Trump’s Board of Peace has a plan to stabilize Gaza. Experts say it may be built on sand.
The “Comprehensive Plan to End the Conflict in Gaza” contains gaps that are alarming experts and observers, particularly in the security files, which appear disconnected from reality on the ground. At the heart of these concerns is the challenge of disarming armed factions, specifically Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the reliance on an international stabilization force whose role and rules of engagement remain undefined, and the push to build a new, inexperienced police force in an environment saturated with weapons.
Experts warn that the combination could turn Gaza into another Iraq.
In Washington, that comparison carries weight. Reconstruction that outpaces security can entrench parallel armed power rather than neutralize it. The sequencing error of post-2003 Iraq still shapes how U.S. policymakers evaluate stabilization plans.
The security track is widely seen as the plan’s most fragile pillar. Samir Hulileh, a Palestinian economist and former minister, argues that the current trajectory is replicating the 2003 Iraq model that led to state collapse. Hulileh notes that recruiting and training approximately 2,000 young police officers will take at least six months, while the future of roughly 16,800 Palestinian Authority police officers in Gaza, along with the remnants of Hamas’s former civil police force, remains undefined.
“This reminds us of the U.S. decision in 2003 to dissolve the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification,” Hulileh said. He warns that deliberately sidelining existing forces will carry severe consequences. “Practically speaking, when you have 30,000 to 40,000 trained men in the streets of Gaza, with no food, no work, and you don’t include them in the plan, who are you leaving them to? They will turn to extremism, and if they get weapons, they will carry out attacks. That is exactly what happened in Iraq.”
On the ground, the first phase has already begun. Two thousand Palestinians have registered to serve in the new police force, which is being trained in Egypt and Jordan, with a long-term target of 12,000 personnel. The National Committee for Administering Gaza is still operating out of Cairo, unable to function inside the Strip due to security complications and ongoing Israeli restrictions, including the ban on dual-use materials, which continues to stall serious reconstruction. Hulileh argues that lifting the blockade and opening the crossings are prerequisites for any implementation to take hold.
The international stabilization force raises its own questions. Indonesia has committed 8,000 troops, but the mandate of the force remains vague. It is still unclear whether these troops will monitor or actively enforce security inside Gaza’s neighborhoods, a distinction that matters enormously on the ground.
The deeper complication is disarmament. The Board of Peace is demanding complete disarmament, a condition Israel also insists on. Hamas, for its part, speaks of “collecting weapons” rather than surrendering them. Hulileh believes full disarmament cannot be imposed from outside. “No Islamic or Arab actor will risk going into any kind of confrontation, small or large, with Hamas,” he said. His assessment is that Hamas may ultimately manage its own weapons collection, but only if given sufficient political incentives to do so.
The plan’s fragility also reflects regional tensions playing out behind the scenes. Experts who spoke to Alhurra say sensitivities between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have affected implementation. Abu Dhabi’s central role, operating through Mohammed Dahlan and his network inside the National Committee, has contributed to a cautious Saudi posture. Riyadh’s financial contribution stands at one billion dollars; a figure analysts read as a signal: the Kingdom is rejecting arrangements that bypass formal state institutions and is wary of reconstruction becoming a venue for proxy influence rather than a path to genuine stability.
Hulileh also attributes the plan’s weaknesses to fragmentation inside the U.S. State Department. Officials in Washington, he said, “are dealing with Putin and Ukraine, then rushing to Iran, then back to Gaza,” leaving the team overseeing the Gaza file scattered and unable to focus on the precise, high-stakes details that will ultimately determine whether this plan holds.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Rami Al Amine
A Lebanese writer and journalist living in the United States. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from the Faculty of Religious Sciences at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of the poetry collection “I Am a Great Poet” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2007); the political pamphlet “Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South” (Lebanese Plans, 2008); a book on social media titled “The Facebookers” (Dar Al-Jadeed, 2012); and “The Pakistanis: A Statue’s Biography” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2024).
