strike – the most sensitive question returns to the Lebanese arena: will Hezbollah drag the country into a new “support war”?
Observers stress that Hezbollah’s decision to enter a new confrontation with Israel is not made in Haret Hreik in Beirut’s southern suburbs, but rather formulated in Tehran, given the group’s role as one of Iran’s most prominent military arms outside its borders and a key component of its regional strategy. Among those making this argument is retired Brigadier General George Nader, a strategic expert, who affirmed this view in an interview with Alhurra.
Political analyst Elias Zoghbi likewise told Alhurra that Hezbollah “no longer controls its own military or political decision.” He argued that “if the decision were left to the party itself – whether to engage in war or not – it would certainly choose not to become involved, fully aware of the magnitude of the losses it would incur, especially in human terms among its fighters, leadership, and support base.”
However, Zoghbi added, the issue goes beyond internal calculations. In his view, the party is tied “to the core” to the decision of Iran’s Supreme Leader, citing former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s description of Hezbollah as “a soldier in the guardianship of the jurist.”
In parallel, Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper reported that Tehran – unlike during the “Twelve-Day War” – is this time seeking to involve Hezbollah in any future confrontation with Israel. The newspaper quoted Israeli officials as warning Hezbollah that any military intervention would expose it to a devastating strike.
Between Will and Capability
Even if a decision were made in Tehran for Hezbollah to enter the war should it erupt, Nader raises a key question: does the party still possess the actual ability to implement such a decision under its current conditions?
Nader answers that Hezbollah today does not have the same capabilities it enjoyed before October 2023. He points to a significant decline in its military capacity, “both in manpower and armaments,” noting that “its room for maneuver inside Lebanon has narrowed due to pressure from the Lebanese Army, while Israeli aircraft continue their intensive overflights of the south, limiting its ability to initiate or maneuver.”
He also notes that “Israel is carrying out near-daily strikes targeting party members, officials, and what remains of its military infrastructure and missile arsenal, benefiting from clear technological and intelligence superiority, as well as security breaches – factors that further contribute to Hezbollah’s attrition.”
Zoghbi likewise believes that Hezbollah no longer possesses the combat capability it had at the height of the early stages of the “support war” it launched against Israel “by direct order of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.” As a result, any new war undertaken in defense of Iran would be, in his words, “less influential and less effective than before.”
Deterrence Messages… and Warnings
Reuters reported that senior U.S. national security officials informed Trump that “the military is ready to carry out potential strikes against Iran starting Saturday,” though the timeline for any military action could extend beyond the end of the weekend, according to sources familiar with the matter cited by CBS News.
Meanwhile, the Israeli army has raised its level of readiness in anticipation of a scenario involving a U.S. strike on Iran, and the possibility of an Iranian retaliatory response targeting Israel directly or through other arenas, including Lebanon.
In this context, the commander of Israel’s Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Rafi Milo, said in remarks broadcast by Israel’s Channel 12 last January that the army is on maximum alert in anticipation of any escalation, adding: “We do not know where this is heading.”
Zoghbi believes that any Hezbollah involvement in a new war would be met with an Israeli response “far harsher and more painful than before – and would represent a tragic end for the party and a devastating loss for Lebanon.” He argues that Israel may view any upcoming confrontation as its final opportunity to eliminate the threat of the “Iranian arm” on its northern border.
He recalls the experiences of the July 2006 war and the 2023–2024 “support war,” noting that Israel fought “two incomplete wars, achieving what could be described as half-victories, while matters remained unresolved – as if there were a managed stalemate that allowed Hezbollah to retain military power that waxed and waned.” Today, he says, Israel is seeking to “settle the situation once and for all, especially if a war with Iran breaks out.”
For his part, Nader stresses that “any military move by Hezbollah will be met with a harsh Israeli response,” meaning the cost of engaging in a new confrontation would be far higher than at any previous stage.
The Cost of an Explosion
Lebanon is experiencing a sharp internal divide over the prospect of Hezbollah’s military involvement in a regional confrontation. Between those who see any escalation as defending a strategic position within a broader regional axis, and those who believe that tying the country to a conflict between Iran and the United States would burden it with the consequences of a war it neither decided nor can withstand, the internal rift is deepening at an exceptionally fragile moment.
In this context, Hezbollah’s recent statements about not remaining neutral sparked a wave of political criticism centered on the need to neutralize Lebanon and prevent it from being dragged into another war.
Nader believes that any military involvement by the party “will lead to the loss of whatever popular or political cover it still has, amid deep internal divisions and a decline in public sentiment – even within its own base, which had previously supported military adventures.”
He warns that the country, already suffocating under financial, economic, and social crises, is incapable of bearing the cost of an additional conflict, arguing that any escalation would place Lebanon before existential risks that go far beyond the military dimension.
Economic expert Professor Jassem Ajaka, for his part, notes that 2026 “is not an ordinary year in Lebanon’s history.” He points to a World Bank report confirming that the country is still suffering the repercussions of the 2024 war, which drained the state treasury by approximately $8.5 billion and resulted in the loss of more than a third of GDP – making any talk of resilience “closer to economic fantasy.”
Regarding the most affected sectors, Ajaka told Alhurra that tourism and agriculture – two pillars of the Lebanese economy – “have suffered devastating blows, with thousands of hectares of farmland damaged, while the tourism sector struggles to survive amid ongoing tensions.”
As for infrastructure, he said, “it is on the verge of collapse. Power generation plants are nearly shut down, hospitals are suffering acute shortages of staff and equipment, and in the event of a full-scale war, displacement would not merely be a logistical nightmare, but could turn into a humanitarian catastrophe.”
On the ground, signs of public anxiety are already emerging, Ajaka added, through “pre-emptive displacement and daily panic,” coinciding with rising fuel prices and the introduction of new taxes to support the public sector.
Zoghbi, however, offers a contrasting reading, arguing that Hezbollah’s involvement in the war would entail “loss and gain at the same time. The loss would be the widespread destruction of lives and property; the gain would be Lebanon’s liberation from the grip of the party’s weapons, which have exhausted the country for at least three decades.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
